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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis explores how new materialism might be approached and redefined 
within posthumanist literary studies, so that Samuel Beckett and Tadeusz Kantor can 
be read as the theoreticians of the poetics and performativity of the matter.
1
 As I en-
deavour to prove, their works become speculative spaces whose territories are ven-
tured in a two-fold purpose. They might be visited in order to challenge the dominant 
linguistic / material binary and thereafter to provide powerful material imagery, ex-
panding our perception of human and nonhuman agencies. Yet, they might also func-
tion more radically, occupying the limits of language itself; when that is the case, 
Beckett’s and Kantor’s works turn out to be “machines” that produce material and 
discursive relations which undergo profound mutual transformations and redistribu-
tions in time and space. In this sense, as this dissertation aspires to show, both artistic 
projects might temporarily suspend the primacy of the representation-oriented para-
digm, but also destabilise historically granted anthropocentric positions of a reader, 
spectator, author, or subject. 
The framework I propose consists of several minor projects, both critical and 
affirmative. Firstly, this thesis aims at reconstructing and describing onto-
epistemological and ontological interventions in the contemporary humanities, which 
have gained significant attention recently. Secondly, it attempts to confront these 
tendencies with literary criticism, which for many of their representatives has long 
                                                             
1
 In my readings of Kantor I will focus exclusively on the following works from his “theatre of death” 
period: The Dead Class, Wielopole, Wielopole, Let the Artists Die, and I Shall Never Return. Follow-
ing his late cricotage from 1987, Kantor reformulates his position as “the theatre of love and death.” I 
refrain from adopting this term primarily because the Freudian connotations of the theatre of love and 
death might lead to unnecessary inconveniences. See: Marta Kufel, “Błędne Betlejem” Tadeusza 
Kantora [Tadeusz Kantor’s “Faulty Bethlehem”] (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2013), pp. 259-
264. 
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appeared irreconcilable with their either material or ontological orientations. Thirdly, 
this dissertation endeavours to re-read the selected works by Becket and Kantor, 
keeping in mind their indebtedness to such tropes as dwelling, archive, history, 
memory, animality, the end of the world, or even environmental crises. Finally, as 
both oeuvres emphasise the importance of a fleeing and non-linguistic plane, they 
will be re-educated through the new materialist framework; hence, it will be possible 
to employ Beckett’s and Kantor’s works as the materialist and corporeal takes on the 
onto-epistemological rupture enacted by the Anthropocene and its implications that 
do not necessarily fall into “realist fantasies” but rather indicate the peculiar and al-
ien dynamics that underlies this event.  
Before we proceed, the perspective of this dissertation has to be clarified with 
regard to the aforementioned assumptions. On the one hand, this thesis cannot form 
an argument rooted in either literary history or comparative tradition. On the other, 
even though theatre and performance studies would probably provide this project 
with a beneficial intellectual horizon, their methodologies might be reductive in tack-
ling the abundant stories coded in the matter. Consequently, I rather locate my posi-
tion as founded on the relationship between literature and philosophy, and identify it 
simply as theoretical. The reason for that lies in the fact that despite the growing dis-
trust in the continental/analytical dyad among contemporary scholars, this thesis – 
sometimes even unwillingly – happens to be biased towards the continental aspect, 
which forecloses the great part of what we commonly recognise as “literary theory.” 
Furthermore, such a – seemingly vague – distinction makes it possible for me to re-
sort to both formalist and interpretative modes of analysis. 
Although Beckett and Kantor are rarely juxtaposed in literary and cultural 
analyses, there is intense complementarity between these authors. In fact, they be-
7 
 
 
 
 
long to the same generation that not only experienced the horrors of both world wars 
and industrialised genocide, but also faced intricate social and technological revolu-
tions, the reigns of postmodernity, and the ceasing significance of modernist para-
digms. On the one hand, these circumstances have led to an intense degree of self-
reflexivity and metafiction of their works. On the other hand, gestating in the shadow 
of these events, their oeouvres have commonly inclined to what Hans-Thies Leh-
mann calls postdramatic theatre, with its distinctive collapse of historical and narra-
tive teleologies, lack of linear temporality, and dissolution of fixed locations.
2
 For 
both Beckett and Kantor, space oscillates between being an isolated void and a 
crammed den, unravelling their shared fascination with the (after)lives of objects, 
things, remnants, and even machines. Time, respectively, turns into the figure of in-
tense condensation, containing irruprive repetitions, loops, and returns. Consequent-
ly, both authors contribute to re-thinking time and space as immanent qualities, 
which are constantly emerging and keep unravelling the difference. Beckett and Kan-
tor share the fascination with nonhuman beings that exist alongside dramatically de-
teriorated and mutilated human beings. Eventually, such weird spatio-temporalities 
allow them to put forward logics of coexistence and simultaneity; these two catego-
ries are employed to render human subjectivity as frail and failing, to construct ab-
stract figures of memory that does not belong to anyone, to devise absurdist imma-
nent landscapes, and to expose anthropocentric imagery to the excessive materiality 
of things.  
Many of these associations already endorse the other complementarity, name-
ly, that joining both Kantor and Beckett, and new materialism together. First of all, in 
                                                             
2
 Hans-Thies Lehmann, Postdramatic Theatre, trans. Karen Jürs-Munby (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2006), pp. 150-158. 
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both oeuvres, we might notice that the nonorganic, nonanimated, or simply nonhu-
man entities are provided with vibrant force or agency. Secondly, because of that, 
Kantor and Beckett share the distrust in narratives, if not in language itself. Thirdly, 
not only do they contest the fixed division into subject and object, but also they chal-
lenge various other instances of dualistic thinking, melting such binaries as public / 
private, history / memory, or I / the Other. Finally, just as new materialist thinkers, 
Beckett and Kantor hold to the transgressive corporealities that are by no means 
fixed, but rather porous or permeable, which is manifested in numerous transforma-
tive connections these are able to make. These circumstances, or points of reference, 
will accompany us through Kantor’s spectacles, and Beckett’s plays and prose, serv-
ing as their theoretical underpinnings. What becomes problematic at this point, how-
ever, is the dissonance between the significance of new materialism to feminist stud-
ies and the explicit androcentric ground of both oeuvres. After all, posthumanist in its 
method, new materialism has evolved from corporeal feminism, regarding the im-
portance of non-centralised materiality capable of detaching the female bodily speci-
ficity from the sexual and social means of oppression the patriarchy has grounded on 
it. As I am convinced, however, new materialism does not boil down to its feminist 
genealogy, but traverses through different corporeal orders, be it those of animal cor-
porealities, material environments, or embodied encounters with the vibrancy of 
things, to name a few. In spite of their androcentrism, Beckett and Kantor might be 
the partners in theoretical debates concerning these other orders, which allow us to 
capture their deconstruction of a subjective position as more direct and seemingly 
more productive.  
What also becomes problematic is the mere fact that Prismatic Theatres is not 
about theatres, wholly. Aside from the obvious inclusion of Kantor’s spectacles and 
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Beckett’s plays, the presence of the latter’s prose seems to indicate certain genre-
oriented inconsistencies. However, as I argue, Beckett’s novels and short stories are 
as theatrical as his dramatic pieces. Diachronically speaking, Beckett is devoted to 
abandoning and reworking the same topics over and over again, as if he could not 
find a suitable medium for the issues that preoccupied him. The most straightforward 
example is Not I, which to a great extent resembles a dramatisation of The Unnama-
ble and seems to be restaged as a poem in “what is the word.” By the same token, the 
disquietude of being observed that inspires Beckett’s Film is equally challenged in 
short stories, precisely “The Lost Ones” and “Ping,” whereas theatrical “Breath” cor-
responds to prose “neither.” There is yet another reason for such a choice of the title. 
Samuel Weber points out that theatricality relies on “irreducible opacity.”3 We read: 
When an event or series of events takes place without reducing the place 
it [has] “taken” to a purely neutral site, then that place reveals itself to be 
a “stage,” and those events become theatrical happenings. As the gerund 
here suggests […] such happenings never take place once and for all but 
are ongoing. This in turn suggests that they can neither be contained 
within the place where they unfold nor entirely separated from it. They 
can be said, then, in a quite literal sense, to come to pass. They take 
place, which means in a particular place, and yet simultaneously also 
pass away – not simply disappear but happen somewhere else. Out of the 
dislocations of its repetitions emerges nothing more or less than the sin-
gularity of the theatrical event.4 
Beckett’s prose discussed in this dissertation seems to mirror the logic Weber eluci-
dates. Despite their textual and conventional limits, “The Lost Ones,” “Ping,” or The 
Unnamable unduly set up a sui generis stage that conditions all the events presumed 
by a plot to take place and yet resists to be exhausted by these occurrences, rather 
                                                             
3
 Samuel Weber, “Introduction: Theatricality as Medium,” in: Theatricality as Medium (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2004), p. 7. Emphasis in the original. 
4
 Weber, “Introduction,” p. 7. Emphasis in the original. 
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marking them as temporary and undulating. These events, however, are also singular, 
as – and that will be exemplified by means of the matter’s vibrancy – each of them 
contributes autonomously to the (re)distribution of difference. This fact will be 
shown in the particular readings devoted to these texts.  
Whereas Weber rightly associates theatricality with “opacity,” I endeavour to 
render the “theatres” I discuss prismatic.5 Still, regardless of their clarity, prisms are 
opaque entities. In English, a prism designates a geometrical figure that is either an 
object or a fixedly delineated material space. However, such a solidity should not be 
taken for granted; etymologically speaking, a prism is derived from prisma and from 
prizein, which literally means “to saw.”6 Prisms are “cut objects” thereby entangled 
in the logic of fragility, remnants, indeterminacy, and dispersion. These two qualities 
indicate the uncanniness that – according to new materialism – resides in the matter. 
This trend’s return to the material does not pertain to the physical or the mundane, as 
its name might suggest; rather, new materialism posits matter within the interplay of 
dynamic forces and embodied encounters, of setting the limits and transgressing 
them, which necessarily involves vulnerability, fragility, and exposure. Finally, 
prisms signify optical devices partaking in the diffraction of light. Precisely, light 
captured in the prism makes the waves it consists of bend and ripple, changing its 
colours and trajectories. Diffraction, therefore, bears resemblance to materialisation, 
transformation, and redistribution. As it will be explored in this thesis, diffraction is 
also the theoretical stance of Karen Barad, a crucial thinker for new materialists, and 
                                                             
5
 In 2013, Jeffrey Jerome Cohen edited a captivating volume, entitled Prismatic Ecologies, attempting 
to provide new ways of thinking in environmental humanities, which relied on the colour metaphors, 
detaching ecology from its preoccupation with “greenness.” Although my dependence on the figure of 
a prism immensely differs in motivations and uses from Cohen’s, our shared new materialist and 
posthumanist orientations make our perspectives surprisingly close to each other. In this sense, Co-
hen’s proposition becomes one of the chief inspirations for this thesis. 
6
 Online Etymology Dictionary. Available at: http://www.etymonline.com (access: 20 February 2019). 
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it covers the transgressive process of boundary making. Diffraction as the category 
affects the modernist texts, vanguard spectacles, and contemporary theories dis-
cussed in this dissertation, making them ripple through each other; what becomes 
essential are their affirmative interplay and the possibility of creative experimenta-
tion, which might relocate the conceptual limits and establish new configurations for 
both new materialism and literary theory. 
Chapter 1, entitled When Did Language Lose Its Primacy? On Matter, Ob-
jects, and Things, is a theoretical introduction to contemporary ontological and onto-
epistemological tendencies in humanities and a general outline of the methodological 
perspective adopted and shaped in this thesis. Consequently, it discusses the key 
concepts of such thinkers as Karen Barad, Jane Bennet, Timothy Morton, Donna 
Haraway, and Serenella Iovino and Serpil Oppermann. At the same time, this chapter 
attempts to locate these notions within a greater framework of the Anthropocene, 
which for the purposes of this thesis is put forward mainly as an epistemological rup-
ture and a possibility of radical intimacy between humans and nonhumans. Eventual-
ly, the theoretical horizon of the chapter is collated with Jacques Derrida and Mau-
rice Merleau-Ponty in an endeavour to enhance the scope of the explored theories 
and to recognise their shared roots. 
 The following chapter, “Dark Crammed Holes”: Diffractive Memories and 
the Theatre of Death, is devoted solely to Kantor and encompasses his innovative 
redefinition of memory. Placing him within a greater turn in contemporary theory, 
this chapter shows that Kantor shares with it the dominant distrust in historical narra-
tives (understood as fictions whose referentiality is based on power relations), and a 
growing interest in traumatic and non-individual modes of memory. Thereafter, the 
principles of Kantor’s philosophy of history are discussed and confronted with Gilles 
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Deleuze and Karen Barad. A medium dependent on diffraction, photography turns 
out to condition Kantor’s innovative aspirations to stage such memories whose affec-
tive dynamics feels more real than even the most detailed historical narrative. Ulti-
mately, his own multiple positions in the theatre of death, read as a medium for indi-
vidual history, are discussed in the context of diffraction. 
Since revisiting Kantor’s “memory” involves trespassing on both intimate and 
historical sites, Chapter 3, entitled “Unspeakable Homes”: Practices of Dwelling in 
Life and in Death, problematises the liminal spaces and the fact of them being inhab-
ited mostly by human actors. Both Kantor and Beckett construct uncanny locations 
that appear equally as intensely material places and as the figures of lack. Hence, the 
Anthropocene serves as an interesting context for our investigations, for it articulates 
the uncanny sense of belonging and liminal home spaces, comparable to those both 
authors share. Relying on this correspondence, this chapter opens with the decon-
structionist reading of the end of (individual) world and the archive. These two 
tropes, recurrent in Embers, Breath, Film, and Krapp’s Last Tape, prepare a ground 
for analysing two homely and archival tropes, that is, dust and rags, and their pres-
ence in Beckett’s and Kantor’s works. Read through Donna Haraway and Jolanta 
Brach-Czaina, both metaphors happen to formulate chthonic and tentacular modes of 
coexistence and sympoiesis, exposing uncanny homely spaces to the vibrant and 
transformative dynamics of nonhumans that co-inhabit them. 
Following the points made in the previous chapter, Aristeus and Thanatos: 
Insects, Mannequins, and the Death of the Nonhuman pays even greater attention to 
the significance of nonhuman agencies in Beckett and Kantor. As it assumes, the 
most detailed figures of the nonhuman in both artistic projects are insects and man-
nequins, respectively, which bear significant similarities to each other. What be-
13 
 
 
 
 
comes crucial here is their convoluted relation to death. Including Rosi Braidotti’s 
posthumanism and diverting to thinkers eschewing new materialism, Alain Badiou 
and Giorgio Agamben, this chapter intends to show how these figures of the nonhu-
man rely on the emptied form of death, an event deprived of linear dying or a 
posthuman per se, which conditions vivid configurations of becoming. Furthermore, 
it demonstrates how Beckett and Kantor withdraw from concentrating on individual 
nonhumans and adopt the logic of the swarm which, among others, sheds light on 
their assumed agentism and endorses Beckett’s relation to modern technologies. 
The final chapter focuses exclusively on Beckett and his two short stories: 
“The Lost Ones” and “Ping.” Vulnerable Landscapes: The Ecology of Exhaustion 
and the Aesthetics for the Anthropocene returns to the connections between the 
eponymous epistemological rupture and Beckett’s works, put forward in “Unspeak-
able Homes.” The final chapter proposes to read the aforementioned stories as the 
ecologies after the end of the world itself, assuming that Beckett’s post-apocalypse 
necessarily involves the collapse of descriptive and perceptive modes that partake in 
its narratives. In other words, his works are interpreted as the means to crash the 
speculative bubble from which the narratives of end times
7
 are narrated by an ob-
server unaffected by the end of the world. Inspired by Paul Saunders and Gilles 
Deleuze, this chapter treats “The Lost Ones” and “Ping” as the (proto-)allegories for 
the Anthropocene. It indeed emphasises their critical project that deconstructs the 
speculation of living in the end times by means of challenging particular modes of 
language and visual perception. More importantly, Vulnerable Landscapes focuses 
on the affirmative project, most visible in “Ping,” attempting to build Beckett’s 
                                                             
7
 By referring to the end times, I indicate the sense of finitude which is deprived of any eschatological 
narrative superstructure. 
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“post-apocalyptic” realms from the materiality of language, whose grammatical, log-
ical, and semantical rules are nearly completely abandoned in an attempt to avoid the 
aforementioned speculative position. 
Rooted in the polysemy of its eponymous metaphor, Prismatic Theatres in-
volves both Beckett’s abstract prisms and spaces, and Kantor’s fragile confrontations 
with his alternative biographies and artistic positions. Bleak and desolate, these hap-
pen to take place within fleeting yet vibrant realms of the nonhuman. Beckett and 
Kantor stage (trans)corporeal encounters, stories of the lively matter, and the dynam-
ics of non-anthropocentric notions of time and space, all of which profoundly affect 
one’s (already liminal) position. More importantly, Prismatic Theatres is also the 
hall of diffraction, entangled in the dynamic boundary-making practices. Persistently 
anticipating the cognitive crisis of the Anthropocene and renegotiating the limits of 
subject / object or human / nonhuman positions, Kantor and Beckett expand our cor-
poreal and materialist imagery and exercise the performativity of the conceptual ma-
chines inscribed on their works. 
  
CHAPTER 1 
When Did Language Lose Its Primacy? 
On Matter, Objects, and Things 
 
As human beings we inhabit an inelucta-
bly material world. We live our everyday 
lives surrounded by, immersed in, matter. 
We are ourselves composed of matter. 
We experience its restlessness and intran-
sigence even as we reconfigure and con-
sume it. […] In light of this massive ma-
teriality, how could we be anything other 
than materialist?
1
 
We’re not beginning to… to… mean 
something?
2
 
 
The Fear of Meaning Something 
One of the most widely quoted lines from Samuel Beckett’s Endgame, 
Hamm’s remark happens to be an allegory for the intellectual landscape of theory in 
the 20
th
 and the 21
st
 centuries. Evolving through the critique of romanticised and uni-
versalised structures, and thereafter through poststructuralist and postmodernist dis-
persion of meanings, the linguistic turn has been achieving gradual distrust. It seems 
now that the language-centred theories have grown stale, being incapable of address-
ing the rapidly changing world with its excessive natural disasters, improving tech-
                                                             
1
 Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, “Introducing the New Materialisms,” in: New Materialisms: On-
tology, Agency, Politics, eds. Diana Coole and Samantha Frost (Durham and London: Duke Universi-
ty Press, 2010), p. 1. 
2
 Samuel Beckett, Endgame, in: Samuel Beckett, The Complete Dramatic Works (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1990), p. 108. 
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nological networks and means of communication, or emerging emancipatory move-
ments, which resist constructivist imagination. The discoveries in modern biology 
and physics, the widening spectrum of extinct species, global warming, bioethical 
concerns, capitalism and its decentralised logic, social revolutions in North Africa, to 
name a few: all of these issues eschew strictly linguistic conceptualisations. Perhaps 
theory is reaching the very moment in history when meaning as a category must be 
negated. Speculative and object-oriented methodologies, which popped out in the last 
twenty years, indeed subscribe to the aforementioned fear of “meaning something.” 
Moreover, a similar observation might be applied to the representatives of the French 
Thought such as Alain Badiou or François Laruelle, who have been gaining consid-
erable praise in the Western academia with regard to the intricate and abstract sys-
tems they propose. As it will be shown throughout this dissertation, new materialism 
also stems from the fear expressed by Hamm, yet at the same time, this movement 
cherishes and fuels it against all odds. Is it, however, because of the greater anxiety 
of resuscitating androcentric and anthropocentric agendas that the traditions rooted in 
the linguistic turn have managed to identify and dismantle? Or, is it because of the 
conviction that corporeality and materiality alone leave us with conceptual scarcity 
and methodological inoperativeness equal to those bequeathed from the linguistic 
turn? 
Actually, the tensions presented in this tentative and ex cathedra outline, 
which will be explored in detail further on, are not recent phenomena; they resonate 
with the tone similar to the one Bruno Latour introduced to social sciences nearly 
thirty years ago. In We Have Never Been Modern, he demonstrates that modernity is 
founded on the conviction that the successful purification was conducted by means 
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of dividing “reality” into two pure spheres of the social and the natural.3 Diachroni-
cally, this split has incorporated diverse forms in order to conceal its arbitrary and 
limited position: the nonhuman has been perceived either as too powerful – so that 
all the social relations have been becoming inferior to the ungraspable “Nature” and 
its forces – or as too weak, giving way to the primacy of the social. Furthermore, the 
dialectical reasoning has not come with an apt solution either, as it only meshes with 
the possible links between the aforementioned spheres, never aptly transcending the 
binary itself.
4
 For Latour, we have reached the moment when the proliferation of the 
social and natural hybrids (or the quasi-objects, as he calls them) – for instance, 
HIV/AIDS policies – is so intense that the modernist contract cannot be upheld any 
longer. Putting it bluntly, one cannot tell where one sphere ends and the other begins. 
This, in turn, affects our coexistence with nonhumans and emphasises their agencies, 
oftentimes neglected in theoretical debates. A nonhuman notion of time might be a 
suitable illustration of this shift. For Latour, while modernity tends to perceive time 
as an arrow focused on constant progress, progress itself is already mediated by the 
purification processes; in order to pinpoint it – preferably as either a scientific or a 
natural revolution – one has to recognise and allocate the elements of the passing 
array in favour of the new one.
5
 For the “moderns,” the past is constantly ceasing to 
exist, whereas the “postmoderns,” who acknowledge the hybrid dispersion, cannot 
avoid pursuing the new.
6
 As Latour postulates, the rejection of the purifying scheme 
requires “politemporality”7; turning towards the nonhuman and the material requires 
                                                             
3
 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard Universi-
ty Press, 1993), pp. 16-18. 
4
 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, p. 55. 
5
 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, pp. 71-74. 
6
 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, p. 74. 
7
 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, p. 74. 
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us to understand time no longer as a flow, but rather as a cluster of forces varying in 
intensities, amounts, and trajectories.  
The question of time is not brought up accidentally; not only does it pose a 
recurrent motive in this dissertation (which analyses, among others, archives, memo-
ries, or the end times in general), but also it shows how politemporal matter engages 
in narrative and storytelling practices. In his insightful Stone: An Ecology of the In-
human, Jeffrey Jerome Cohen ponders upon the temporality of the lithic, denying it 
as a static remnant of the bygone past in favour of the dynamic figure of inheritance. 
Cohen claims: “Stone conjures spans that transient humans cannot witness and yet 
are called upon, anxiously, to narrate. We crave apocalypse and its oblivions because 
they suit our small historical frames: there is comfort in the tidy closure they yield.”8 
Through their intrinsic durability, stones not only surpass any historical account, but 
also happen to be “time’s most tangible conveyor[s].”9 Being both the far anteced-
ents of the earliest narratives and most probably the entities that will outlive humans, 
they function as the return of the repressed with the fossilised and petrified traces of 
extinct species, and with the tools from the distant human past that have endured 
only because they are made of stone.
10
 Yet, by means of the same movement or 
force, stone is a message to those after us, including the times after us. Carrying fu-
ture and past timelines in itself, the lithic allows us to “encounter alien durations”11 
hidden in its cold vividness, in the same manner as the great building projects – the 
York Minster, the cathedral of Norwich, or Stonehenge, to use Cohen’s examples – 
confront us with how they surpass the lives of their builders, whose transient intents 
                                                             
8
 Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, Stone: An Ecology of the Inhuman (Minneapolis and London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2015), p. 85. 
9
 Cohen, Stone, p. 79. Emphasis mine. 
10
 Cohen, Stone, p. 85. 
11
 Cohen, Stone, p. 80. 
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and stories have been buried in the enduring walls, and how the very same structures 
are interpreted by the inhabitants of different times. Thus, inheriting from stones 
takes form of the atomised network of stories in which the imprinted pasts force us 
affectively to construct them as presents, which are open to the future reconsidera-
tions. 
Rooted in the aforementioned intuitions, the purpose of this chapter is three-
fold. Firstly, it aims at presenting selected topics stemming from the ongoing debates 
over the new materialism with regard to its philosophical and theoretical contexts. 
Following the cartographic method inaugurated by Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der 
Tuin,
12
 I would like to expand the scope of this movement into the adjacent “territo-
ries” in order to place new materialism within a greater shift – precisely, the renais-
sance of ontology and onto-epistemology in humanities. What is worth mentioning, 
since every mapping gesture is inherently anchored in writing (the graphein of car-
tography), this act also partakes in constructing a suitable bridge joining together the 
aforementioned theoretical framework with literary studies. Secondly, this chapter 
poses a necessity of the spatial, temporal, and agential shifts that the Anthropocene 
puts in motion. Accordingly, this epoch will be presented in relation to the ideas of 
Claire Colebrook, Donna Haraway, Timothy Morton, and Joanna Zylinska, exposing 
its intense redistribution of the human and the nonhuman agencies, sympoietic orders 
of coexistence, and the (a)temporal coding of excessively material reality. It will 
serve the purpose of both introducing the seminal arguments of these thinkers and 
creating the de-geologised concept of the Anthropocene as such. Thirdly, this chapter 
will lead us through the possible connections between discursive and material prac-
                                                             
12
 See: Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin, New Materialism: Interviews and Cartographies (Ann 
Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2012). 
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tices, onto-epistemological approaches, and literary theory. With regard to this postu-
late, the theoretical projects of Karen Barad, Jane Bennett, Serenella Iovino and Ser-
pil Oppermann, and Timothy Morton will be introduced; indeed, the assumptions of 
these approaches will lay a cornerstone for the methodological pillar of my thesis. 
Expanding the influence of deconstruction onto the aforementioned authors, this 
chapter endeavours to tighten the bonds between these scholars. Reading Derrida’s 
“envois” against its negativity, I will attempt to formulate the common ground for 
Morton’s, Barad’s, and Bennett’s approaches in reference to intimacy, which mani-
fests itself in their search for what Maurice Merleau-Ponty has named the flesh. In 
the following chapters, I shall juxtapose such a proposed framework with the oeuvres 
of Samuel Beckett and Tadeusz Kantor. I will argue that in the light of the aforemen-
tioned renaissance, these artistic projects might contribute to the new materialist re-
flection. Just as within a diffractive reading Kantor and Beckett meet in a “quantum” 
dialogue of aesthetic leaps and conceptual twists, they also ripple through the onto-
logical and material turns in humanities, and themselves set a stage for rethinking 
such notions as memory, time, intimacy, coexistence, and simultaneity, when these 
turn out to be complex mixtures of fluctuating matter. 
New Materialism: A Minor Outline 
Although this section will be devoted to the minoritarian and atomised read-
ing of new materialism inspired by Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin, we first 
ought to briefly posit the genealogy of this movement. Most commonly, new materi-
alism expands the scope of posthumanist reflection, enabling it to explore the territo-
ries that have formerly remained inaccessible to it. In order to achieve that, new ma-
terialism privileges embodied encounters with the nonhuman world, and numerous 
21 
 
 
 
 
material and corporeal agencies this world consists of. However, the underlying pur-
pose of this turn does not differ significantly from the objectives Cary Wolfe postu-
lates with regard to posthumanism; as he argues, “posthumanism means not the tri-
umphal surpassing or unmasking of something but an increase in the vigilance, re-
sponsibility, and humility that accompany living in a world so newly, and differently, 
inhabited.”13 Elsewhere, he adds:  
[Posthumanism] forces us to rethink our taken-for-granted modes of hu-
man experience, including the normal perceptual modes and affective 
states of Homo sapiens itself, by recontextualizing them in terms of the 
entire sensorium of other living beings and their own autopoietic ways of 
“bringing forth a world” – ways that are, since we ourselves are human 
animals, part of the evolutionary history and behavioral and psychologi-
cal repertoire of the human itself.”14 
Similarly, new materialism rejects the anthropocentric ways of thinking, while rec-
ognising the importance – yet not superiority – of human agencies (or rather agencies 
humans are entangled in) among other material agencies distributed around us. For 
new materialists, matter also gains its “own autopoietic ways of ‘bringing forth a 
world’,” which does not make it alive by any means; still, this fact embraces its un-
canny vibrancy and an alien ability to act, perceptible in corporeal encounters. Con-
sequently, as Cohen points out, “only in admitting that inhuman is not ours to con-
trol, possesses desires and even will, can we apprehend the environment disanthro-
pocentrically, in a teetering mode that renders human centrality a problem rather than 
a starting point.”15 New materialism, therefore, becomes an intellectual and activist 
successor to posthumanism. 
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Posthumanist in its method and motivations, new materialism seems to have 
evolved from a separate field, that is, from the recent feminist criticism. The trans-
gressive corporeality that is at odds with the binary or purifying thinking is already 
mentioned in Donna Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto.” Susan Hekman comments 
upon it as follows: “Haraway is trying to […] deconstruct the discourse/reality di-
chotomy.”16 Such an aim confronts feminist studies with the collapse of dualisms 
since this decision enmeshes discursive into material, corporeal, technological, and 
biological, and blasphemes the theory, as Haraway at once suspends its mythic, iron-
ic, factual, and fictive aspects. For Haraway, “a cyborg world might be about lived 
social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship with 
animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory 
standpoints.”17 A comparable task is undertaken by Elizabeth Grosz in her Volatile 
Bodies; driven by the premises corresponding to Haraway’s, she also postulates the 
importance of rethinking feminism by means of materiality, outside of natural / cul-
tural and mind / body dyads. For her, dualistic thinking, just as its Cartesian roots, 
not only has facilitated the exclusion of corporeality and its relation to material reali-
ty, but also has fostered the implied androcentric agenda that allowed for creating the 
means of sexual and social oppression of women.
18
 Moreover, Grosz emphasises the 
indeterminable concept of (not only female) corporeality as a possible solution to this 
impasse; she writes, “[t]he body is neither – while being both – the private or the 
public, self or the other, natural or cultural, physical or social, instinctive or learned, 
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genetically or environmentally determined.”19 Finally, Hekman chooses yet another 
direction; she affirms the importance of materiality supplementing constructivism, as 
the lingustic mode alone simply “interprets malleable reality.”20 It both has failed to 
provide solutions to women’s economic and social inequality or sexual abuses and 
has not allowed women to articulate their bodily and biological (or even medical) 
specificity.
21
 In each case, feminist perspectives prefigure the qualities associated 
with new materialism and found their political and social status on stripping the lin-
guistic of its central position, affirming material and corporeal existence, rejecting 
dualistic reasoning, and reconnecting the purified spheres.  
Despite this diachronic background, perhaps one of the most comprehensive 
categories ascribed to the materialist turn in humanities rapidly developing since 
1990s is hinted at by Dolphijn and van der Tuin in their ground-breaking study. Pre-
cisely, the authors label this shift as the “minor tradition” in the straightforward 
Deleuzian sense of this term.
22
 For Gilles Deleuze, “[m]inoritarian authors are those 
who are foreigners in their own tongue.”23 This foreignness – exemplary of Franz 
Kafka, but also of Samuel Beckett and James Joyce – results in writing on the verge 
of language itself, which, as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari insist, exposes the 
machinery behind language and its automatic production of assemblages.
24
 Conse-
quently, what is at stake is not being minor – for the French philosophers this would 
                                                             
19
 Grosz, Volatile Bodies, p. 23. 
20
 Susan Hekman, The Material of Knowledge: Feminist Disclosures (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 2010), p. 3. 
21
 Hekman, The Material of Knowledge, p. 3. 
22
 Dolphijn and van der Tuin, New Materialism, p. 94. It can be debated whether “minor” or “minori-
tarian” suits better here, considering slight differences between them. For the sake of clarity, I stick to 
the term chosen by Dolphijn and van der Tuin.  
23
 Verena Conley, “Minoritarian,” in: The Deleuze Dictionary. Revised Edition, ed. Adrian Parr (Ed-
inburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), p. 167.  
24
 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, “What Is a Minor Literature?,” in: Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari, Kafka: Toward Minor Literature, trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis and London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 22. See also: Claire Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2002), pp. 115-118. 
24 
 
 
 
 
be an unattainable task – but becoming-minor, indicating a relation transgressing the 
aforementioned literary context significantly. While becoming-minor, a minority 
develops a relation to a majority, in which the former can be represented as non-
denumerable, whereas the latter – as denumerable.25 The majority occupies a fixed 
position, while its range of self-articulations is predictable, since the denumerable set 
is defined by its countable elements. Contrarily, the minority is demarcated by noth-
ing but “the connection, the ‘and’ produced between elements, between sets, and 
which belongs to neither, which eludes them and constitutes a line of flight.”26 In 
other words, becoming-minor is an assemblage-like form of expression that punc-
tures the fixed borders of the majority – be it those of language, identity, or norms. 
Yet, at the same time, it presents itself in a way that cannot be neutralised by being 
counted and thus included in the set.
27
 Deleuze and Guattari therefore reverse the 
common figure by insisting that it is the majority which is silent, whereas the minori-
ty speaks. 
Referring to minor traditions in philosophy serves Dolphijn and van der Tuin 
as a contextual frame for the theoretical movement they describe, even though their 
account strives for neither completeness nor closure. Minor itself, new materialism 
demands the eponymous cartography, delineating the arbitrary borders in a fashion 
that is equally aware of its conventionality and open to the possible revisions of the 
territory covered.
28
 In a more specific Deleuzian sense, instead of a fixed representa-
tion of a field, they aim at constructing a map embracing the deterritorialising and 
reterritorialising forces that have brought about a new materialist paradigm; the nov-
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elty inscribed in its name is not necessarily placed in the modernist fetish of the 
new,
29
 but rather comprises the act of rewriting and reconfiguring the particular phi-
losophies, or reconciling them in a way that has been perceived as peripheral. Dol-
phijn and van der Tuin thus write a sui generis “minor introduction” to a minor tradi-
tion, never entirely certain, nor claiming its authority as a manual or a canon. Rather, 
they subdue their work to the de- and re-territorialisations they simultaneously identi-
fy. Such a perspective stems from the conviction that “new materialism is fascinated 
by affect, force, and movement as it travels in all directions. It searches not for the 
objectivity of things in themselves but for an objectivity of actualization and realiza-
tion.”30 New Materialism – which resurfaces in the encounter of interviews and the 
following theoretical investigations – sets at its heart a relation without privileged 
discourses, whose “uncertainty” and incessant movement fuel the production of 
knowledge. 
New materialism is postulated and affirmed in the very moment when the lin-
guistic turn – successfully colonising disciplines of humanities and social sciences 
since 1920s – seems to reach the state of a critical standstill. Likewise, the dominat-
ing Anglophone reception of French poststructuralist philosophy (the French 
Thought) happens to be equally helpless. In the middle of the last century, the La-
canian interpretation of the Saussurean model of sign – widely accepted in cultural 
and literary studies – juxtaposed the relation of signifier and signified with that of the 
symbolic and the imaginary, respectively, separating them with a bar.
31
 Absent in the 
works of Saussure, this element – congruent to prohibition and castration – remains 
inherently included in the model, as it is distinguished from the notion of difference. 
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As Kirby notes, it “[t]hus […] becomes a guarantee of property that encloses the 
concept sign within the domain of language/culture, and segregates subjects and their 
attributes accordingly.”32 As a result, the natural and the material have become local-
ised in the precarious exteriority outside of the model, while the theory has granted 
itself a right to treat these two interrelated planes as either blatant or potentially 
threatening elements it has properly neutralised. Alternatively, the references de-
manding the possibilities of embracing any of the excluded contents turn out to be 
incapable of grasping them; they have produced the representations rooted in the 
already stored images, which after being put in motion claim to produce means they 
in fact only mimic.
33
 Therefore, it should not surprise us how ineffective the con-
structivist theories happen to be while dealing with the issues of global warming, 
threats of the pandemic and the downfall of antibiotics, biopolitical manoeuvres of 
modern societies, or the speculative architecture of the capital, even though they re-
main capable of theorising them clearly by means of otherness, difference, and  
aporia. 
A corresponding criticism of the impotency haunting the theory of post-
modernity is provided by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in their Empire. Within 
their Marxist and Spinozian project, the authors assess postmodern theories (although 
also emphasising their postcolonial offshoot) as significant insofar as they foreshad-
ow the advent of a passage through the modern forms of sovereignty, yet frail when 
it comes to realise the liberating project they have promised. It is so because for 
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Hardt and Negri postmodernity has never entirely overthrown the Enlightenment, 
and focused only on one of its veins instead. Precisely, what it leaves intact is the 
vein “initiated by the revolution of Renaissance humanism, from Duns Scotus to 
Spinoza, with the discovery of the place of immanence and the celebration of singu-
larity and difference.”34 Postmodernists have instead posed “a challenge […] specifi-
cally to the tradition of modern sovereignty,”35 which originates in “the construction 
and mediation of dualisms”36 convoked in order to actualise the philosophical inven-
tions of the aforementioned intellectual tradition. The postmodern project of over-
coming these dualisms and simultaneously omitting the immanent field they restrict 
does not, therefore, guarantee the return to this tradition of difference, but rather cel-
ebrates the difference which already belongs to the realm confined by the fixed 
boundaries. Thus, this model can only theorise difference, but finds it impossible to 
produce one, since it relies on the structure it so eagerly criticises, and in this sense 
remains indifferent to it.  
Dolphijn and van der Tuin identify the aforementioned movement as “push-
ing dualisms to an extreme,”37 deriving the expression from Henri Bergson. Since the 
discourses of the linguistic turn and postmodernity have had a tendency to structure 
difference in relation to negativity with no satisfactory outcome – linking it with im-
possibility, undecideability, deadlock, or distance – the radical turn towards the af-
firmative approach to difference is demanded to overload the dyadic thinking instead 
of rejecting it. It is owed to the scientific discoveries of the last century, mostly those 
in physics and biology, that one can no longer think of matter as either a static condi-
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tion or a finished product. Diana Coole and Samantha Frost help understand it when 
they claim that “materiality is always something more than ‘mere’ matter: an excess, 
force, vitality, relationality, or difference that renders matter active, self-creative, 
productive, unpredictable.”38 Dolphijn and van der Tuin, but also many other theo-
rists, relish on this conviction in their pursuit of the non-reductive method. This time, 
however, the formerly privileged position of epistemology is required to give way to 
onto-epistemology. The reconfiguration of the latter is aimed at providing a ground 
for the affirmative although elusive approach, hoped to open the deadlock the con-
temporary theory has fallen into, and to redistribute matter and language into an 
equilibrium it previously lacked. For Dolphijn and van der Tuin – as well as for 
Braidotti or De Landa – a way to achieve that is paved by Deleuze’s re-readings of 
the minor philosophies of Bergson, Nietzsche, and Spinoza, resulting in the univocal 
difference, and the machine foregrounding and producing it.
39
 Indebted to a different 
tradition, Kirby’s method encompasses the deconstructive readings of Saussure and 
Derrida, overthrowing the positions commonly ascribed to them regarding the natural 
as the transcendent element.
40
 New materialism engages in the philosophies or read-
ings that have been hitherto perceived as peripheral. It creatively transforms their 
potential into that of minor approaches; the emphasis is placed on immanence rather 
than transcendence, intertwinement rather than the cut, and multiplicity or singularity 
rather than dualisms. This fact opens theory for the revitalising readings of such fig-
ures as David Hume (Quentin Meillassoux), Alfred North Whitehead (Isabelle Sten-
gers), Gilbert Simondon (Brian Massumi), William James (William Connoly), de-
spite the significant differences between them. 
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Traversing the limitations of time, object of study, or school, the against-all-
odds gesture grounded upon pure affirmation equally redistributes the positions so-
cial sciences and humanities have been ascribed in relation to their “hard” counter-
part. In this respect, Coole and Frost might be right that any scientific revolution – be 
it the rise of quantum physics, axiomatic set theory in mathematics, or the Anthropo-
cene in geology – has to render itself in a new form of philosophical materialism.41 
At first glance, the importance of employing the natural sciences into the new mate-
rialist discourse might be regarded as the extension of the long postmodern tradition, 
which replicates the impasse of the so-called “culture wars.”42 It is not entirely true. 
Historically and theoretically speaking, this is the great achievement of the feminist 
science studies and writings of Donna Haraway, but also of the actor-network theory 
inaugurated by Latour (and influenced by Michel Serres) that the “hard sciences” 
have turned out to be not that “hard,” while their privileged epistemological position 
and the claim of objectivity have been rendered arbitrary. Just as the analyt-
ic/continental dyad is being challenged or “pushed to an extreme,” the collapse of the 
barrier separating humanities and natural sciences stems from the intent of finding 
superiority in non-reduction, affirmation, creation, and transformation. This tendency 
does not therefore contribute to the pursuit of scientificity, objectivity, or legitimacy 
– the objects of Alan Sokal’s famous accusations – but rather it cherishes the possi-
bility of productive collisions, new connections, and singularities. 
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With regard to the two aforementioned tendencies, probably the most radical 
realisation is provided by Quentin Meillassoux and his widely commented correla-
tionist argument. In After Finitude, he delivers an attack on the current status of phi-
losophy with regard to its inheritance of Kantian subject-object dualism. Precisely, 
Meillassoux challenges “the idea according to which we only ever have access to the 
correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart 
from the other.”43 As Graham Harman rephrases this claim, “the correlationist holds 
that we cannot think of humans without world, nor world without humans, but only 
of a primal rapport or correlation between the two. For the correlationist, it is impos-
sible to speak of a world that pre-existed humans in itself, but only of a world pre-
existing humans for humans.”44 Consequently, its “weak” form covers the classical 
Kantian position according to which Ding-en-Sich exists, although we are incapable 
of reaching it.
45
 Strong correlationism, on the contrary, provides us with a view that 
Ding-en-Sich does not exist at all.
46
 In order to challenge this subject-object correla-
tion, Meillassoux argues that it is vital to radicalise the strong correlationism, which 
leads him eventually to reconsider notions of probability and radical contingency. 
Incapable of finding a rescue in language – as it cannot avoid Kantian dualism – 
Meillassoux somewhat repeats the philosophical gesture of his mentor Alain Badiou 
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and turns towards Georg Cantor’s redefinition of infinity; therefore, mathematics is 
regarded as the underlying principle of his own ontological proposition. 
Albeit Meillassoux’s speculative project has failed to serve as a cornerstone 
for a unified movement in philosophy, the thought-experiment it entails has helped 
rethink the positions of various philosophers dissatisfied with both the language-
matter and subject-object dualisms. Even Harman – probably the most meticulous 
commenter and rigid advocate of Meillassoux’s project – calls both the solvability of 
the correlationist deadlock in a manner proposed by the French thinker and its 
preeminent place in the modern history of philosophy under the question.
47
 Still, for 
Harman – but also Ian Bogost, Levi Bryant, or Timothy Morton – Meillassoux’s ar-
gument has allowed to formulate their own position contributing to the movement 
called object-oriented ontology (OOO); this heterogeneous tendency, in the most 
general sense, regards the diagnosis of correlationism as a starting point to think in 
terms of objects beyond both their cultural determination and their division into an 
untraceable number of constitutive relations and particles.
48
 Unlike new materialists, 
OOO opposes interconnectedness as the underlying principle of reality and turns 
towards the not pre-determined object as a quasi-essentialist claim which cannot be 
deconstructed. Perceiving the new materialist claims as correlationist means to trans-
cend the dualistic thinking, OOO affirms the rehabilitation of metaphysics, whose 
developments and discoveries might be thereafter applied to issues resistant to classi-
cal representation-oriented discourses. Van der Tuin summarises: 
Both traditions strive towards cutting across the Kantian deeming impos-
sible of reaching the Thing-in-Itself. According to OOOers, Kant’s mind-
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dependence must be eliminated in order to move beyond “correlation-
ism.” They claim that the Thing-in-Itself possesses its own logic (hence, 
the ontological turn). New materialists argue that even rationally intuiting 
a Thing-in-Itself is preceded by embodied encounters, so they do not 
leave the human subject behind, but speak of the entangled nature of 
knowing and being (“onto-epistemology” references “the study of prac-
tices of knowing in being”). It is argued that “representationalisms” can-
not do justice to this entanglement. Whereas the two actualizations of 
contemporary theory originate from the same virtual stem, they are con-
flictual.
49
 
Driven by the similar intuitions, new materialism and OOO oppose two logics of 
excess. The materialist one cherishes entanglements and embodiments, emphasising 
the flows and fluctuations of forces within a greater project of founding a non-
reductionist subject. The ontological one, in contrast, avoids it as the naïve replica-
tion of Kantian dualism. Instead, OOO emphasises the importance of the non-
relational, withdrawn objects, whose quasi-exteriority is not necessarily located in 
any kind of transcendence.
50
 
Recently, within a historical and theoretical process, OOO and new material-
ism have tended to bifurcate, while the growing antagonism between them is becom-
ing more and more apparent. In this sense, they switch from the minor positions I 
have previously ascribed to them and situate themselves in the heart of the “main-
stream.” Mainstream, actually, is not used coincidentally in this context; watchful 
apprentices of postmodernity, both movements have construed their own solid insti-
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tutions while relying on the less conventional means of circulation within the global-
ised academia, including their vivid activity in blogosphere, inclination towards open 
access and non-profit publishing organisations, and creation of international re-
searchers networks.
51
 Still, the turn that has occurred does not rely solely on its me-
dia; as a matter of fact, the emergence of new tendencies, the shift in reception, and a 
strive for new canonisation processes have been widely foregrounded. In his Post-
continental Philosophy, John Ó Maoillearca provides a different categorisation based 
on the premises similar to those theorised in this section; he gathers the philosophical 
projects of Alain Badiou, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Henry, and François Laruelle under 
the common banner against the continental/analytical dyad.
52
 All of these thinkers 
insist in their philosophical projects on their radically immanent frame. As Maoil-
learca claims, this might provide an alternative to both the phenomenological para-
digm (dominating in the first half of the 20
th
 century) and the linguistic one, whose 
outcomes are still persisting.
53
 A different reception is provided by Ian James in The 
New French Philosophy. In his readings of Badiou, Laruelle, but also Jean-Luc Nan-
cy, Jacques Rancière, and Catherine Malabou, James attempts to describe the shift 
towards the immanent real eluding signification, new modes of subject, and non-
reductionist approaches oriented at singularities.
54
 What is, however, interesting in 
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his reading is the fact that it poses a question of the possibility of philosophy after 
deconstruction, coded in the inclusion of either ardent polemicists of Jacques Derrida 
(Badiou, Laruelle, Jacques Rancière, or Jean-Luc Marion) or his close students and 
colleagues (Jean-Luc Nancy, Catherine Malabou, Bernard Stiegler).  
Rather than seeking a shared identity, the minor ontologies introduced above 
constitute a scattered image tentatively unified only by the unbearable urge to oppose 
the dominating postmodern paradigm and a more general ontological turn in philoso-
phy and critical theory. Interestingly enough, this attempt to retrieve either objects or 
matter where they belong by no means supports the claim of redeeming the world 
from the postmodern dissolution, fuelled by the linguistic arbitrariness. All of them, 
in fact, robustly point out that the end of the world has never been so certain. 
After the Two Ends of the World 
The renewal of the ontological approaches in humanities and social sciences 
situates itself in the collision of the surging excess of material events and phenomena 
which the late 20
th
 and the early 21
st
 centuries have been exposed to, and the inability 
to successfully naturalise them within a linear narration of progress, embedded in a 
stable notion of one shared world. Putting it bluntly, this task is no longer possible 
mostly because the world has already ended, or, as Timothy Morton provocatively 
claims, it ended twice: firstly, in 1784, when a steam engine was invented by James 
Watt, and later, in 1945, when a nuclear weapon was tested, and then used in Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki.
55
 For Morton, “[t]hese events,” with their gradually accelerating 
emission of carbon and plutonium respectively, “mark the logarithmic increase in the 
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actions of humans as a geophysical force.”56 He thereby adopts the Anthropocene to 
his own philosophy (itself a burning issue among geologists), contributing to that 
trajectory of material philosophical accounts – represented by, among others, Joanna 
Zylinska
57
 – which relishes and endorses this powerful image. Interestingly, even 
though geologists rather agree upon the turn the Anthropocene induces as well as 
upon its origins, the temporal scope it covers (be it an age or an epoch) remains an 
unravelled mystery.
58
 Undoubtedly fuelling the disparate readings among the 
posthumanist and materialist thinkers, this indeterminacy allows us to treat the causa-
tive “geophysical force” of the Anthropocene as a paradoxical one. On the one hand, 
the Anthropocene inscribes traces of human activity on the geological strata, preserv-
ing it in a way which has already provided data concerning the extinct species from 
the epochs past. On the other hand, this force marks a shared point of reference to 
global warming,
59
 anticipating the end of human domination over the “subdued” 
Earth, if not another mass extinction. 
The acknowledgement which the Anthropocene has recently gained within 
humanities – along with the apocalyptic timelines it highlights – does not necessarily 
result in an inoperative interpretative framework. As Claire Colebrook suggests, it 
rather “relies on looking at our own world and imagining it as it will be when it has 
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become the past. In imagining this world after humans we are reading what is not yet 
written or inscribed.”60 Further on, Colebrook clarifies: 
The positing of an anthropocene era (or the idea that the human species 
will have marked the planet to such a degree that we will be discernible 
as a geological strata) deploys the idea of human imaging – the way we 
have already read an inhuman past in the earth’s layers – but does this by 
imagining a world in which humans will be extinct. The anthropocene 
thought experiment also alters the modality of geological reading, not just 
to refer to the past as it is for us, but also to our present as it will be with-
out us. We imagine a viewing or reading in the absence of viewers or 
readers, and we do this through images in the present that extinguish the 
dominance of the present.
61
 
The ongoing “thought experiment,” as Colebrook calls it, invokes a politemporal 
reading, which projects future as past based on the parallel projection of past 
through present. Such a relation between these two timelines envisions the earth be-
fore humans, already inscribed in the lithic, and the earth-to-come without humans, 
whose traces are already in motion. This tension posits a greater need of reconfigur-
ing the dynamic present, whose both post-apocalyptic and pre-apocalyptic statuses 
do not allow for bringing it to a halting point. Instead, the Anthropocene challenges 
the notion of inheriting within a frame of constantly rising entanglements and linkag-
es between the human and the nonhuman, the material and the socially constructed, 
or the historic and the geological. The end of the world deploys itself as spatial and 
temporal dispersion, affirmatively transforming itself into different triages within 
ontology, epistemology, and ethics. 
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Following the posthumanist tracks the Anthropocene delineates, what re-
mains confusing is the fact that the term, which calls the human dominating position 
into question, stems directly from the Greek anthropos. With regard to geology, this 
connection should not surprise us, as the Anthropocene encompasses the fact of hu-
man presence marked in the sediments. Other disciplines of natural sciences might 
associate this turn with the destructive impact of human actions on the biosphere. 
Still, the significance of the aforementioned problem is not properly grasped within 
humanities. In The Minimal Ethics for the Anthropocene, Zylinska proposes an inter-
esting reading of the eponymous concept; we read: “The term [the Anthropocene] 
does however entail an appeal to human singularity (not to be confused with human 
supremacy), coupled with a recognition that we can make a difference to the ongoing 
dynamic processes taking in the biosphere and the geosphere – of which we are 
part.”62 Simultaneously, Zylinska emphasises the activist aspect of her approach; 
influenced by Morton, she claims: “The ethics for the Anthropocene would […] en-
tail a call for a return to critical thinking, for a reparation of thought.”63 Just as Cole-
brook, Zylinska does not deprive the Anthropocene of the question concerning hu-
man agency and importance. However, whilst for Colebrook such a human being has 
to accept the wager of this “thought experiment” and posit himself or herself through 
his or her absence, Zylinska stresses an intuitive approach, in a Bergsonian manner, 
immersing one within the dynamic life and its intersecting movements.
64
 What is, 
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therefore, at stake is such a recognition of the alterity of the nonhuman which is nev-
er accomplished, but rather actively expanding as long as one yields to the underly-
ing vibrant forces. 
If we return to Morton’s idea of the double end of the world, we will instantly 
realise that for him such interpretations are incongruous. As he points out, the An-
thropocene indicates the moment when the correlationist contract cannot be upheld 
any longer, which is the reason for its promulgation among the speculative theo-
rists.
65
 Morton pronounces this moment in history the age of asymmetry, or the time 
of hyperobjects. While Jean Baudrillard’s hyperreality stages such an event after 
which the object completely dissolves diluted by its representations and chains of 
signification, hyperobjects are immune to these and – more importantly – indisputa-
bly exist. As entities they remain thinkable, yet every single act of thinking them is 
eventually predestined to fail since it cannot grasp them entirely; hyperobjects are 
simply “too vast.”66 Consequently, they might be captured only as the aesthetic ef-
fect, which – although temporarily clutching on the illusion of a whole – encounters 
the brute resistance; hyperobjects dismantle the relations between object and subject, 
interiority and exteriority, firmness and elusiveness. Finally, every single act of 
thinking them in a unified way reaches their sudden outburst and expansion, every 
extraction – realisation of the manner in which they fluidly are stuck to other hy-
perobjects and the subjects “entrapped” within them, and every mapping – the dis-
covery that they are already elsewhere. Yet, not despite this withdrawal (as Harman 
would put it) but precisely because of it, Morton convincingly identifies the hyperob-
ject of the Anthropocene par excellence: that is, global warming. 
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Morton’s critical project indeed posits the reflection on global warming in the 
very core of Hyperobjects, contributing to his revision of ecocriticism(s) through 
OOO. Against Meillassoux, he detaches his anti-correlationist intuitions from re-
thinking of the absolute, contingency, and probability via Cantorian mathematics. 
Furthermore, he dismisses correlationism as a dominating bind in the modern history 
of philosophy.
67
 Instead, he interweaves correlationism with the Anthropocene. On 
the other hand, in Morton’s take on the complexity of global warming, one might 
start to imagine hyperobjects as simply coexistent with the mere ones. In order not to 
fall within this conceptual confusion, Morton insists upon the underlying feature of 
interobjectivity with its crucial concept of the mesh, introduced in his Ecological 
Thought. He claims that “all entities whatsoever are interconnected in an interobjec-
tive system that elsewhere I call the mesh.”68 Etymologically related to mass and 
mask,
69
 the mesh itself serves Morton both as an engulfing ontological plane and as a 
quasi-medium through which hyperobjects are apprehended, even if that is but a de-
lusion. The mesh is thus a “sieve.”70 As Morton claims, it functions as a “potent 
[metaphor] for the strange interconnectedness of things, an interconnectedness that 
does not allow for perfect, lossless transmission of information, but is instead full of 
gaps and absences.”71 In its overflows and sudden compressions, the “vast[ness] and 
intima[cy]”72 of the mesh absorb not only objects and their linkages, but also spaces 
in-between them, as well as separating distances. Braiding relations and their lack, 
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the mesh also subtly conceals the processes and mechanisms that are indisputably at 
work, remaining in the strange pulsating yet untraceable motion. Henceforth, the 
mesh conditions hyperobjects as the entities that are equally temporary and perma-
nent, or fragmentary and complex. This, in turn, is provided by the congruence of the 
subjective plane with this objective realm; as Morton distinguishes it from interob-
jectivity, intersubjectivity marks “a shared space in which human meaning reso-
nates.”73 In order not to rephrase the correlationist deadlock Morton so eagerly con-
demns, he emphasises that the subjective stratum is by no means exterior to the ob-
jective one, but rather is incorporated as one of the parts within the mesh. In other 
words, subjectivity is but a drop within the fluxes of transgressive interobjectivity. 
In The Ecological Thought, Morton juxtaposes the mesh with the concept of 
strange stranger; yet, in Hyperobjects he frames the relation between them anew. 
Finding a powerful ally in Martin Heidegger, Morton adopts his notion of the Rift – 
the intrinsic ontological split – which in his case will divide hyperobjects precisely 
into the mesh and strange stranger.
74
 The self-contradictory mesh produces a simula-
tion in which its delicate intricacies fade, leaving one with a soothing sense of famil-
iarity with the surrounding organisms or objects. After all, it is but a sieve distrib-
uting reality within reasonable doses. Strange stranger, for its part, covers the abso-
lutely uncanny encounter beyond prediction or anticipation. It is a stranger whose 
strangeness cannot be put within the neutralising dialectic. As a concept, it linguisti-
cally repeats itself, mimicking either a tautology or a superlative. It thus becomes 
strangeness directed at itself, referring to its own void.
75
 As Morton clarifies, strange 
stranger restages in fact Derridean arrivant: a figure of pure coming which is condi-
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tioned by the infinite distance since we cannot not only disclose his/her/its identity, 
but also identify its final destination or time of arrival.
76
 While in The Ecological 
Thought arrivant as strange stranger is converted into a widely shared uncanniness 
featured by every living organism, in the Rifted map of hyperobjects it turns out to 
form a level ontologically prior to the mesh.
77
 It thus marks the indispensable uncan-
ny essence of the real objects that is converted into the mesh, which, on the contrary, 
can be perceived sensually. 
In Morton’s theory of the hyperobjects, consisting of core uncanniness and 
the sensual mesh built on it, the perception of time is also illusory. Precisely, time is 
neither linear nor singular, but rather – in a Whiteheadian manner – it emanates di-
rectly through objects without the intervention of one’s consciousness. As Morton 
argues elsewhere, the rest is but an aesthetic effect.
78
 Still, this is just the tip of an 
iceberg; we read in Hyperobjects: 
We should then entertain the possibility that hyperobjects allow us to see 
that there is something futural about objects as such. If time is not a neu-
tral container in which objects float, but is instead an emission of objects 
themselves, it is at least theoretically more plausible that an object could 
exert a backward causality on other entities, than if objects inhabit a time 
container that slopes in one particular direction.
79
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As delineated in the fragment above, future future  happens to function as Derrida’s à 
venir or “to come.” This is the messianic possibility of arriving at any time, which by 
no means can be predicted or calculated, but rather relies on the wager of expecta-
tion. As Morton points out, “essence is future.”80 Hence, it is identified as the unde-
niable yet contingent condition enabling “the pure possibility of the object as such.”81 
Since one can conceive of hyperobjects exclusively by means of pieces and glimpses, 
the present seems to be never experienced directly. Adhering to each other, hyperob-
jects emanate with equally viscous timelines, whose interference might be sensually 
caught, yet stems from the concealed essences. Eventually, the time of hyperobjects 
happens to be “molten”82; it melts together these timelines, merges past with future, 
and then solidifies with various intensities. 
Even though I am not entirely convinced of Morton’s proposition, which it-
self remains non-complementary with particular interpretative decisions made 
throughout this thesis, at least three significant ways in which he contributes to this 
work should be enumerated. First, his relation to both OOO and literary criticism 
lays foundations for the better understanding of his polemical stance to Jane Bennett 
regarding the possible input of the onto-epistemological turn for literary studies. By 
the same token, Paul Saunders’ reading of Beckett via Morton presented in Chapter 5 
might benefit from this part, for Saunders refers to the ideas and arguments that have 
developed into the theory of hyperobjects. Secondly, Morton detaches the Anthropo-
cene from its activist and “realist” framework, and perceives it as the particular spa-
tial and temporal configuration, whose aporetic core disperses the limits of time and 
space, and involves them in vivid yet uncanny metamorphoses. For this reason, the 
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Anthropocene for Morton turns out to be gnomic, alien, and weird.
83
 Finally, he lo-
cates this shift within an indebtedness to deconstructionist criticism by means of the 
very same tropes that Jane Bennett and Karen Barad adopt. Perhaps his revision of 
the Anthropocene within such a framework might result in a theoretical bridge that 
would connect their new materialist claims with his gnomic interpretation of this 
geological age. 
Morton is not the only scholar who notices weirdness and darkness looming 
out of the event of the Anthropocene; in Staying with the Trouble, Haraway argues 
that we are currently inhabiting a profoundly chthonic world. Her venture point is 
new materialist, nonetheless. For Haraway, the Anthropocene and its geopolitical 
variant known as the Capitalocene evoke a particular crisis of imagination, suppress-
ing it through the all-embracing, if not mythical, narratives they formulate. Both 
terms “lend themselves too readily to cynicism, defeatism, and self-certain and self-
fulfilling predictions, like the ‘game over, too late’ discourse […].”84 Still, the condi-
tion of the world cannot be reduced to narrowly selected human and nonhuman ac-
tors and the apocalyptic stories that absorb them. Hence, Haraway supplements these 
two narratives with one of her own, that is, the Chthulucene; we read, “the Chthulu-
cene is made up of ongoing multispecies stories and practices of becoming-with in 
times that remain at stake, in precarious times, in which the world is not finished and 
the sky has not fallen – yet.”85 The Chthulucene embraces tangling material and se-
miotic practices of both humans and nonhumans, their interweaving stories, and the 
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manners in which they coexist and sympoietically (and not necessarily autopoietical-
ly) come to being. In this sense, the world we inhabit becomes deeply chthonic; what 
is at stake is the ongoing entanglement with uncanny or perilous materialities, alien 
and rarely noticeable nonhumans surrounding us, and the earth – or Gaia – which has 
regained its agency outside of the apocalyptic stories. Haraway postulates a configu-
ration which is profoundly disturbing, yet what she puts forward is, in fact, the radi-
cal intimacy to the nonhuman world we dwell in, which embraces the greater vulner-
ability of the surrounding reality. This uncanny fragility is not necessarily anchored 
in the particular perspective of the end of the world; rather, it encompasses the possi-
bility of mutual transformations between humans and nonhumans, which barely 
leaves any comfortable boundary intact.  
The fascination with the Anthropocene haunts the most recent studies in phi-
losophy, art criticism, critical theory, and literary studies. At a same time, it posits a 
significant dilemma, which can be spotted in Zylinska’s intuitive approach, Cole-
brook’s textual one, and Morton’s ontological one explored above in a greater detail. 
Precisely, the question oscillates around tackling the end of the world with regard to 
correlationism, whose empirical reference turns out to be exactly the Anthropocene. 
Still, the question seems to be broader. It poses the impasse of encountering the non-
human, nonanimated, and non-representational in the very moment when there is no 
shared telos whatsoever. Whether it is better to dare succumb to the danger of mime-
sis and fetishised representation, or to produce a resistant ontological matrix risking 
its own inoperability seems yet to be discovered in this analysis.  
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Falling into the Flesh 
In 2012, New Literary History devoted an issue to the relation between the 
new speculative movements – mostly OOO – and literary studies, whose influential 
contributions were the essays authored by Harman and Morton, followed by a re-
sponse written by Jane Bennett. Although both ontologists take different points of 
departure – Cleanth Brooks and Percy Bysshe Shelley, respectively – and reach dis-
similar conclusions, they seem to share a common enemy. For Harman, OOO makes 
it possible to return to such a realism which Derridean deconstruction has claimed a 
right to, yet which it has eventually dissipated in the chains of differences without 
identities.
86
 Harman argues for grasping the essentialism OOO proposes and for re-
thinking literary criticism through the radical decontextualisation which unmasks the 
ontological conditions of the works.
87
 As for Morton, he redefines a poem through 
his ideas of the Rift, future future, and the reduction of the episteme to aesthetics, 
indicated in the previous section. A poem is an object whose “meaning is (in) the 
future.”88 Therefore, the future future of the poem has to be affirmed in order to 
“acknowledge that we coexist with uncanny beings in a groundless yet vivid reality 
without a beyond […],”89 which redirects us back to Morton’s figure of strange 
stranger. If for Harman deconstruction has committed an error that has to be fixed by 
OOO, for Morton Derrida turns out to be the greatest precursor of this movement. 
Yet, despite this emerging conflict, both authors seem to be reconciled by the mutual 
hostility towards the interconnectedness instilled by the post-Deleuzean thinkers, 
which, as they are convinced, brings them back from the withdrawn realm through 
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their division into underlying relations or constitutive particles. As they believe, the 
excess inscribed in the essences of the objects and the consequent possibility of in-
ducing a change in the world are therefore squandered. 
The spectre of materialism is haunting Morton’s project. In An Object-
oriented Defense of Poetry, he manifests: “OOO is realism without materialism.”90 In 
Realist Magic, he formulates his main challenge against such tendencies by calling 
them “lava-lamp materialisms,” implying not only that their former appeal has been 
replaced by kitsch, but also – and predominantly – that they affirm flows and liquid 
mattering without a recognition that these seemingly transgressive fluxes are already 
limited by the transparent glass walls of a presupposed container.
91
 However, is Mor-
ton himself immune to this logic of interconnectedness? Stacy Alaimo – with a little 
help from Nancy Tuana, whom she juxtaposes with Morton – observes that in the 
opening chapter of Hyperobjects, while commenting upon the particular impacts 
global warming has on him, he “writes from his own embodiment.”92 Obviously, one 
may overrule such an argument recalling that this is the account of strange stranger 
transmitted between objects, including Morton himself. However, does this argument 
indeed solve the raised issue of the preceding embodiments, embracing the literary-
material processes he is involved in, the social and natural agencies he touches upon, 
and – finally – the subjective position he nevertheless acquires? In other words, does 
it provide efficient tools for analysis or simply narrow its scope? We may conclude 
ironically that Morton himself turns out to be the victim of Michel Serres’ famous 
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comment, which states: “An idea opposed to another idea is always the same idea, 
albeit affected by the negative sign. The more you oppose one another, the more you 
remain in the same framework of thought.”93 
Alaimo’s brilliant remark finds a degree of resemblance with Bennett’s re-
sponse. Influenced by Latour, Bennett strives for mitigating the expansive attitudes 
of both Harman and Morton, subtly implying their threat of purification. While ac-
cepting some of Morton’s points, she expresses doubts concerning both the possibil-
ity of transcending correlationism and the manner in which he does so. She claims: 
“If we are not [capable of transcending the provincial, prohuman-conatus perspective 
from which we apprehend the world], then a good tack might be to stretch and strain 
those modes to make room for the outlooks, rhythms, and trajectories of a greater 
number of actants, to, that is, get a better sense of the ‘operating system’ upon which 
we humans rely.”94 Whilst the recognition of objects along matter and relations does 
not pose a conflict for Bennett (against Harman, she postulates diverse units), she 
associates Morton’s insistence upon hyperobjects as vehicles for holism.95 Hence, 
instead of objects alone, she – in relation to Deleuze and Guattari, and Latour – em-
phasises the role of systems that might occasion in more applicable apparatuses, pre-
vailing over the solemn ontologies which she responds to. Such a position, with re-
gard to Morton’s favourite example of global warming, might allow us to re-estimate 
its dependence on capitalist systems, for instance;
96
 concerning art, it does not neces-
sarily have to waste the excess provided by the ascension of entities to uncanny ob-
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jects since “assemblage theories can offer an account of the emergence of novelty 
without also rendering the trajectory, impetus, drive, or energetic push of any exist-
ing body epiphenomenal to its relations.”97 As we will note further on, Bennett pro-
claims a Weltanschauung which is open towards various materialisms and ontologies 
of the inhuman, and commits herself to a world crammed with the plethora of lively 
matter and things.  
In Vibrant Matter, Bennett frames her own position, briefly signalled in her 
response to Morton. Focusing rather on things than objects, she advocates their 
“Thing-Power: the curious ability of inanimate things to animate, to act, to produce 
effects dramatic and subtle.”98 This inherent capacity allows her to reformulate 
things by means of Deleuze and Guattari’s operator and Latour’s actor, in order to 
treat living and non-living entities equally, basing on their ability to act; hence, she 
refers to them as actants.
99
 By means of such a reconfiguration, she becomes closer 
to Coole and Frost’s standpoint of inhabiting the material world via consisting of the 
heterogenous material particles than to that proclaimed by OOO.
100
 Furthermore, she 
equally dismisses the foundational critique of correlationism. Bennett argues for the 
moderate indebtedness to Kantian subject-object relation: 
How can the vital materialist respond to this important concern? First, by 
acknowledging that the framework of subject versus object has indeed at 
times worked to prevent or ameliorate human suffering and to promote 
human happiness or well-being. Second, by noting that its successes 
come at the price of an instrumentalization of nonhuman nature that can 
itself be unethical and can itself undermine long-term human interests. 
Third, by pointing out that the Kantian imperative to treat humanity al-
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ways as an end-in-itself and never merely as a means does not have a 
stellar record of success in preventing human suffering or promoting hu-
man well-being: it is important to raise the question of its actual, histori-
cal efficacy in order to open up space for forms of ethical practice that do 
not rely upon the image of an intrinsically hierarchical order of things. 
Here the materialist speaks of promoting healthy and enabling instrumen-
talizations, rather than of treating people as ends-in­themselves, because 
to face up to the compound nature of the human self is to find it difficult 
even to make sense of the notion of a Single end-in-itself. What instead 
appears is a swarm of competing ends being pursued Simultaneously in 
each individual, some of which are healthy to the whole, some of which 
are not.
101
 
Bennett somewhat allies with Zylinska, who – within her autonomous approach – 
equally raises the significance of “cutting-up” the world in order to be capable of 
saying anything about it; only then are we provided with a space whose production 
of concepts and means of assessment can be retrieved from the absolute arbitrariness, 
without falling into the trap of committing ourselves to the “construction of ontologi-
cal edifices that float like palaces in the sky.”102  
In her project, Bennett recognises a different threat. The matter which vi-
brates, emanates vivid energy, and is liberated might be individualised and fetishised. 
Because of that, she always contextualises it in the broader assemblages and systems 
capable of tracing the “swarms” in which matter comes to act in relation both to hu-
man and nonhuman material entities.
103
 This rhizome-like redefinition leads Bennett 
to claim that “[h]umanity and nonhumanity have always performed an intricate dance 
with each other. There was never a time when human agency was anything other 
than an interfolding network of humanity and nonhumanity […].”104 What is, how-
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ever, interesting is the fact that her approach – seemingly conflictual with Morton’s – 
is rooted in the same category: Derridaean à venir.105 The messianicity-without-
messianism it entails indicates expectation without any prediction or assumption 
concerning that which is expected. Therefore, the achieved openness allows Bennett 
to deprive her project of any intentionality, and consents for focusing on the efficacy 
and causality of matter instead. 
Even though not mentioned in the debate published in New Literary History, 
Serenella Iovino and Serpil Oppermann’s notion of storied matter provides yet an-
other application of new materialism to literary studies. Furthermore, it might func-
tion as a provisory theoretical link between the discussed ideas of Bennett and those 
of Barad, which will be discussed later on. Iovino and Oppermann advocate the ne-
cessity of material ecocriticism which is capable of retrieving the corporeal practices 
from the primacy of the constructivist (or linguistic) approaches, and, at the same 
time, of dissolving the conceptual barrier between these seemingly disconnected 
realms. Supporting the view of matter’s vibrancy and the dynamics of nonhuman 
agencies, Iovino and Oppermann proceed to rethinking the notions of narrativity and 
textuality. As they claim, we might redefine these categories in two ways; we can 
focus either “on the matter’s (or nature’s) nonhuman agentic capacities [that] are 
described and represented in narrative texts (literary, cultural visual)”106 or “on mat-
ter’s ‘narrative’ of creating configurations of meanings and substances, which enter 
with human lives into a field of co-emerging interactions,”107 so that “matter itself 
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becomes a text […].”108 Following the latter claim, Iovino and Oppermann argue that 
“[m]atter, in all its forms, in this regard, becomes a site of narrativity, a storied mat-
ter, embodying its own narratives in the minds of human agents and in the very struc-
ture of its own self-constructive forces.”109 Matter, therefore, becomes creative and 
active, abundant in stories it imposes on itself and its interpreters. What is more, its 
spreading and vibrant becoming does not lock it up in an isolated bubble of material 
connections, but rather expands it onto both material and discursive practices. Even-
tually, it dissociates the corporeal relations into the trans-corporeal ones, involving 
human and nonhuman bodies within a greater network of connections, irruptive 
transformations, and reciprocal forces, which human agency preserved in its attach-
ment to the textual is by no means excluded from. 
The dynamic interplay of the material and the discursive that is problematised 
by Iovino and Oppermann is grounded upon the conviction of the performative as-
pect of matter, widely discussed by Karen Barad. A feminist philosopher and physi-
cist by training inspired equally by Deleuze, Derrida, and Niels Bohr, Barad has in-
troduced her agential realism in Meeting Universe Halfway. By the same token, she 
has contributed to quantum or scientific readings of deconstruction, peculiar yet in-
creasingly popular within new materialist circles.
110
 For Barad, influenced by the 
Cophenhagen interpretation of the relativity theory, the world depends on the quasi-
exterior observer and the apparatus – a weird, experimental yet socially constructed 
medium. As she points out,  
Relations do not follow relata, but the other way around. Matter is neither 
fixed and given nor the mere end result of different processes. Matter is 
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produced and productive, generated and generative. Matter is agentive, 
not a fixed essence or property of things. Mattering is differentiating, and 
which differences come to matter, matter in the iterative production of 
different differences.
111
 
The realm of science with all of its objects is molten – it consists of relations inter-
weaving to the extreme; hence, it requires the third party in order to solidify, and 
render its “non-human real”112 into the distinguishable forms and the social practices 
that affect them. This position, for Barad, is occupied by apparatuses; as Slavoj Žižek 
demonstrates in his only non-antagonistic account of Barad, “while apparatuses are 
immanent to the human, a product of human productive and scientific engagement 
with reality, they are simultaneously inhuman in the sense that they enable us to dis-
cern the contours of a real which is not part of our reality.”113 Barad introduces, 
therefore, an immanent space of translation in its Latourian understanding – and 
communication between human and nonhuman.
114
 
With regard to the immanence of her project, Barad advocates the notion of 
intra-action. While two entities interact, in view of the prefix inter-, one has to as-
sume their fixed borders, their precise locations, and their impenetrable exteriority to 
each other. Intra-action, on the contrary, emphasises the immanent space instead, 
oriented at the mutuality of the inanimate and animate, visible and invisible, material 
and discursive. Apparatuses “enact agential cuts”115 producing the subject-objects 
divisions. The intra-active dynamics is placed in motion, resulting in the materialisa-
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tion of time and space, particles and meanings.
116
 Still, this process never succumbs 
to a fixed and arbitrary order, but rather reconfigures and redistributes it, affirming 
indeterminacy and non-exhaustible potentiality.
117
 The borders are drawn by the ap-
paratus, yet their intra-active entanglements remain transgressive. For Barad, such 
material and discursive entanglements bear resemblance to Derrida’s notion of 
hauntology, known from Specters of Marx.  
Hauntology is the conjuration of ontology, relying on the French homophony 
of hauntologie and ontologie; in this pair, the latter is summoned by the former, 
drawn into mutual conspiracy, yet simultaneously casted away and exorcised.
118
 Der-
rida coins hauntology in order to redefine the notion of inheritance through spectrali-
ty. The spectre belongs to the same iterable tradition as différance or animots; it en-
tails the dynamics “meant to signal the intervention upon or contravention of simple 
presence/absence schemas which opens up the invention of something tout autre.”119 
Just as the ghost of Hamlet’s father, the spectre is armoured and hidden behind the 
visor; its identity relies solely on the wager of conspiring with the apparitions and on 
the decision to respond to them.
120
 Inheritance is therefore but a spectral dialogue 
depending on responses and responsibilities, which confronts one with the impossi-
bility of grasping one’s legacy. In order to approach it somehow, one has to follow 
the “injunction to reaffirm [it] by choosing,”121 materialising the fragmentary form of 
the inheritance, and keep in mind that the frontiers assigned thereby are never given 
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once and for all.
122
 For Barad, the dissolution of the present, past, and future that 
Derrida contributes to becomes congruent to intra-active enfolding of matter or 
spacetimemattering, to use her concept, with the underlying response fuelling quan-
tum entanglements.
123
 The figure of the spectre – and this is the direct linkage within 
Derrida’s work – not only conditions messianicity deprived of any messianism, but 
also comes as a revenant or arrivant; this renders close the approaches of Barad, 
Bennett, and Morton, since each of them accepts the contract of pure yet fragile ex-
posure to what is to come. Perhaps these approaches should be considered not as 
conflictual, but rather as interwoven in their shared inherent hospitality.  
In “envois,” the opening “chapter” of The Post Card, Derrida merges pieces 
of his actual love letters with the fabricated ones, and then tampers with all of them 
by means of including blank spaces. The reader is left with the uncertainty of the 
proper addresses, addressers, authenticity and authorship of the texts, chronology and 
subsequence of the emerging fragments. For Derrida, this is precisely the nature of 
postcards, which, never carried in envelopes, are by design exposed to the interven-
tion of the Other: be it the act of reading and touching them for the very first time, 
the act of crossing out their parts, or the act of overwriting them. Fascinated with this 
correspondence, Derrida announces: 
Thus I apostrophize. This too is a genre one can afford oneself, the apos-
trophe. A genre and a tone. The word – apostrophizes – speaks of the 
word addressed to the singular one, a live interpellation (the man of dis-
course or writing interrupts the continuous development of the sequence, 
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abruptly turns toward someone, that is, something, addresses himself to 
you), but the word also speaks of the address to be detoured.
124
  
The figure of the apostrophe marks the inevitable exposure to the Other, as it signi-
fies both the act of addressing oneself and the punctuation mark of substitution, if not 
erasure. The postcards might be apostrophes per se – the effects of substituting one 
content with another, with no guarantee whether one is reading the initial text or the 
sign of its lack. Due to the aforementioned logic, each of “envois” never reaches its 
final and fixed form, but rather partakes in an undecidable movement oriented to-
wards possible alterations and transactions to come. 
If read within a mere speculative perspective, “envois” – through the shifting 
apostrophes – marks the tension between the embodiment and withdrawal, and be-
tween relations and materialisation. Yet, as Derrida finds out, an apo-strophe is in 
fact a cata-strophe: the sudden overturn.
125
 The apostrophe induces the uncertainty 
of things hidden behind the articulated speech and the punctuation mark, as if the 
remaining shard of the splintered meaning. Yet, the places might be switched without 
recognition. The catastrophe might mark here a dangerous twist contained within 
each act of exposure and hospitality, realised in the gesture of revealing the postcards 
to the unpredicted receivers and summoning the forces affecting their circulation. In 
their catastrophic twist, Derrida’s actual and fake love letters abandon intimacy un-
derstood as the sense of possession – be it authorship, address, or entitlement – to 
shed light on their form emerging from the coexistence of the bewildering things and 
the unleashed trajectories they follow. This affirmative reading of Derrida haunts and 
joins Barad, Bennett, and Morton together. For Barad, “[m]atter is a matter of uncan-
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ny intimacy, condensation of being and times.”126 Morton, for his turn, argues that 
“what remains without a world is intimacy.”127 Bennett – although never entirely 
referring to this term (which can be explained by her strong critical and translational 
orientation, in a Latourian sense of this word) – claims that acknowledging the vi-
brancy of matter can result in reminding “kinship between the human and inhu-
man,”128 since one’s corporeality has to be understood as a “material,” and at the 
same time it is not “exclusively human,” but rather “populated and constituted by 
different swarms of foreigners.”129 
These accounts of the force of intimacy and embeddedness in non-
presupposed hospitality connote a much earlier project, briefly delineated by Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty in his unfinished The Visible and the Invisible. Perhaps, the shared 
strivings of Barad, Bennett, and Morton might be reconfigured as different pathways 
to the peculiar configuration which Merleau-Ponty calls the flesh. Furthermore, the 
previously mentioned stances of Haraway and Iovino and Oppermann might also 
benefit from this position. For Merleau-Ponty, the “flesh is not matter, […] [n]or is 
the visible”; “it is not a fact or a sum of facts ‘material or spiritual’,” neither is it “a 
representation for a mind […].”130 Instead, it is an “incarnate principle that brings a 
style of being wherever there is a fragment of being. The flesh is in this sense an ‘el-
ement’ of Being.”131 Stemming directly from the disparity between touching and 
being-touched, when two hands touch different objects, the same object, and finally 
themselves, Merleau-Ponty recognises the flesh as “a texture that returns to itself and 
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conforms itself.”132 As Coole points out, the flesh is devoid of “teleological presump-
tion” as it gains its generative force from “folds, deferrals and reversals.”133 As the 
element of being, not necessarily belonging to it but enfolded with it, the flesh inter-
weaves with the sensual world; it gains energy, transfers it to bodies, and creatively 
transforms them. In its reversibility it returns to itself and remains aimed at itself as a 
non-determinant fluctuation of force. The flesh might serve as a junction in which 
the critical projects of Morton, Barad, and Bennett intersect, each enveloping within 
the others; by design, the flesh mediates the indeterminate being by gathering its 
forces with the contingent and vibrant processes of embodiment. 
Literary Materialists 
In this chapter, I have attempted to map the turn occurring within contempo-
rary humanities which results in the shared liberation from the snares of language 
tightened in the second half of the 20
th
 century in favour of the material, the ontolog-
ical, and the embodied. Throughout my argument, I have endeavoured to demon-
strate how the new emerging trends intersect and part ways, and develop both histor-
ically and theoretically. Following Barad, Bennett, Haraway, Iovino and Oppermann, 
and Morton, I have aimed at creating a shared hypothetical space in which their indi-
vidual differences should not be confined within the frame of a conflict, but rather 
interwoven in the constantly enveloping encounter. Such an affirmative approach 
indeed weakens the cohesion of their selected claims, yet it is compensated with the 
possibility of including these arguments within new systems which recognise differ-
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ent temporal and spatial realms of the nonhuman, developing bonds with them and 
not only inoperable abstractions.
134
  
By means of the alliance thereby gathered, I will endeavour to shed light on 
its potential interactions (or intra-actions) with the works by Samuel Beckett and 
Tadeusz Kantor. Exploring and expanding the ideas briefly introduced in this chap-
ter, I will further focus on Beckett’s and Kantor’s intuitions concerning the crisis of 
the subject/object divide, manifested in their fascination with the forces driving spac-
es, particles, voids, fragmentariness, embodiments, and the like. Equally, these au-
thors manifest various doubts with regard to the primacy assigned to the all-
embracing time that flows linearly. Nonetheless, their potential does not simply 
emerge in these associations, but rather in their individual attempts to abandon the 
mimetic and representative strategies in favour of creating the whole machinery or 
medium capable of inducing the aforementioned processes. If that is the case, then it 
is more than urgent to return to them as to the theoretical partners and re-read the 
works of these “literary materialists” in the context of the onto-epistemological shift 
in the contemporary theory.  
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CHAPTER 2  
“Dark Crammed Holes”  
Diffractive Memories and the Theatre of Death  
 
in the front, there is 
the contempt (mine) 
for “general” 
and off icial  
History.
1
 
 
Exeunt History 
History is in withdrawal
2
; after over one hundred years of its scientifically se-
cured form, it eventually reclaimed the place among other literary genres it had been 
holding up until the 19
th
 century with its inherent “paradoxical position of creating 
objects it claims only to discover,”3 to use Joan W. Scott’s words. The poststructural-
ist proliferation of accounts previously marginalised – including among others femi-
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nist, postcolonial, gender, and queer historiographies – demystified the fragility of 
historical narratives within a greater biopolitical framework of institutionalised vio-
lence. Accounts oriented towards the future – with the neoliberal Hegelian closure 
prophesised by Francis Fukuyama and the postmodern thesis on the unnecessity of 
history being two dominant narratives – turn out to be equally futile. While both 
models might be considered outdated marks of their times, contemporary humanities 
has hardly overcome them and has fallen into a dearth of social or political alterna-
tives. Although this point demands a separate and detailed discussion, politics of 
austerity reproducing further inequalities, dispersed military and para-military atroci-
ties, and increasing climatic instability have gradually been exposing the insufficien-
cy of the solutions proposed by these models. In a way, it should not surprise us that 
in the light of the aforementioned challenges, history and historiography – as such 
scholars as Hayden White and Frank Ankersmit suggest – have become preoccupied 
with their own aesthetics and poetics, whereas the recent criticism has massively 
abandoned them in favour of event (in the discourses of the contingent future) and 
memory or testimony (in those focused on the lost past). 
History is in withdrawal also because it betrayed those who had put their faith 
in it. Industrialisation of murder along with racist genocides spreading throughout the 
20
th
 century not only neutralised the axiological and privileged position of history 
and called its pedagogical usage into question, but also resulted in the epistemic rup-
ture which reached the only viable solution in indefinite distance. Whereas indeed 
many classical modernist and postmodernist stances benefit from this aporetic as-
sumption, trauma studies observed that purifying the general and official history of 
its hidden subjective agenda is simply not enough; rather, it becomes vital to under-
stand the fashion in which the most intimate and repressed “histories” become pub-
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lic.
4
 What is at stake – to formulate it more theoretically – is to trace the marks of 
historical events in the mechanisms of structural trauma they fuel, and then to identi-
fy the channels of transference, constructed by the later primeval and deeply re-
pressed contents.
5
  
While the outline presented above does not aim at being a comprehensive lec-
ture on the vast area of intersections of memory and history in the contemporary crit-
ical thought, it briefly indicates selected transitions it has gone through; as it will be 
demonstrated further on, this selection is predominantly motivated by the fact that 
Tadeusz Kantor’s spectacles correspond to similar issues, and even predict some of 
them. This chapter is devoted to the affective and material practices by means of 
which Tadeusz Kantor reconstructs what I call diffractive memories. Driven by his 
“contempt […] for ‘general’ and official  History,”6 he meticulously develops a 
radically subjective aesthetics of the theatre of death aimed at touching upon the ex-
cess of life, so that twisted and repetitive memories turn out to be more “authentic” 
than even the most detailed historical account.  
I will begin with summarising Kantor’s philosophy of history and memory, 
focusing predominantly on the central role of repetition and the public/private binary. 
Moreover, I will introduce the key concepts of his theatre of death and trace its evo-
lution. Then, I will introduce Gilles Deleuze’s concept of syntheses of time and Ka-
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ren Barad’s reading of diffraction. These notions, along with Kantor’s own theoreti-
cal investigations, will allow me to demonstrate how the anti-representationalist po-
tential inscribed in the theatre of death can be conceptualised. In order to achieve 
that, I will scrutinise the function photography fulfils in Kantor’s works, keeping in 
mind that taking pictures, as a physical phenomenon, relies on diffraction. Finally, I 
will distinguish and explore three figures of radical memory – the pre-natal one, the 
anti-natal one, and the posthumous one – to exemplify the work of the aforemen-
tioned diffractive memories preserved in Kantor’s oeuvre. 
Dark Crammed Holes  
What Kantor’s oeuvre shares with the double withdrawal of history is un-
doubtedly its placement between two catastrophes, understood as both disastrous 
events and a sudden overturn, implied by the etymology of katastrephein.
7
 The first 
one conditions the epistemic rupture as well as splintered construction of the world. 
The other one looms at the gates as a messianic event which will suddenly arrive 
from nowhere. It is the self-perpetuating threat of unimaginable dehumanisation 
which we once allowed to happen and which fosters our vigilance. To begin with, 
Kantor’s project of the theatre of death with its unique aesthetics to a great extent has 
been made possible by the enormous formative effect that the genocides of the early 
20
th
 century have had on his generation; this effect becomes embodied in the canoni-
cal figure of the defamiliarised room which no longer resembles the space remem-
bered from one’s childhood.8 Rather, this room encapsulates the desolated battlefield 
where the most intimate and the historical once clashed. Childish innocence was rup-
                                                             
7
 See: Online Etymology Dictionary. Available at: http://www.etymonline.com (access: 20 February 
2019). 
8
 See: Tadeusz Kantor, “The Milano Lessons. Lesson 12,” in: A Journey through Other Spaces, pp. 
258-260. 
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tured by absurd violence, which was irreversibly imprinted on the matter of this most 
familial space and the objects residing in it. Consequently, it is no wonder that this 
ruined landscape becomes the privileged space in Kantor’s works, serving as the 
place where victims of the Shoah meet with unremembered Adaś perished in the war, 
where mechanical infantrymen encounter family members, and, finally, where geno-
cides interweave with private traumas of abandonment, rejection, vituperation, or 
rape. None of these, however, are supposed to reach a suitable working-through 
within a historical process. The theatre of death often employs the figure of circling 
processions, known from both Wielopole, Wielopole and Let the Artists Die, which 
compresses the private and the historical within a faulty march through the same 
tragic events again and again. Yet, the hidden revelation this figure delivers is not 
only that of a flat course of history, but also that which makes the artist inevitably 
fail in every struggle against its powers. The anticipatory dimension, in turn, encom-
passes the contemporaneity as an unsuccessful project to repair the mistake made in 
the past: the inclusion of the individual life.
9
 Back in the late 1980s, Kantor writes 
that we are on the threshold of the Modern Apocalypse, that is, the times when over-
whelming communication silences art and individual expression, technological re-
production supplants creativity, and all-embracing commodification and commercial-
isation exclude many human beings deprived of their share in the rapidly multiplying 
yet centralised surplus of goods and knowledge.
10
 
                                                             
9
 Kantor, “To Save from Oblivion,” p. 252. 
10
 See: Kantor, “The Milano Lessons. Lesson 12,” p. 268. Bitterly posed, Kantor’s notion of the Mod-
ern Apocalypse seems to be biased. He opposes the commercialisation of everyday life, which we 
would today dub as neoliberalism, and endorses artistic elitism and distrust towards rapidly develop-
ing technologies of communication; however, the latter two processes hardly proved to threaten indi-
vidual human beings and their expression. Even though such outcomes might have not been foreseea-
ble in the 1980s, it is difficult not to read the juxtaposition Kantor leaves us with as signals of his own 
fear of the declining position of the artist, a father figure after all, and “his” privileged voice. The 
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In the light of what has already been said, Kantor seems to be aware that 
while history cannot be, for obvious reasons, defeated on its (battle)field, it is possi-
ble to confront it by means of memory, whose potential must be re-discovered be-
forehand. As for history, its “general and official” form has earned nothing but his 
“contempt.”11 As he claims further on, this “history of / mass Movements, / mass 
ideologies, / passing terms of Governments, / terror by power, mass wars, / mass 
crimes…”12 has to be confronted by that which it has always aimed at forgetting, 
namely: “Small , / Poor, / Defenceless, / but magnificent / history of / individu-
al  / human / l ife .”13 Interestingly enough, Kantor has not elevated the role of tes-
timony, crucial for the contemporary critical theory. Is it because of his performative 
and theatrical inclinations? Or, is it because of the anxiety that testimony might be 
eventually dissolved in a greater narrative? These questions cannot be easily an-
swered; what seems to be of a greater importance is the fact that Kantor has not put 
his trust in narrative processes, but he rather follows the idea that the power of 
memory has to be adopted via the broader redefinition of the affectivity of its tempo-
rality. Kantor writes: “TIME was unreal. / TIME PAST / and everything that was 
real in life / were bereft of their life’s function and life’s effectiveness in this unreal 
TIME.”14 In the same text, he adds that in order to grasp the potential of this revela-
tion, a new “nonphysical” dimension has to be introduced to his works: “THE 
CONDITION OF DEATH – of the DEAD – RECREATED IN THE LIVING. / 
TIME PAST MYSTERIOUSLY SLIPPED INTO TIME PRESENT. / The past exists 
                                                                                                                                                                            
dyad of mass and individual that Kantor is obsessively placing in the centre of his revision of history 
and memory, and it points to the possibility of an upcoming catastrophe. 
11
 Kantor, “To Save from Oblivion,” pp. 251-253. 
12
 Kantor, “To Save from Oblivion,” p. 167. Emphasis mine. 
13
 Kantor, “To Save from Oblivion,” p. 167. Emphasis mine. 
14
 Tadeusz Kantor, “Memory,” in: A Journey through Other Spaces, p. 157. 
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in / memory. / DEAD! / Its inhabitants are / DEAD, too.”15 The project of the restitu-
tion of memory thus turns out to be an inherent part of the theatre of death. 
What is by design at stake in the theatre of death – the artistic period launched 
by Kantor in 1970s – is the affirmation of the singularity of the theatrical encounter. 
As Kantor postulates in his manifesto, the theatre of death is predominantly interest-
ed in recovering the most primordial moment when both the actors and the audience 
stood against themselves for the very first time, equally similar and uncannily oth-
er.
16
 Since for Kantor death in his theatrical project can only be manifested by “the 
absence of life,”17 a mannequin – stunningly resembling a human being – becomes 
posited as the “MODEL for a live actor.”18 By means of resemblance, imitation, 
mimicry, parody, and repetition, the theatre of death cherishes the deconstruction of 
the same/other binary. The founding encounter turns out to be a deeply traumatic 
one; when death becomes indistinguishable from life, and a copy – from authenticity, 
the theatrical reality exposes its own artificiality. The spectators lose their safe and 
comforting separation from the stage, which the convention has provided them with. 
Consequently, they are deprived of their fixed sense of belonging, time, and space 
whereas their boundaries become temporarily suspended, if not abolished at all.  
Even though Kantor praises the function of appearances in his manifesto, the 
theatre of death happens to dissolve the conventions oriented at representation; ap-
pearances are understood here merely as simulacra purifying the relationships that 
bind the living together. While reading Gilles Deleuze and Maurice Blanchot in The 
Posthuman, Rosi Braidotti notes that the event of death precedes itself; death does 
not point to the horizon of one’s existence, but instead, the cut it is supposed to enact 
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 Kantor, “Memory,” p. 158. 
16
 Tadeusz Kantor, “The Theatre of Death,” in: A Journey through Other Spaces, p. 114. 
17
 Kantor, “The Theatre of Death,” p. 112. Emphasis in the original. 
18
 Kantor, “The Theatre of Death,” p. 112. 
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founds one’s relation to death beforehand. Hence, dying is no longer the matter of 
the linear being towards death hinged in time understood as Chronos, but rather it is 
hinged in time as Aion – constantly actualising the present as becoming. In Braidot-
ti’s vitalist reading, death happens to be the “condition of possibility” and a sieve 
through which one is constantly reconfiguring oneself and one’s boundaries.19 Kan-
tor seems to approach death similarly. For him, it is detached from the “chronic” 
notion of the ultimate event; rather, death functions here as a transformative potential 
suspending the aforementioned boundaries. Bit by bit, it fuels the movement of dif-
ference between the ones onstage, the roles they play, and the ones among the audi-
ence, contributing to the sudden and singular event that is supposed to come: the 
shock, the encounter. The theatre of death, therefore, delves into the most intimate 
and forsaken part of being alive, and, by means of its temporary suspension, makes 
us more attuned to the singularity emerging in the theatrical performance and the 
becoming it facilitates. 
The room crowded with memories – replacing the classroom introduced in 
The Dead Class – becomes the central space for the theatre of death. In the opening 
passage to Wielopole, Wielopole, Kantor writes: 
The room of my childhood 
is a dark HOLE, which is full of junk. 
It is not true that a childhood room in our memory 
is always sunny and bright. 
It is turned into such by 
a literary convention. 
It is a DEAD room, 
as well as a room of the DEAD. 
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 Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2013), pp. 130-133. 
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Recalled, 
it dies.
20
 
 He continues: 
Here is a room of my childhood,  
that I keep reconstructing again and again  
and that keeps dying again and again  
with all its inhabitants. 
Its inhabitants are the members of my family. 
They continuously repeat all their movements and activities 
as if they were recorded on a film negative shown interminably. 
They will keep repeating those banal, 
elementary, and aimless activities 
with the same expression on their faces, 
concentrating on the same gesture 
until boredom strikes. 
Those trivial activities 
that stubbornly and oppressively preoccupy us 
fill up our lives…21 
With regard to these passages, it should not surprise us that for Kantor recalling 
times past is a “murky and dubious practice.”22 A ruptured spatial dimension of 
trauma, the room no longer remains a safe and secluded haven, nor does it point to 
the origins of one’s existence. Just as Kantor himself adamantly doubts the power of 
dreams,
23
 the room belongs to an anti-Bachelardian house; nobody wants to return to 
it, and nobody projects it on further inhabited spaces.
24
 Dispersed, crammed, and 
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 Tadeusz Kantor, Wielopole, Wielopole, in: Tadeusz Kantor, Wielopole, Wielopole (Kraków and 
Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1984), pp. 32-33. Translation by Michal Kobialka is quoted in: 
Kobialka, Further on, Nothing, p. 282. The quotation is modified with regard to the error in transla-
tion indicated in this chapter, footnote no. 2. 
21
 Kantor, “Memory,” pp. 157-158. Originally, this fragment was included in the script of Wielopole, 
Wielopole. 
22
 Kantor, Wielopole, Wielopole, p. 33. 
23
 Kantor, “The Milano Lessons. Lesson 12,” p. 264. 
24
 Bachelard claims that “the house protects the dreamer, the house allows one to dream in peace.” 
Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space. The Classic Look at How We Experience Intimate Places, 
trans. Maria Jolas, with a new foreword by John R. Stilgoe (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), p. 6. This 
issue is discussed in detail in the first two chapters of Bachelard’s book. See also: Stacy Alaimo, Ex-
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cluttered, this ruined territory is never entirely recovered, but rather it overwhelms 
one with the shreds of identity and memory scattered there, making any attempt of 
complete arrangement futile. One always finds something different than that which 
has been expected or searched for, whereas each ascribed order strikes one with its 
temporariness, inadequacy, and artificiality.  
Resisting stable representations, the room engulfs one with the abundance of 
materiality residing in it. Firstly, it bears traces of the disastrous events which led to 
its recent desolated shape. Secondly, as a result of those devastating powers, the ma-
terial is its only present inhabitant. Similarly to the theories discussed in Chapter 1, 
Kantor – indebted to the informalism of the 1950s and 1960s – privileges the dynam-
ics and transformative potential of matter.
25
 Against form and other solid construc-
tions, this movement redefines matter as “fluid” and “infinite,”26 which in turn is 
unfolded in its advancing decay and progressing erosion.
27
 Well-aware that such ma-
teriality can be captured within the onto-aesthetic project, Kantor proposes what he 
calls the reality of the lowest rank. According to its principles, objects and things 
become worthy insofar as they reach the threshold of their uselessness and wrecked 
condition; tatters, shreds, dirt, junk, garbage, scraps – these are the components of 
such reality.  
The abovementioned postulate has by all means been included in the theatre 
of death. The room introduced in Wielopole, Wielopole is employed once again in 
Let the Artists Die, in which it smoothly turns into a morgue, and later into a den 
                                                                                                                                                                            
posed: Environmental Politics and Pleasures in Posthuman Times (Minneapolis and London: Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, 2016), p. 16. Rightly so, Alaimo notes that the homely image Bachelard re-
calls implicitly points to a male fantasy. Although I do not comment on this issue, it undoubtedly is an 
interpretative path which is worth exploring also in connection to Kantor’s preoccupation with houses 
and rooms.  
25
 Tadeusz Kantor, “Reality of the Lowest Rank,” in: A Journey through Other Spaces, p. 117. 
26
 Kantor, “Reality of the Lowest Rank,” p. 117. 
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 Kantor, “Reality of the Lowest Rank,” p. 117. 
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crowded with scoundrels, while in I Shall Never Return a similar sleazy haunt serves 
as an opening setting. Since death is never a far cry from remnants, these abandoned 
places are never physically distant from wooden crosses and the debris remaining 
after fierce battles, as the settings of both spectacles suggest. Finally, crammed with 
random objects, the room is also the realm of a dilettantish masquerade or a clownish 
play, that is, the activities of the lowest rank: exaggerated, grotesque, and provision-
al. While discussing the path to rediscover the power of memory, Kantor emphasises 
that child-like naïveté (presumably embodied in the figure of the room and in im-
proper acting) and the rethinking of the possibilities of the stage (as the reality of the 
lowest rank) are required.
28
 Both of them are marginalised, ridiculed, and unrecog-
nised by the general public. Retrieving the most private and intimate – including 
memories – is possible only by means of including poverty with its widely repressed 
reality and making it the most radical statement that artistic practices can pose. 
The Employment Agency of the Dear Departed, introduced in Wielopole, 
Wielopole, is yet another dimension of the lowest rank conditioning the work of re-
calling. Memory is indeed “murky and dubious,” precisely because those who return 
in it are caricatures: entities suspended between mechanical repetition of their lines, 
catchphrases, or daily activities and the impossibility of recovering the very moments 
in which they were frozen in our memory, forever unchangeable and lost. In fact, one 
hires “shadowy, dubious sort of creatures” to function as his or her close relatives 
who are gone. Hence, in Kantor’s reconstruction of Wielopole the uncles happen to 
be “common tramps,” the mother – a blatant street-walker, while the father is imper-
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sonated by a “dodgy-looking bloke.”29 Although such an agency could function as a 
metaphor for the memory archive, it rather deconstructs its own contents, questioning 
their finitude and the possibility of wielding control over them. Stricken with repeti-
tions, the hired shadowy entities are incapable of providing those whom they replace 
with authenticity, which is demanded from them. Instead, they immerse in the gro-
tesque logic of mechanisation and objectification. Wojciech Owczarski claims: 
In the imagination of the artist, The Employment Agency [of the Dear 
Departed] is not a metaphor for memory, but rather an experiment explor-
ing how the dead exist. Their scenic realness, the constantly exposed ma-
teriality of the effigies, and the actors impersonating these mannequins – 
all of these suggest that Kantor’s artistic work does not boil down to 
struggles with the incapacities of human memory. There is more to it. 
[…] The existence of deformed relatives is real. […] Their degradation, 
debasement, and fall are the prices of making them present once again.
30
 
A similar conclusion is driven by Michal Kobialka, who finds in Kantor’s work “a 
portent of other universe” which “could only be sensed now, in a different way, af-
firming the atavistic gestures of human beings, who came into a space liberated from 
the seductions of everyday life and its fetishized, enchanted simulacra.”31 Emphati-
cally, the power of the Employment Agency exceeds the murky business of renting 
people. Indeed, it stores desolate places, distressing stories, twisted habits, and unset-
tling routines. Perhaps, the Agency points to another argument for recalling the room 
of one’s childhood as the space one does not want to return to at all. Lodged, such a 
room embraces the possibility of deconstructing the temptation to represent it, or to 
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 Kantor, Wielopole, Wielopole, p. 33. I use here the translation by George Hyde included in: 
Krzysztof Miklaszewski, Encounters with Tadeusz Kantor, trans. and ed. George Hyde (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 73. 
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represent it idyllically: the possibility which is performed as a shattered memory on-
stage. 
The relation between the room – but also between other spaces carefully con-
structed by Kantor – and the Employment Agency (whose presence exceeds Wielo-
pole, Wielopole) prefigures the crucial role of repetition in the theatre of death. In the 
light of our previous considerations, one may dare say that Wielopole Skrzyńskie – 
Kantor’s hometown recalled in the spectacle – does not exist at all; it is already me-
diated to us by Wielopole, Wielopole, that is, an employed, distorted, repeated image 
performed onstage, which is uncannily different from and deceptively similar to the 
place it aims to recover. For Kantor, repetition encompasses a bitter and weak at-
tempt to repeat the divine act of creation; simultaneously audacious and clumsy, even 
as the very intention such an endeavour is predestined to fail and thus to provoke the 
vengeful gods.
32
 The reason for this lies in the fact that repetition, as Kantor argues, 
pinpoints its very origin as the decision of human beings to “[c]reate something as if 
for the second time, / out of that which already exists [...].”33 This, in turn, has two 
implications. Firstly, repetition is inseparable from any form of artistic activity. Sec-
ondly, repetition inherently conspires with death and the dead since it cannot flaw-
lessly re-create the object it repeats: the object which has initially seduced one with 
its liveliness and realness. Importantly enough, this heretic act resides on the other 
side of illusion, which is directly opposed to reality.
34
 It attempts to purify everything 
from its “real” origins which once seduced one (just as the echo transporting a sound 
but not an event that is gone) and to suspend its seriousness (just as childish mimick-
                                                             
32
 Tadeusz Kantor, “Illusion and Repetition,” in: Further on, Nothing, p. 403. 
33
 Kantor, “Illusion and Repetition,” p. 403. 
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ing).
35
 In Kantor’s theoretical and aesthetic work, repetition becomes a central ges-
ture of the theatre of death, but also, as it will be explored later, a figure of passing 
memory and weakening control of an artist over his or her oeuvre. 
Kantor’s “dark holes” are crammed and cluttered, while all of their residents 
multiply constantly. In a critical endeavour, repetition in Wielopole, Wielopole de-
constructs the mnemonic and quasi-biographical figures, replicating the employed 
dear departed and imitating their behaviour. Let the Artists Die and I Shall Never 
Return follow the aforementioned logic and focus on their own meta-qualities in a 
straightforward manner. In the former spectacle, Kantor’s life is disintegrated into 
several repetitive acts marking his dispersed existence. Such a formal device projects 
the uncanny impression of how the death of an artist affects his or her work, and how 
this event wanders on the limits of artistic imagination and mundaneness of biologi-
cal demise. The latter one, finally, provides a space in which Kantor’s previous spec-
tacles and performances repeat themselves in the weird meeting between himself and 
the individuals who poorly and weakly imitate the roles they have already played. 
Yet, each of these cases unfolds the other side of Kantor’s repetition: the affirmation 
of life and its potential, which takes place directly after the deconstructive and puri-
fying practice. Accordingly, it affirms particular human beings, their memories, the 
memory of them, that which would remain after them, and that which memory could 
make of these creations. Self-aware, Kantor picks the only suitable figure for such a 
project: his own life as the only life of an individual that he can access. This is the 
price and the means for providing a counter-model against general histories, public 
insensitivity, and totalising accounts; this is an outcome of revolting against shady 
representations and patronising narratives. All of these, as he indicates, are meant to 
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embrace his life, a life in “its contours and features, its matter.”36 Neither cynical nor 
nihilist, the ontology of the lowest rank – if we can speak of such – focuses therefore 
on “THE ESSENCE OF LIFE, bereft of / STYLIZATION, GLITTER, false PA-
THOS, or ACADEMIC BEAUTY.”37 
Diffraction and Repetition 
Kantor’s theatre of death employs death as a negation of that which is alive 
only insofar as it unravels the hidden liveliness of things. Repetition, usually exag-
gerated, offers one of such possibilities; it debunks the cohesion of arbitrary memo-
ries by reducing them to looped moments imprinted in our minds just before their 
incorporation into smooth and organised whole. Then, perhaps, they are no longer 
memories; memories, after all, are spontaneous, random, and clumsy. What Kantor 
seems to be particularly interested in is something much more elusive. Contrary to 
the deceptive and idyllic work of memory, it might be the desire to reach the raw 
materiality of time before it forks into present, past, and future. This is the materiality 
which tempts to animate time anew, to relive it, but this time on its nonhuman terms. 
Previously, we have connected this to the vitalist concept of aion; in the light of our 
recent considerations, the syntheses of time – an earlier Deleuzian concept – would 
be more applicable, since – as Tamsin Lorraine suggests – they structurally prefigure 
the aionic time.
38
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In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze argues – in a nutshell – that one’s sense 
of time is divided into active syntheses, relying on the processes of the mind, and the 
deeper passive ones that condition the former. Following Hume, Deleuze points out 
that “[r]epetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but does change something 
in the mind which contemplates it.”39 This movement of novelties has to be included 
within a subjective notion of time, which embraces the homogenous instants, their 
repetitions, and thus succession. This, in turn, requires that prior to any conscious 
way of contemplating time, time has to be passively synthesised as a condition for 
further determinations.
40
 The first synthesis operates on the level of habit; it consti-
tutes passing yet living present, which by means of retention unfolds itself as past, 
and by means of anticipation – as future: its two immanent dimensions.41 In order to 
make its passing possible and simultaneously to preserve its present aspect, the sec-
ond synthesis is demanded. Deleuze claims that “the past, far from being a dimension 
of time, is the synthesis of time of which the present and the future are only dimen-
sions.”42 The second synthesis establishes the paradoxical pure past coexistent and 
intertwined with the present, filtrating succession of one present instant with anoth-
er.
43
  
There is, however, a third synthesis which corresponds to Kantor’s oeuvre the 
most: that of future which unfolds itself as present and past, or, in other words, that 
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of an empty time.
44
 The uncanniness of Kantor’s work excludes the habit-oriented 
living present of the first synthesis (despite his interest in routine), whereas his own 
reflections on repetition suggest that the stake is greater than the progressing archivi-
sation of the second one.
45
 According to the third synthesis, time opens itself, ceasing 
to follow its circular movement. Formally speaking, the figure of this synthesis is a 
caesura; it redistributes “before” and “after” anew, re-arranges boundaries, and al-
lows a novelty to emerge. Seemingly static, it happens to be a condition for what has 
been previously unthinkable, dividing time into series. Beginning as the symbolic 
image of an event after nothing can remain unchanged, the caesura must be applied 
so that the unbounded excess can be further carried away: this is the totality of the 
past.
46
 The caesura relates itself to its foundational crashed image of the totalised 
time in the creative metamorphosis of the present, reorganising it under the influence 
of the past.
47
 Then, the future arrives as a repetition by excess whose asymmetry de-
stroys the “Self” which has been hastily identified with it. For Deleuze, it is “as 
though the bearer of the new world were carried away and dispersed by the shock of 
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multiplicity to which it gives birth.”48 The self and the subject – cut with the caesura 
– become shattered in the work of repetitions.  
This is the moment when Deleuze turns towards Friedrich Nietzsche, who 
most prominently, ahead of his times, diagnosed the baseless and dissolved subject 
(after the death of God) not through disintegration but through liberation. Deployed 
in this process, the overman – whom Deleuze also refers to – encompasses radical 
autonomy with excessive possibilities of becoming.
49
 James Williams claims that the 
devastating diagnosis Deleuze puts forward becomes rhetorically emphasised with 
the overman so that the triumph of underlying “faceless multiplicity” might be an-
nounced.
50
 Williams’s comment is apt in this sense that Deleuze seems to be not so 
much interested in the overman itself, but rather in these unrestrained capacities of 
becoming. That is why he adopts another Nietzschean figure: the eternal return. The 
eternal return embraces circular movement in which – surprisingly – one never re-
turns to the “same” and “self,” but rather becomes involved in a creative metamor-
phosis of the present. The totality of the past is broken, whereas the only thing that 
actually returns is nothing but difference, unfolding temporal planes and facilitating 
the mechanisms of becoming. 
Although Kantor’s relation to temporality is not as complex as Deleuze’s, and 
even remains at odds with some of its aspects, both of them do seem complementary. 
As it has been discussed above, the theatre of death cherishes the shock evoked by 
the collapsing fetishes of identity and identicality, or of self and the same. It can be 
argued, then, that Kantor’s philosophy of time follows assumptions similar to 
Deleuze’s. His hostility towards the unifying and impersonal history and his distrust 
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towards totalising temporal schemes, both of these are achieved by means of disrupt-
ing their regular flow and unveiling what lies behind them. Hence, the staged time is 
also focused on shock and handling the excess: precisely, the excess of life. Surpris-
ingly, in comparison to Deleuze, this is also accomplished by rethinking the function 
of repetition as a vehicle for difference. Since these aspects will be emphasised and 
elaborated further on, let me only assume that for Kantor temporality of the theatre of 
death also relies on the seeming return of the same, which is never what one has 
counted on but rather something entirely different unleashed by the liveness of mat-
ter. 
Before we proceed with further analysis, I would like to argue that Kantor’s 
works require a methodology which foregrounds the movements of the third synthe-
sis, yet operates on such a level that the overwhelming materiality of his work can be 
traced. Karen Barad’s agential realism and her reading of diffraction, introduced in 
Chapter 1, happen to be useful tools in this matter.
51
 Together with what we have 
already said on Deleuze, her investigations will help us trace two strategies Kantor 
applies to his materialised memories onstage. The first one will emerge as a differ-
ence achieved through duplicated and dispersed decoys for “I.” The temporalities 
assigned to these decoys collide with each other, unhinging the staged events from 
the totalised accounts of memory, history, or unified time. Still, they do not confront 
us with untraceable chaos; rather, they assign limits and borders – perhaps, even cae-
surae – anew, shaping the future yet only insofar as it is comprised of what already 
belongs to the past. The other strategy, rooted in the eternal return, prohibits the past 
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to come back as it once was. From the looped lines and twisted habits, through the 
family and infantry raised from the dead, to circular movements in the processions of 
wraiths, Kantor’s works employ the logic of return to ensure us that coming back 
from the depths of memory results only in a surprise at best, if not in failure and dis-
appointment. The past repeats itself in the course of constantly unfolding difference. 
Recently, diffraction has become a significant method, an affirmative figure 
of difference, and a reading strategy in critical theory. In the most general sense, it 
derives its metaphor from classical physics, in which diffraction signifies a phenom-
enon of waves bending after reaching an obstacle, or a process of interference of two 
or more waves. It finds the most telling visual example in the fluctuating surface of 
the pond in which one throws a couple of pebbles one after another. In a more mod-
ern movement, quantum mechanics revises this statement, emphasising that it is not 
only a quality of waves, but rather a phenomenon intrinsic to every single particle.
52
 
Firstly adopted to critical theory by Donna Haraway, diffraction serves the purpose 
of conceptualising the patterns of difference within rapidly changing semiotic and 
technological paradigms. Haraway proposes a strategy that traverses through disci-
plines, discourses, ideas, or even texts beyond their temporal fixtures in the move-
ment akin to that of the rippling waves on the surface of water.
53
 Barad, on her part, 
reconsiders Haraway’s proposition in a two-fold manner, treating it as both an object 
of study and a methodology. The latter one – although reminiscing some tools al-
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ready developed in literary theory
54
 – constitutes a reading strategy opening one text 
of culture by another, despite their temporal or historical disjunctions, within a per-
spective that is not rooted in the central narrative of conflict. Diffraction as an object 
of Barad’s study embraces the dynamism of setting, transgressing, and transforming 
boundaries within spatial and temporal becoming of the indeterminate reality. 
Just as the diffractive potential of matter has been proven by a two-slit appa-
ratus in quantum physics, thinking diffractively calls for a re-reading of an apparatus, 
briefly introduced in Chapter 1. Reading Judith Butler, Michel Foucault, and Niels 
Bohr, Barad proposes that “apparatuses are the material conditions of possibility and 
impossibility of mattering; they enact what matters and what is excluded from mat-
tering. Apparatuses enact agential cuts that produce determinate boundaries and 
properties of ‘entities’ within phenomena, where ‘phenomena’ are the ontological 
inseparability of agentially intra-acting components.”55 Inspired by Bohr, Barad con-
ceptualises an apparatus as the means of experimentation, which remains inseparable 
from the senses partaking in a research it expands. Yet, since apparatuses are pre-
dominantly material, experiments they conduct also come into being in a material-
ised time and space, as knowledge relies on discursive/material processes of setting 
and going beyond the boundaries. Apparatuses mediate the nonhuman to the human: 
they produce the object they “measure,” they produce themselves, and, finally, they 
produce those who entail the cuts in an immanent intra-action (and not inter-
action).
56
 However – and this must be particularly emphasised – apparatuses are not 
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reconfigurations that one can safely apply to or deploy in a world. Actually, they are 
material-discursive assemblages which we are part of instead.
57
 
Neither of the cuts is definite, neither of the spacetimes is all-encompassing, 
“nothing […] is new”58 and “nothing […] is not new.”59 Such a complex play of in-
determinacy and boundaries calls the issues of time – of succession – into question, 
which is the problem that troubles Deleuze in Difference and Repetition. Barad ar-
gues that 
[d]iffraction is not a singular event that happens in space and time; rather, 
it is a dynamism that is integral to spacetimemattering. Diffractions are 
untimely. Time is out of joint; it is diffracted, broken apart in different di-
rections, non-contemporaneous with itself. Each moment is an infinite 
multiplicity. “Now” is not an infinitesimal slice but an infinitely rich con-
densed node in a changing field diffracted across spacetime in its ongoing 
iterative repatterning.
60
 
In the same manner as diffractive patterns in physics never return or re-turn to their 
place of origin unaltered, this moment of repatterning is not a problem of simple one-
to-one repetition. Barad adds elsewhere:  
There is no inherently determinate relationship between past and future. 
Phenomena are not located in space and time; rather, phenomena are ma-
terial entanglements enfolded and threaded through the spacetimematter-
ing of the universe. Even the “re-turn” of a diffraction pattern does not 
signal a going back, an erasure of memory, a restoration of a present past. 
Memory – the pattern of sedimented enfoldings of iterative intra-activity 
– is written into the fabric of the world. The world “holds” the memory of 
all traces; or rather, the world is its memory (enfolded materialization).
61
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These two recapitulations describe processes reminding us of what we have already 
said about Deleuze’s third synthesis. Similarly, diffractive patterns are not necessari-
ly taking place in time and space. On the contrary, time and space are constructed by 
the wandering patterns. Simultaneously, their movement, even though seemingly 
withdrawing, does not mark a successful return. What returns instead is a difference 
or a new material configuration. Deleuze and Barad, although independently, deline-
ate an indeterminate realm deprived of its own temporality and governed by itera-
tions. Although each of these repetitions is hinged to a point in the past, the past it-
self loses its stability and is prohibited to pass once and for all. In Deleuze, it haunts 
us through the eternal return; the past comes back in and to the future, since differ-
ence it transports breaks the circularity of time. Barad perceives the aforementioned 
realm through the dynamics of diffractive patterns, which at the end of the day trans-
form the material configuration of time and space.
62
 These are, however, occurring in 
the single plane of fluid indeterminacy, called the memory of the world. Hence, Bar-
ad’s contribution to our reading is two-fold. Firstly, she expands the movement of 
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difference onto the nonhuman agencies. Secondly, she proposes the powerful idea of 
the memory of the world: a condition and a reservoir for all further diffractive 
movements. The memory of the world is the elusive bulk of matter which is always 
elsewhere, out of our reach, in its ceaseless and paradoxical being “here.” Connoting 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s flesh of the world, this pre-subjective and withdrawn do-
main is always oriented at itself and equally congruent to the material configurations 
of time and space.
63
 Its indeterminacy, thus, provides the diffractive patterns – the 
dynamics of difference – with a transformative potential.  
Although Deleuze’s third synthesis and Barad’s diffraction are quite recent 
theoretical interventions, they bear striking resemblance to the project inaugurated by 
Kantor. In his theoretical text devoted to repetition, Kantor enumerates how it encap-
sulates life stifled by our need for clarity, harmony, and order. We have already men-
tioned the child whose mimicking disquiets the seriousness of the world and the echo 
resonating the absent objects and events; however, Kantor also refers to the images 
of memory and time. Memory is the site of repetition because of one’s ability to 
learn something by heart, or to memorise: it “transfers the real [of the instant] into 
the past which is constantly dying.”64 Learning by heart dismantles the metonymy of 
the past and memory, as each attempt of doing so selects and stores different infor-
mation. As a process, such strict memorising indeed updates and revises each piece 
of information but also does not immunise itself to rewriting other remembered ele-
ments; this repetition brings to light the surplus nature of memory itself. Although 
the constantly dying past seems to pass in a linear manner, we cannot think here in 
terms of the pure past; the past itself is dying but it never reaches death per se. Time, 
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respectively, exposes itself as repetition within a thought experiment according to 
which it is possible to contract it absolutely, so that no calendar or any other human 
way of counting time is capable of grasping its passage.
65
 Therefore, time becomes 
the most radical repetition which reveals itself as “both / eternity and nothingness 
at the same time.”66 Consequently, it deconstructs the arbitrariness of lived experi-
ence of time, and its commonly accepted rhythms and repeatability. Be it void-like or 
eternal, time becomes unbounded, but this purified form is incomprehensible.  
Once again, it must be mentioned that neither incomprehensible time nor ex-
cessive memory is static and unchangeable. Since none of the repetitions contains the 
originary creative power, memory and time become loci of omnipresent failure: after 
all, one cannot control the excess of life. Nevertheless, Kantor stresses in his essay 
that repetition is worth employing in artistic gestures because it opens a passage to 
those dying realms which purify life of its superstructures, and hence makes it possi-
ble to affirm life as such. This excessive life pierces through the dense veil that has 
been woven by the representations and narratives imposed on it. If that is the case, 
then each of the repetitions is targeted at producing, or rather evoking a deeply hid-
den element of life. This element is a novelty which in fact is not new at all: it has 
always been in its place, making it possible to be repeated, although its coordinates 
have been scarcely known or accessible. Anticipating these momentary blinks of life, 
Kantor connects the greatest task of art with the possibility of reaching the flows of 
life’s fluidity through the alliance with inevitable death. This pursuit of change, puri-
fying death which never comes definitely, and the underlying eschewing fluidity 
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connote Baradian imagery: indeterminacy, boundaries-making, and – to go that far – 
the intra-action of life and death. 
Photographic Apparatuses  
Even outside of Barad’s reading, diffraction – as the phenomenon of overlap-
ping waves – happens to haunt photography: the medium culturally associated with 
death, and the medium Kantor is obsessed with in his late works. Diffraction would 
be most commonly exemplified as the rippling water, distorted sound in the sinuous 
corridors, or light passing through the prism; however, it is also a significant factor 
participating in the activity of taking a photograph, which might affect its sharpness 
and, thereafter, the overall quality. Aside from the posthumously premiered Today Is 
My Birthday not discussed in this chapter, photography and the photographing act are 
constitutive elements of Wielopole, Wielopole and I Shall Never Return, and the 
foundational metonymy in Let the Artists Die. In Wielopole, Wielopole, Kantor in-
troduces a bio-object, as he calls it, resembling a large and old-fashioned camera. 
Brought onstage by the chthonic and obnoxious cleaning lady from the nearby photo 
studio, it triggers the event of the “right use of Mr Daguerre’s invention.”67 Hideous-
ly laughing, the Death – incarnated in the employed cleaning lady – turns the crank; 
then, the barrel of a machine gun exerts from the lens.
68
 Firstly aimed at the dying 
priest, further on the deadly camera is used to shoot dead the recruits posing to/in a 
photograph, and, at the end of the play, it takes one last family picture; all of the 
scenes are controlled by Kantor himself, sitting at the verge of the stage in a safe 
distance. In I Shall Never Return, on the contrary, it is Kantor himself who is shot by 
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Daguerre’s invention operated by the spectres returning from the already completed 
works. 
Staging the period shortly before Kantor is born, Wielopole, Wielopole ad-
dresses the impulse produced by the photograph of recruits, which includes Kantor’s 
father among the infantry, who in the near future will abandon his family and flee. 
Devoid of their identities and individual expression, the infantrymen themselves 
stand for repetition, which is seen in their unified appearances as well as mechanical 
and synchronised behaviour.
69
 As the trigger of the camera-machine gun is pulled, 
their shivering bodies freeze; yet, the deadly object extracts them from the photo-
graph found by Kantor and makes their intrusion to Wielopole possible. Each of the 
recruits becomes resurrected as the very moment when he has been trapped in the 
picture, and hence is deprived of his past and future. From this moment on, the re-
cruits will return and engage in the rape of Kantor’s mother and in the pogroms of 
the Jews, whilst Kantor’s father will haunt and divert the repetitive existence of other 
dear departed. History repeats itself; the infantrymen follow their reiterative lots, but 
– importantly enough – each of their acts bears the traces of unexpected violation of 
the space of memory. In the theatre of death, the use of the camera boils down to an 
anti-photographic act, which instead of compressing and appropriating the object it 
captures, liberates its excess.
70
 
Comparing photography to theatre in Camera Lucida, Roland Barthes indi-
cates that both domains share a common mediator – the death itself. We read: 
We know the original relation of the theatre and the cult of the Dead: the 
first actors separated themselves from the community by playing the role 
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of the Dead: to make oneself up was to designate oneself as a body simul-
taneously living and dead […]. Now it is the same relation which I find in 
the Photograph; however “lifelike” we strive to make it (and this frenzy 
to be lifelike can only be our mythic denial of an apprehension of death), 
Photography is a kind of primitive theatre, a kind of Tableau Vivant, a 
figuration of the motionless and made-up face beneath which we see the 
dead.
71
 
For Barthes, the correspondence between the theatrical and the photographic instils 
the deadliness that the camera inevitably transfers. For Kantor, on the contrary, death 
the camera re-inscribes in the images in a frail endeavour to isolate and preserve a 
moment makes photography one of the greatest inventions of all time. The deadly 
potential of taking photographs deprives life itself of what is built on it. As for 
Barthes, it is worth noting that the primitive theatres are not the only mythic sources 
underlying the photographic medium. Elsewhere, he elucidates that photography, 
despite imprinting one as the other in the static image, results in a rather marginal 
sense of uncanniness when it comes to the confrontation between the person photo-
graphed and the picture preserving this moment. Yet, this repressive mechanism is 
even of greater importance, because the existence of I as the Other in the photograph 
redirects one back to “the vision of double” widely “compared to hallucinations” in 
cultural history.
72
 For Kantor, the strategy of doubling – most profoundly realised in 
the crucial roles played by Janicki twin-brothers – is straightforward and central to 
his understanding of repetition. Crowding and crammed within the dark holes, dou-
bles and decoys – mostly the nightmarish infantrymen – make the audience confuse 
reality with mirages and sanity with madness. These figures aim at puncturing the 
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stable practices of looking, which are possible vehicles for the repression Barthes 
discovers. 
Considering that Barthes regards photography as an instance of death inter-
rupting its lifelike aspirations and Kantor – as an instance of life that is made possi-
ble by the work of death leads us to another important theoretician of this medium, 
Vilém Flusser. Flusser argues that the camera – itself containing a mirror at its core – 
reflects all the possible and reachable images belonging to the particular moment in 
time. This is the condition preceding the autonomous decision of the photographing 
subject, who, himself or herself reflected in the looking glass, eventually looks else-
where, closing his or her eyes with the movement of the diaphragm. Consequently, 
one image is chosen over the excess of other possibilities as that worth saving, con-
demning those not included in the picture to the realm of “lost virtualities.”73 Such a 
redefinition displaces the role of the photographer, privileging the apparatus itself, 
whose action now depends on the diverged gaze, on the appropriation of a different 
image than the one which has triggered the decision, and, finally, on the extraction of 
one of the possibilities. In this light, the aforementioned bio-object in Kantor’s 
Wielopole, Wielopole makes the photographer’s decision fractured even more pro-
foundly. The sound of salvo implies that instead of capturing a single photograph, the 
camera-machine gun, after the trigger has been pulled, results in a series of repeating 
shots: both images and bullets. Hence, repetition appears to be the death of choice. 
Mechanical iterations of the same frame entail numerous images and extracted mo-
ments. Still, each of them is different, even though their boundaries have been estab-
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lished through the same pull of the trigger of the camera, whose setting has remained 
unaltered. 
Reversing the qualities ascribed to the photographic medium by Barthes, 
Kantor seems to employ potentialities similar to those that Flusser mentions. The 
idea of lost virtualities, weakness of one’s decision, a sudden twist within the ex-
pected effect: all of these notions are present in the universe Kantor delineates in the 
theatre of death. What is worth mentioning, Flusser’s decentralising – if not de-
anthropo-centralising – gesture emphasises the nonhuman performativity of the cam-
era, non-defining but still participating in the role of a human operator, and a certain 
arbitrariness of the final picture, rooted in the multiplicity of possible, minimally 
different, images. Once again, we are not that far from Barad. If Kantor’s Wielopole, 
Wielopole is in fact a recalling, then the whole space of the spectacle is the site of 
memory or world memory materialising particular figures, images, fantasies, and 
reveries. The use of the photographic device breaks with the realistic framework, 
establishing a separate sphere within the piece, producing new modes of repetition, 
and putting the element which has not previously belonged to it – the photograph of 
the recruits – in its centre. The photographic apparatus happens to be an apparatus 
per se: it cuts the reality of the spectacle anew, suspending the principles of the 
commonly established reality and introducing those of the reality of the lowest rank. 
Moreover, the salvo from the machine gun opens a new space at the very beginning 
of the work and closes it by means of capturing the last family snapshot at its end. 
Both reconfigurations include Kantor himself (the figure orchestrating the play, the 
object and the source of the biography Wielopole, Wielopole stages), the cleaning 
lady operating the camera, the recruits, and the family members who are within the 
frame. Eventually, each of these elements suspends the convention, gives meaning to 
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the photographing act by scenic gestures, and participates in the dislocation of 
boundaries that despite constant repetitions move the “plot” onwards. 
The phallic metonymy of the camera and the machine gun comprised in a de-
vice aimed at and used against the recruits, including Kantor’s employed father, sig-
nals an intensively anti-paternal act. Wielopole, Wielopole stages the period before 
Kantor’s birth. Paradoxically, however, it stages this period while being directed and 
orchestrated onstage by Kantor, who corrects moves of particular actors, adjusts par-
ticular objects, or opens and closes the large door at the back (a suitable metaphor for 
the abyss of memory). Biographically speaking, Marian Kantor – the father – after 
joining the army in 1914 never returned to Wielopole but moved to the Silesia, aban-
doning his wife pregnant with Tadeusz. We can assume that to a great extent Tade-
usz Kantor knows his father only from the pictures. Founded on this deeply forma-
tive abandonment, Wielopole, Wielopole attempts to exorcise the haunting father by 
trapping him in the photograph once and for all; yet, it fails miserably, bringing him 
back to “life” (or “death,” in Kantor’s case) instead. Devoid of his own voice, Marian 
Kantor marries Helena Berger and thereafter traverses the space of a childhood room, 
murmuring ominously and measuring everything with his ruler, and thus disrupting 
the repetitive course of the daily routines. What is even of a greater importance, he 
sits among other members in the last family picture, structurally resembling Leonar-
do da Vinci’s Last Supper: an event directly disclosing the betrayal of the filial figure 
and his following imminent demise. Now, while indeed changing the past is impos-
sible, this prenatal projection functions as what Adrian Parr calls the “singular 
memory.”74 Instead of framing memories in narratives or representations, this con-
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cept indicates the movement of difference that the relation to the past events re-
inscribes in future-to-come, inspired by Deleuze’s third synthesis of time.75 Kantor 
himself – with regard to his own memories, family stories, fantasies, and traumas – 
sets in motion history-without-history, whose anchor in the personal experience 
makes it more real than any account; it repeats the unreachable events in the past in 
order to re-distribute boundaries in the future which eventually manifest themselves 
in the shattered present. Paternal abandonment cannot be denied, whereas family 
stories of it do not give justice to its cataclysmic effect; hence, it becomes repeated in 
an attempt to re-inscribe the excess this event has unbounded and to make use of it. 
Read in this light, I Shall Never Return provides us with another apparatus, 
whose relation to that known from Wielopole, Wielopole suspends the status of the 
latter. I Shall Never Return does not touch upon biographical traces directly, but ra-
ther it focuses on the condition of the artist. Appearing onstage, Kantor is divided 
into two figures: the transcendent voice from the speakers, which provides a com-
mentary to the spectacle, and “embodied” Kantor playing himself, who wanders 
amidst his own creations immersed in the clownish repetition of their roles known 
from other works. Infuriated by his presence, they begin to tug him. Then, the clean-
ing lady known from Wielopole, Wielopole once again uses the camera-machine gun, 
this time against Kantor. Its own creator, therefore, passes through the gates of the 
theatre of death. Later on, the audience discovers that he is divided into yet another 
figure: a mannequin. In the bitter and parodic transfiguration of the marriage known 
from Wielopole, Wielopole, this very same mannequin replaces Marian Kantor in 
order to wed his own mother.
76
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 Parr, Deleuze and Memorial Culture, pp. 185-186. 
76
 I would like to leave aside blatantly obvious Freudian connotations of this scene and focus instead 
on it in terms of the diffraction with the formerly discussed work. 
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The double use of the camera-machine gun functions as the diffraction, disal-
lowing one to hold to any of the apparatuses. For Barad, as we remember, materiali-
sation occurs within a greater field of memory of the world, containing all of its pos-
sible materialisations, dissolving past and future relations.
77
 Formally similar to Mer-
leau-Ponty’s flesh of the world, such a memory forms the immanent and intertwining 
texture upon which particular pieces of reality are enacted.
78
 Analogously, I Shall 
Never Return supplements the space of individual yet singular memory with another 
dimension, which, however, is not transcendent, but rather unfolds in the reconfigu-
ration of the very same texture. Wielopole, Wielopole punctures the notions of histo-
ry and memory by means of referring to the prenatal events suspending the legitima-
cy of what could have been remembered; instead, it puts forward a greater machinery 
capable of purifying the superfluous constructs in favour of returning to the affective 
memories provided by the excessive power of life. I Shall Never Return confronts us 
with a sui generis anti-natalist perspective: what happens with my creations if I – 
myself – am not distinct from them, but mediated by them to such an extent that the 
non-artistic reality cannot be determined on its own. In other words, it responds to 
the question of what happens if “I” is unreachable otherwise than through one’s own 
artistic expression, and therefore subjugated to the same laws and processes. It is an 
act of recalling or remembering through “I” imprinted in the works which constructs 
the material space of encounter. When Kantor places himself at his own father’s 
place in the well-known scene of marriage, he demonstrates that the employed Mari-
an Kantor has only been either Tadeusz Kantor or, to be precise, his father sieved by 
the imagination of the artist. Furthermore, this act is conducted by the mannequin, 
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 Barad, “Nature’s Queer Performativity,” pp. 145-146. 
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 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 146. For further exploration of the flesh, see Chap-
ter 1. 
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whose resemblance to Kantor does not entail a definite cut, but rather fuels further 
relating patterns. Diffractively, the theatre oriented at the “real I” revisits the past 
events, constantly suspending possible hierarchies and defining positions of control. 
Then, its movement unbounds the potentialities hibernated in the past, so that the 
boundaries of knowledge, both those providing sense and those materialising on-
stage, are pushed to the extreme. The multiplicity unleashed thereby challenges the 
possible unities or binaries in the performative experimentation, encouraged by the 
concurrent inevitability of failure and the power of repetition, and heads towards the 
very possibility of smallest breaches in the structure of life through which the exces-
sive life in itself can arrive at any time. 
The Diffraction of I 
The diffraction presented above requires one more reference with regard to 
the theatre of death; in Let the Artists Die the diffraction of “Kantors” is performed 
within the project of memory which is in fact the posthumous memory. In this work, 
in spite of the absence of the photographic bio-object, as Michal Kobialka ensures us, 
the reality itself is constructed from negatives.
79
 We read in Further on, Nothing:  
Once memory was called forth, it folded back upon itself, generated new 
images that crashed into each other. Onstage, these memories were 
shown simultaneously as a cluster of negatives. Since, as Kantor pointed 
out, they were transparent, the Self, or the audience, could only see one 
frame, which contained the imprints and traces of all other frames re-
called from the storeroom of memory.
80
  
In “Memory,” Kantor points out that this is the device that “accompanied” him dur-
ing his process of re-discovery of memory: 
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memory, [sic!] 
makes use of film NEGATIVES 
that are still frozen – 
almost like metaphors 
but unlike narratives – 
which pulsate 
which appear and disappear, 
which appear and disappear again 
until the image fades away 
until… the tears fill the eyes.81 
The onto-aesthetic strategy of negatives is especially visible in the opening part of 
Let the Artists Die, in which the room merges with the morgue. Old and crippled, 
Helena Kantor (Berger) comes to see her son, either dead or at the verge of agony (as 
it will be shown in a while, there is no difference between these two states). If we 
take a closer look, the figure of Tadeusz Kantor is diffracted into four characters. 
Janicki twin-brothers play Kantor on the deathbed (“I – the Dying One”) and Kantor 
describing his own demise (“Author”). Since both actors swap their roles during the 
performance, none of these two identities can be pinpointed, propelling the move-
ment of repetitions. The third one, “I – at the age of six” riding through the stage on a 
bike enters within the reminiscence of the past. Finally, there is Kantor played by 
himself, although not entirely separated from the spacetimemattered spectacle, who 
observes the whole encounter – as usually – from a distance. Let the Artists Die stag-
es thus a particular experiment of imagining one’s death both at its verge and directly 
after it. Repetitions, however, prevent us from accepting its final form; after all, we 
encounter death as an account (“Author”), death as a singular event represented on 
stage (“I – the dying one”), death as an end of the linear process (suggested by the 
reminiscence of idyllic I on a bike), death emerging through the repetition observed 
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from a distance (Kantor), or even death as the suspension of the former example by 
including the instance of the observer as part of imagining his own demise. Each of 
these takes diffracts with one another, so that life becomes punctured, mocked, and 
ridiculed, orientating one towards its elusive counterpart: death. What is at stake is 
therefore a point of reaching the imagination beyond its spatial and temporal limits. 
Let the Artists Die replaces the metaphoric take on photography known from 
Wielopole, Wielopole and briefly implied in I Shall Never Return with the metonym-
ic one. Instead of re-defining the ontology of the frames and images, it accepts them 
as constitutive forms. Coexistent negatives multiply the diffractive processes in a 
double imagining of one’s death: the artistic one and the personal one. The move-
ment through each of their embodiments re-visits the instances contributing to the 
posthuman notion of memory which is anchored in the past events but turned to-
wards the future; this premise constantly revises and alters the stable ground that 
each take (account, event, linearity, etc.) attempts to occupy, claiming its place as the 
one and only performative. While none of these makes it possible to imagine the 
posthumous world as it is, Let the Artists Die instead presents death outside of the 
fetishised image – as a critical illusion. It is the memory which not so much holds 
actual events in itself as, while being oriented towards them, re-organises the order of 
differences with regard to only available singular life and materialises the excessive 
remnants of this process within the contours of the “real I,” to refer back to Kantor’s 
postulate.  
Starting from Wielopole, Wielopole and ending with Let the Artists Die, one 
can observe Kantor’s radicalising stance on the work of memory. Albeit Wielopole, 
Wielopole still holds to the linearity of the archived, or photographed, history, it 
opens the space of memory towards sudden twists and intrusive transgressions; 
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Wielopole, Wielopole, thus, departs from the “public” or commonly accepted history 
in order to re-live intimate and highly subjective memory onstage. I Shall Never Re-
turn exemplifies a different approach. This work abandons almost every link with 
reality so that it is able to construct a site of an impossible encounter: one which has 
never happened. This impossible meeting serves as an illusory insight on the individ-
ual history and its artefacts. Finally, Let the Artists Die confronts us with even more 
complex intra-actions than the previous two spectacles; in this piece, the work of 
memory, memorising, (re-)writing, and (re-)reading become central. The diffracted 
“Is” of the dying protagonist, Kantor himself, participate in a paradoxical space 
which is indeed constantly dying: one cannot tell whether death has come or not. It is 
equally past and to come, inscribed in the world memory of the stage and its material 
plane. Struggling with the possibility of ceasing to be, Kantor organises the alterna-
tive montage of his time of dying which produces an affective charge. This charge 
pierces through the deconstructed mechanisms of memory, wanders through personal 
and collective trauma, and revives the founding myths of Kantor’s identity; all of 
these are performed to make it possible to relive the precise moment of passing. 
Thus, against all odds, a non-existent memory is devised or rather grasped from the 
depths of the stage and its texture, as well as other affective strata lying beneath, to 
make us face the excess of individual human life. 
The purpose of this chapter has been multidirectional whereas the argument 
has involved various detours and diffractions. Firstly, it has attempted to explore 
Kantor’s twisted and dense relation with history and memory. Thereafter, the theoret-
ical notions of Deleuze and Barad, precisely those of the third synthesis of time and 
diffraction, have been introduced. These two models – or apparatuses – have been 
diffractively and affirmatively read within the interpretations of Kantor’s Wielopole, 
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Wielopole, Let the Artists Die, and I Shall Never Return. Instead of engaging in the 
deconstruction of two founding narratives of the 20
th
 century Poland (the catholic 
and the patriotic ones) and instead of being guided by psychoanalytical implications, 
I have decided to follow the new materialist path in the reading of memory in Kan-
tor’s theatre of death, understood as a figure anchored in the formal tropes of photog-
raphy and the dispersed identity/subjectivity of Kantor himself. As I have intended to 
demonstrate, both of these tropes involve the work of diffraction patterns, re-
established boundaries, and intra-active apparatuses. I have attempted to explore 
their detailed workings, which constantly challenge unifying and even binarising 
approaches. In order to prove that, I have followed three most radical instances of 
memory in Kantor’s oeuvre: the pre-natal memory, the memory in the absence of I or 
the anti-natal memory, and the posthumous memory. As I am convinced, each of 
them shows that memory for Kantor is neither a narrative nor a representation; ra-
ther, it is a movement of differences oriented towards the future, which suddenly 
comes as the shattering of the present. Memory therefore happens to be disjunctive 
with regard to the events it is related to, but, because of that dissonance, it becomes 
more authentic than any structured reminiscence: firstly, as the affirmation of the 
intrusive excess and secondly, as the deconstructive means. While in this chapter the 
recurring diffractive machine has embodied a formal device, the questions of every-
day life it has touched upon numerously are still open. In the following part of this 
thesis, I will examine homely spaces in relation to the materialised embodiments, this 
time within the diffractive oeuvres of Tadeusz Kantor and Samuel Beckett. 
 
  
CHAPTER 3  
“Unspeakable Homes” 
Practices of Dwelling in Life and in Death 
 
as between two lit refuges whose doors 
once neared gently close, once away 
turned from gently part again 
[…] 
unheard footfalls only sound 
[…] 
then no sound 
then gently light unfading on that un-
heeded neither 
unspeakable home1 
 
Would it be possible to redesign the do-
mestic with an ethics of inhabiting such 
that domestic does not domesticate and 
the walls do not disconnect?2 
 
I Am Not I, Therefore I Am (at Home) 
“neither” is neither what it states nor something entirely different. Reminis-
cent of Samuel Beckett’s emblematic narrative and theatrical conflicts, this peculiar 
short prose is concerned with an aporetic place, equally alluring and unreachable. 
Similarly to its title, the piece marks the ongoing work of negation. Deprived of rec-
ognisable characters and identifiable spaces, “neither” lacks stable referents that 
                                                             
1
 Samuel Beckett, “neither,” in: Samuel Beckett, The Complete Short Prose, 1929-1989, ed. Stanley 
E. Gontarski (New York: Grove Press, 1995), p. 258. Emphasis mine. 
2
 Stacy Alaimo, Exposed: Environmental Politics and Pleasures in Posthuman Times (Minneapolis 
and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), p. 18. Emphasis mine. 
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would hinge the events it stages in a more tangible reality, yet in being such, it be-
comes a trace of dissatisfaction with the fact that its negating – or vacuuming – pro-
cesses are never entirely finished; against all odds, it preserves a form of a completed 
literary work. Non-capitalised, “neither” – now understood as both a title and a word 
– does not mean much in itself, gaining significance only in contexts and grammati-
cal constructions. In a sense, “neither” undermines the determining capacities of lan-
guage and literary works by imposing on us a disjunction between the matter dis-
cussed in this work and the way it is entitled: the title empties the definitiveness of 
the short prose, whereas its content, even though dimmed, weakens the eponymous 
term. Still, neither is also a weird onto-epistemological unit preserving a state of be-
ing in-between: a conceptual space which Beckett calls “unspeakable home,” map-
ping an area both homely and uncanny. In Beckettian universe, “I” is never some-
thing given once and for all, but rather it unfolds as “not-I” over and over again: I am 
not I, therefore I am (at home). Accordingly, it might be claimed that being at home 
has to be also achieved somewhere beyond the failing cognitive capacities and con-
fusing linguistic means, beyond fractured identities and slipping purposes. 
What reconciles Tadeusz Kantor and Beckett is not necessarily the above-
mentioned pursuit of the place in-between, conditioning the artistic practice of the 
latter, but the fact that both are preoccupied with the practices of dwelling or the im-
ages of uncanny homes. In Chapter 2, focused predominantly on the diffractive work 
of memories and affective histories, we have frequently referred to the ruined places 
belonging to Kantor’s scenic cartography: a childhood room, a haunt, or a morgue, 
inhabited by cracked and twisted images of family members, historical figures, or 
artistic creations. Beckett’s own cartography includes absurdist spaces alike; hence, 
Nagg and Nell inhabit the ashbins in Endgame, the speakers in Play reside in urns, 
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Winnie protrudes from an anthill in Happy Days, Mahood ends up in a jar in The 
Unnamable, Mouth and the lone head of Auditor – in Not I and That Time, respec-
tively – are located in the indiscernible void of the stage, and the recording reverber-
ates among the piles of wastes in Breath, a play without (human) actors.
3
 Beckett’s 
imaginary worlds demonstrate the unclear position of inhabiting abnormal spaces at 
the fall of oikos, and the rise of a weird economy of remnants and remains: ruinous 
sites and mutilated bodies that merge into one. Is it not exactly the logic which Kan-
tor points to in Wielopole, Wielopole? As it has been shown in Chapter 2, the recruits 
leave their fixed place in a historical photograph to traverse the room representing 
the sheltered memory of childhood, which can be recollected only as scattered pieces 
of the past. Yet, by doing so, the soldiers’ mechanised appearances only prove to be 
similar to those of our close ones, who – because of the work of memory – are frozen 
in particular situations. As a result, the inhabitants of our memories are fixed in de-
serted locations and their actions are dedicated to isolated objects, which makes their 
bodies absurd, mechanical, and crippled. 
Living in an uncanny home is also a crucial experience of the Anthropocene. 
Importantly, I do not refer to this fact only because of the logic of weakening human 
bodies and capacities in the wake of the perilous spaces and their nonhuman agen-
cies; as I am convinced, not every logic of remnants or remains is embedded in the 
modus of the Anthropocene. Understood as an onto-epistemological thought experi-
ment, the Anthropocene consists in a distinctive re-orientation which stems from a 
shared conviction about human beings as those who are simultaneously extinct and 
alive. Precisely, we have already been fossilised in the sediments and at the same 
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 I purposefully omit the abstract and geometrical spaces that can be found in Beckett’s late prose, as 
these are extensively discussed in Chapter 5. 
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time anticipate the natural disaster; as a result, we face our weakening, historically 
granted control over the “more-than-human” world around us.4 Consequently, it is 
the question of being at home which breaks with the domesticating practices that 
have necessarily conditioned it.
5
 Human beings are presented as radically intercon-
nected with the perilous world(s) they have excessively exploited. As Timothy Mor-
ton demonstrates, the Anthropocene is the time of an uncanny coexistence which 
replaces existence altogether.
6
 Then again, the Anthropocene is also a collapse of 
temporal limits at the moment when the clear-cut division into future, past, and pre-
sent is no longer tenable, just as the linear flow of time. Rather, there are always nu-
merous temporalities of varying intensities at play, marking the work of difference.
7
 
This reflection does not undermine the urgency of linearity manifested in the ecolog-
ical activism in the times of the Anthropocene; instead, this fact marks the signifi-
cance of rejecting the temporal comfort in favour of thinking in terms of a “catastro-
phe-to-come” which has not yet happened even though it is paradoxically already 
there as a structure including the radical break and the movement of difference. Not 
only does the Anthropocene affect our sense of spatial and temporal belonging, but it 
might also be thought of predominantly through the figure of the archive; embracing 
the aforementioned shifts, it turns into both the archiving event and the archived one. 
Similarly to the archive, the Anthropocene conjoins the logics of (re)inscribing and 
decrypting, replacing and wiping out, intimacy and remoteness, completeness and 
fragmentariness, abundance and scarcity, control and its lack, and finally, the origin 
and its deferral. Now, Beckett and Kantor, as the two insightful readers of living out 
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 Alaimo, Exposed, p. 18. 
5
 Alaimo, Exposed, pp. 18-19. 
6
 Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World (Minneapolis 
and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), p. 108. 
7
 See: Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1993), p. 74. 
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of time and out of place, are also the artists who have disclosed and tackled the risks 
that archives might produce. Hence, they might become theoretical allies who – alt-
hough anachronically – might help us understand the mechanisms underlying the 
Anthropocene, a period otherwise unknown to both authors. After all, the Anthropo-
cene stems from neither: being neither here nor there, neither now nor then.  
In a nutshell, this chapter is dedicated to the ways in which the practices of 
dwelling presented in the selected works by Beckett and Kantor re-orientate our 
sense of “being-here,” when the implied we – understood both as a collective and a 
species – is simultaneously extinct and awaiting a catastrophe. These two authors 
have managed to construct weird spaces that despite their intense materiality appear 
to be the loci of lack. As I will show, many of these spaces rely on this paradox due 
to their indebtedness to the peculiar figure of an archive which precedes its later 
poststructuralist and deconstructionist readings. Hence, the Anthropocene emerges as 
a necessary context not only because of the uncanny sense of belonging – or of peri-
lous home spaces – it evokes, but also because of its own archival structure; in other 
words, the Anthropocene designates the archived event including the incoming catas-
trophe as something which has already arrived, and the archiving event which textu-
alises the lithic and our inscribed presence in it. Firstly, I will turn to Jacques Derri-
da’s last seminar and its reading by Michael Naas to put forward the deconstruction-
ist understanding of the archive and its relation to the event of the end of the (indi-
vidual) world. This context will provide an interpretative framework for Beckett’s 
selected archival works: Embers, Breath, Film, and Krapp’s Last Tape. Secondly, 
following the reading of the last play, I will endeavour to turn to more vibrant and 
material figures of the archive, represented in two types of things inherent to any 
homely landscape: namely, dust and rags. Inspired by Donna Haraway, I will explore 
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the chthonic realms presented in Kantor’s The Dead Class and Wielopole, Wielopole, 
and Beckett’s The Unnamable; these works will be presented as the spaces of dy-
namic, tentacular, and transformative coexistence and sympoiesis. Finally, I intend to 
adopt Jolanta Brach-Czaina’s notes on rags to Kantor’s aforementioned spectacles, 
aided by I Shall Never Return, and Beckett’s Endgame; I will show how each of the 
figures discussed – archive, dust, and rags – relies on the opening figure of neither 
and in this sense founds uncanny homes, fosters liminal (co)existence, and thrives on 
contingent transformations. 
The Parrot and the Grave 
The uncanniness of the dwelling practices in Beckett and Kantor relies on the 
simple fact that there is not much left to inhabit. This is the reason for their structural 
correspondences to the Anthropocene. Therefore, the unspeakable homes unfold their 
underlying logic of neither. Beckett and Kantor imply that we are neither at home, as 
the overwhelming catastrophes of the early 20
th
 century and generational experiences 
caused the collapse of oikos, nor deprived of it, as inhabitation and dwelling have 
become crucial matters, presumably in the process of working through a historical 
trauma. In the light of such dispossession of the place, deconstruction provides us 
with an interesting context; it demonstrates that thinking (of) the end of the world is 
inseparable from the archival logic. Before we proceed to more concrete practices of 
dwelling presented in both oeuvres, let us consider the status of the archive in decon-
struction and its direct representations in the discussed theatrical and literary works. 
This will allow us to render less obvious spaces presented in the later sections as sui 
generis vibrant archives, which seem to fascinate both authors the most.  
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Devoted to Derrida’s last seminar, Michael Naas’ The End of the World and 
Other Teachable Moments identifies his whole philosophical project, and the second 
volume of The Beast & the Sovereign in particular, as one “preoccupied with the 
archive.”8 Derrida traverses through Martin Heidegger’s seminar on solitude, world, 
and finitude, Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, Paul Celan’s works, but also such 
topics which imply his own worsening health or personal struggles with the death of 
Maurice Blanchot, his father figure. In the light of these tropes, the coherent notion 
of the world – etymologically pointing to “wholeness,” “completeness,” or “con-
creteness” – can hardly be preserved. In fact, the world, as a word, unmasks its own 
unequivocal etymology rooted in Latin mundus; as Derrida points out, “[t]he world 
as totality of beings is also an order that is appropriate, proper, a good arrangement, 
a harmony or a beauty.”9 It thus seems that the world is never entirely liberated from 
a hidden aesthetic agenda. Consequently, Derrida intends to replace the idea of the 
world with islands: “the archipelagos of the singularities,”10 as Naas calls them, but 
also gentle homonyms fusing French “îles” with “ils,” that is, decentralised and dis-
persed isles with a depersonalised pronoun. Since the world lacks a common ground 
(as it is hard to determine whose or which world we are speaking of at the moment), 
the end of the world becomes the matter of an individual catastrophe. Crusoe hap-
pens to be a person who has been literally deprived of his world and granted with an 
island instead; moreover, this fact makes him the figure of survival evoking particu-
larly archival connotations. Precisely, Crusoe is stricken with the anxieties of being 
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 Michael Naas, The End of the World and Other Teachable Moments: Jacques Derrida’s Final Semi-
nar (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), p. 125. 
9
 Jacques Derrida, The Beast & the Sovereign. Volume II, trans. Geoffrey Bennington, eds. Michel 
Lisse, Marie-Louise Mallet, and Ginette Michaud (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
2011), pp. 32-33. Emphasis mine. See also: Online Etymology Dictionary. Available at: 
http://www.etymonline.com (access: 20 February 2019). 
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 Naas, The End of the World, p. 49. 
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buried or eaten alive, which dissipates the border between being alive and dead. Even 
more interestingly, these images are connected to the “question of different ways of 
disposing of the dead body and different means of preserving – or not – the traces of 
the deceased.”11 The issue of remains returns when Crusoe persistently tries to teach 
a parrot his own name.
12
 Although at the price of reducing the name to (perhaps im-
perfect) imitation of a sound and wiping away its referent, Crusoe reveals his own 
obsession with being remembered, equalising it with desperate survival, when the 
possibility of either living on the deserted island or leaving it once and for all is fad-
ing. Not only do both cases conflate survival with the archival practices, but also 
they release “the taste of death,”13 which Derrida associates with deconstruction. 
For Derrida, the archive is one of numerous liminal figures he pinpoints in 
order to delineate the subtleness of a trace, dissolving clear-cut temporal and spatial 
limits, and suspending the regimes of presence and absence.
14
 From “Freud and the 
Scene of Writing,” through The Post Card, Spectres of Marx, and Archive Fever, to 
The Beast & the Sovereign seminars, to mention but a few texts, Derrida tirelessly 
returns to the distancing and differing patterns that the tehkne of memory 
(re)produces. For Derrida, the archive does not depend on completeness, neutrality, 
eternality, or closeness, the mythical categories often applied to it in cultural anal-
yses. Contrary to these, the archive is not only rooted in arkhē, linking it to “origins,” 
but also in arkheion, emphasising its reliance on the means of control or sovereign-
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 Naas, The End of the World, p. 132. 
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 Naas, The End of the World, p. 131. 
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 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx, trans. Peggy Kamuf (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 
p. 212. 
14
 See: John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida. Religion without Religion 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), p. 145. Emphasis in the original. 
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ty.
15
 Naas argues that aside of these two sources of the archive, another pair might be 
distinguished. Following the analogical and auto-immunising schema to that condi-
tioning Faith and Knowledge, Naas confirms that the archive indeed comes from “an 
attempt to protect, save, or indemnify a unique text, a singular event […]”16; howev-
er, in order to be preserved, the text or the event has to be “inscribed in a medium 
that will make it readable in the future.”17 Hence, the other source originates in “an 
affirmative relation to that past or that text in the form of a promise or performative 
repetition that enlists the deracinating powers of some technoscientific supplement 
[…].”18 In fact, there is an internal dispersion and disjunction within the archive 
which makes it impossible to read everything that has been preserved, since this 
seemingly domesticated whole immediately becomes something else. The preserved 
content is, therefore, lost at least twice: when it is transformed in the process of be-
coming savable, and then when it is distorted in the process of becoming readable. 
Both sources boil down to the auto-immunising relation, simultaneously conditioning 
the preserving capacities of the archive and fuelling its production of difference, so 
that each of these aspects erodes the other. 
Absurdist as they might look when juxtaposed, the imitating parrot and the 
anxiety of being either buried or eaten alive might serve as suitable analogies for 
both the work of the archive and its importance for Beckett and Kantor. To a great 
extent the motifs of storing and disposing are related to the vision of the archive pre-
sented in Chapter 2. Although taking pictures possesses qualities and implications 
inherent in Kantor’s theatre of death, photography itself also bears archival connota-
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 Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever. A Freudian Impression, trans. Eric Prenowitz (Chicago and Lon-
don: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 1-3. 
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tions, circumscribing the past on the one hand and opening it on the other. In short, 
the act of preserving the past in the picture of the recruits proves to fail, causing the 
infernal infantrymen to roam through the stage, unleashing the earlier traumas and 
tampering with the course of time.
19
 What we observe is an attempt to bury the past 
and limit its destructive scope, which suddenly reveals the vividness of the bygone 
past, oscillating between human understandings of being alive and dead. I will return 
to this issue further on. 
For Beckett, photography, understood as an archival device, has never occu-
pied a central role; at best, we might seek the correspondence in his metafictional 
Film. Rushing in panic, the unnamed protagonist of this piece (called O in the 
screenplay) struggles for not being watched. If we consider George Berkley’s famous 
formula “esse est percipi,”20 adopted as a motto for this work, we might argue that O 
is attempting to escape “being,” perceiving this state as a hostile and tormenting in-
stance. Consequently, O would belong to a broader group of Beckettian creations 
stricken with the foundational rupture between their “being” or “I” and the way it is 
represented or manifested (inevitably falling into “non-being” or “not I”). Similarly 
to them, O is also a tragic figure; after covering or eliminating all the instances of 
vision – expelling the cats from his room, putting veils on a fish bowl and the cage 
with a parrot inside, tearing the image of a deity – O is confronted with the fact that 
he has escaped every eye but that of the camera, marked as E in the script, whose 
removal would result in the collapse of the film. In this sense, he is inevitably deter-
mined by the restrictions of the genre or the medium. What is more, lacking an eye 
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himself, O might be metonymically linked to E, exposing the protagonist to the fact 
that, even though he has successfully managed to avoid being observed, he is not 
capable of escaping his own self-perception. From the archival perspective, O strug-
gles for not being imprisoned in the screen, yet his survival is both threatened and 
granted by his own presence in the film stock. Despite his endeavours, O’s body is 
disposed of in Film; still, by no means does this fact deprive him of his life, but ra-
ther negates the fixed limits of life and death. 
If we are looking for tangible archives in Beckett’s works, we have to shift 
from the visual media of photography or cinematography towards the audial ones. By 
the same token, we proceed to Crusoe’s other archival trope: the imitating parrot or 
surviving as the disembodied name. Accordingly, Beckett is captivated by the possi-
bilities that the recorder provides us with. It is this medium which at the same time 
allows us to record our voices into the reel and separates the sounds from the bodies 
that have articulated them. This fact has been extensively presented in Embers.
21
 The 
protagonist of this work, Henry bends the principles of the reality according to his 
commands, directed to the operating medium. At the same time, counterintuitively to 
being a character in a radio play, he is also a storyteller who guides us through vari-
ous narratives and summons the other personae at his orders.
22
 Unfortunately, his 
power over the reel does not guarantee him a sudden change of his tragic fate. Em-
bers dim, whereas their warmth fades away; just as the characters Henry either ven-
triloquises or convokes lack vividness, the stories of the father/children relationship 
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from this dense piece contain a traumatic charge that resists being eventually worked 
through. In the end, Henry is left solitary in the place where the noise of the sea be-
comes a metonymy for that of an empty reel.
23
 Seemingly in control, Henry turns out 
to be incapable of changing that which is actually being recorded on the tape as his 
own commands are already scripted by the radio play itself.  
Yet another archival context is provided by miniature Breath. Consisting of 
no actors and lines, it presents a brief event of prolonged breathing in and breathing 
out, both followed by the very same whimper.
24
 As the recorded sounds are played, 
the stage gradually lightens, revealing the piles of rubbish, and then darkens.
25
 At the 
very first sight, there is something provocative in Beckett’s Breath, alluring us to 
frame the event it stages as the sonic image of human existence, simultaneously 
worthless and transient. Nonetheless, such a reading would be incomplete, as it re-
frains from focusing on difference the recording device puts in motion; Breath con-
sists of the same track of whimper played twice, whose meaning and significance 
change according to the contexts encapsulated in the sounds of inspiration and expi-
ration. Although the recorded content does not change, its repetition hardly preserves 
the sounds as identical; instead, they are stained with difference inherent to any ar-
chived matter. The audial images of being born and dying merge into one sound 
which indeed intoxicates birth with an inevitable death and death with peculiar live-
lihood; at the same time, however, this repeated sound simply feels different. Breath, 
just as Embers discussed earlier, displays the extent to which Beckett’s view on re-
cording devices stems from their failure or betrayal. Promising in their capacities of 
conserving voices, these machines happen to be embedded in dispersion, disjunction, 
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and disappointment. Precisely, they mesh with the content saved on the tape, the in-
stances that claim control over it, and, finally, the listeners themselves. Just as in the 
case of Crusoe’s parrot, the stake of surviving as a name – in this case, as an idiom, a 
story, or even a voice – comes at the price of its disembodiment and repetition, which 
cedes the power over it to the Other. 
Inhabiting the archive which betrays those who put their faith in it achieves 
its most convoluted form in Beckett’s famous Krapp’s Last Tape. Repulsive and 
malcontent, Krapp lives in a den in an unspecified future. In spite of not belonging to 
a well-defined time or space, his living habits surprise us with how structured and 
organised they are. Krapp inhabits an enormous archive amassing the tapes he has 
recorded throughout the years, where each spool and each box of spools are labelled, 
categorised, and kept in order. Each birthday, he dedicates himself to the archiving 
practices. Indeed, Krapp (re)plays the selected spools covering the past anniversaries 
and records a new one, which – as in the case presented in the play – shows his dis-
satisfaction with the recorded content, and – more importantly – disappointment with 
his earlier selves: “Just been listening to that stupid bastard I took myself for thirty 
years ago, hard to believe I was ever as bad as that. Thank God that’s all done with 
anyway.”26 “Self” seems to be a key word in this respect; as many critics have noted, 
Krapp’s Last Tape to a great extent follows the assumption posed in Beckett’s early 
essay entitled Proust. Captivated by Arthur Schoppenhauer, Beckett puts forward a 
reading of Proust’s novels which claims that a unified world is a result of projection 
one imposes on it. In fact, the world is a dispersed entity which comes into being in 
the course of repetition and iterated habits that foreclose the work of memory.
27
 Just 
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 Samuel Beckett, Krapp’s Last Tape, in: The Complete Dramatic Works, p. 222. 
27
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as the world understood as a provisory object, the human subjects are equally dis-
jointed into numerous and subsequent selves, lacking a shared ontological ground. 
As Beckett argues, “the creation of the world did not take place once and for all time, 
but takes place every day. Habit then is the generic term for the countless subjects 
that constitute the individual and their countless correlative objects.”28 This is pre-
cisely the case of Krapp, who indeed creates the world and himself each anniversary 
by recording a new tape, and coexists with his separate pasts and past selves that 
seem to be irreconcilable with the archival event in the present.  
Even though inspired by Proust and Schoppenhauer, the temporal and subjec-
tive transitions we encounter in Krapp’s Last Tape point to particular deconstructive 
mechanisms mentioned above. Krapp’s archive depends on his persistence of being 
in control over his recordings and of being a legitimate source of his reflections. At 
the same time, his obstinacy marks his own failure in both of these respects. Mediat-
ed by the recorder, memory manifests itself as a replicated difference: the resolutions 
and aspirations made years ago evoke but Krapp’s mockery,29 the sound of his voice 
then and his youth in general – surprise at best,30 whereas some words are no longer 
comprehensible, forcing him to check “viduity” in a dictionary.31 Thus, not only does 
Krapp hardly relate to his past identities, but he also follows the urge to correct them 
and revise his recorded memories. Still, are we really certain whether some parts that 
he corrects have never been altered? Or, how many revisions have his tapes under-
gone? Actually, these questions might not be that insightful insofar as they do not 
change Krapp’s position significantly. As he admits at the end of the play, after fin-
ishing his eponymous last tape, “Perhaps my best years are gone. When there was a 
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chance of happiness. But I wouldn’t want them back. Not with the fire in me now. 
No, I wouldn’t want them back.”32 Recollecting his intimate and sentimental memo-
ries, Krapp plunges in despair and isolation, as he cannot manage his own failure 
over the memory itself and over its form on numerous tapes. Indeed, his devoted 
connection to the recorder in an attempt to preserve the present bears similarities to 
Crusoe’s parrot, which instead of repeating or conserving a name, imitates it and 
produces a difference. Perhaps a more suitable archival connotation would be that of 
“envois” mentioned in Chapter 1. This peculiar text is designed by Derrida as a spec-
tral correspondence in which each sending – or postcard – undermines the positions 
of authors and readers, simultaneously exploring the potential Others who might 
have read, rewritten, diverted, or appropriated them.
33
 Although free from the postal 
logic Derrida favours, Krapp’s tapes seem to be distorted by design in a similar way, 
as the recorder makes an intrusion of the Other possible, which is visible in the self-
contradictory and disembodied voices from the past actualised on the stage, in the 
rifts between the archiving Krapp(s) and the archived Krapp(s), and even in the 
Krapps dispersed over the years, to recall Beckett’s own idea. Connecting these in-
stances of Otherness, Beckett’s archive marks a shift turning the authors into the re-
cipients and the objects inscribed on the tapes they record, whereas the overall con-
fusion of intentions, meanings, and significance reveals the frailty they are rooted in; 
it is this frailty that traces the weird reproductive activity of the media and their sub-
tle agencies. 
Undoubtedly an insightful and complex study of the archive, Krapp’s Last 
Tape returns to the other Derridean image of the archive – namely, being buried or 
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eaten alive – as it widely refers to the metaphors of digestion and evacuation.34 From 
the very beginning, Beckett informs us of Krapp’s obsessive relation to bananas, one 
of which he provocatively consumes at the beginning of the play. This habit goes 
long back into his past, as Krapp recalls on the tape recorded on his thirty-ninth 
birthday: “Have just eaten I regret to say three bananas and only with difficulty re-
frained from a fourth.”35 Even then, however, bananas are, as Krapp quickly adds, 
“[f]atal things for a man with my condition,”36 as he suffers from “unattainable laxa-
tion.”37 Precisely, Krapp is stricken with constipation which, psychoanalytically 
speaking, affects even his vocabulary, as the numerously emphasised and exaggerat-
ed “spool” connotes a “stool” instead.38 If Krapp’s archive is predominantly oriented 
at amassing memories, allowing for corrections but not deletions, then the incom-
plete digestive process deprived of evacuation seems to construct its metonymy; in 
Krapp’s Last Tape, the archive becomes a living and biological entity. Contrary to 
Derrida, the problem does not lie, however, in the disposal of the body, but in the 
fact that the biological disposal becomes impossible, making the body a sign of the 
excess of wastes. The tragedy of Krapp lies in the fact that he is incapable of proper-
ly digesting the flow of time and the abundance of memories; instead, he coexists 
with various timelines and various selves accumulated in his den. Like their interpre-
tations, these memories twist and bend, and then are inscribed on the amassed reels. 
The Krapps from the past, in turn, no longer possess their bodies, yet at the same 
time they are only partly consumed, as their voice is materialised in the agency of the 
recorder. Krapp is already buried – swallowed – or eaten alive by the archive-den he 
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inhabits; deteriorated and weak, he exists in the reality that takes power from his own 
archival practices, and turns into a vibrant and living structure materialised onstage. 
The archival relation shifts its attention from the tropes of voices, testimonies, and 
memories – a sui generis inheritance – to the actual issue of corporeality, the disposal 
of a body, or even its persistence in resisting disposability. As a result, the archive 
conjures up the problems of belonging and dwelling, of liminal homes, and of the 
afterlife of the remains, but also to the vibrant and productive agencies of  
(non)human actors that participate in these processes. As I argue, such vibrant ar-
chives are hypothetical models for the artistic spaces of Beckett and Kantor, and the 
loci whose liminality they attempt to found onstage. 
Dusty Archives 
Even though it anticipates some of the qualities of the archive unmasked by 
deconstruction, Krapp’s den does not seem to reside fixedly within the limits of a 
fleeting trace; rather, Krapp’s Last Tape stages the archive as a figure preoccupied 
equally with material, embodied, and vibrant processes. To an extent, in a clearly 
(pre-)deconstructionist manner, Krapp’s archive is the site of deferral and displace-
ment, suspending the authority over the archived matter and disconnecting this mat-
ter from any stable point of its origin. Still, Derrida – followed by Naas – leads us 
through the less explicit figures of the archive, which reminds us of its broader and 
physical relation to storing, inheriting, or remaining; this, in turn, unfolds Beckett’s 
text to even a greater extent. In a sense, there is close connection between Crusoe’s 
yearn for survival within the sound imitated by a parrot and Krapp’s devotion to the 
recording device. Although they serve different purposes, both are entangled in the 
archival relation to the world that is no more: that is gone, lost, or simply crumbled 
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to dust. Crashed by waves, islands constitute the archipelagos of îles (generic ils); 
correspondingly, Krapp’s den, which resonates with sonic waves diffracting at its 
walls, manifests the empty neither. Yet the (un)homely den and its lone inhabitant, to 
follow Derrida and Naas once again, are also rooted in these archival processes that 
are hinted by Crusoe’s fears of being consumed by wild animals or buried alive, that 
is, swallowed by the earth. As I have endeavoured to show, this fact is reflected in 
Krapp’s “practices” of consumption, digestion, and evacuation that are metonymic to 
his archival work. Consequently, the archive, in its exposure to what Derrida would 
call the Other and what by all means might be distinguished into human and nonhu-
man agencies, marks also a tension between embodiment and disembodiment.  
Although for Krapp the “tropes of edibility” (if we can temporarily call them such) 
are unrelated to any anxiety whatsoever, they are the symptoms of his own inability 
to properly digest not only food, but also time and memories. Deprived of linearity 
implied by the flawed biological cycle, Krapp’s den turns into the space of coexist-
ence where diverting timelines and past selves become embodied and enter mutual 
relations. Krapp’s Last Tape leads us through the deconstructionist readings of the 
archive, and, at the same time, unfolds its own vibrant and transformative clusters of 
agencies resisting to be swallowed by the den. 
Archives are silent and strictly controlled spaces which against all odds wel-
come one – extremely persistent and intrusive – visitor: dust. It is dust which is the 
most lively inhabitant of archives. Carolyn Steedman mocks Derrida’s famous ar-
chive fever with providing her own account of what it actually is:  
ACTUALLY, ARCHIVE FEVER comes on at night, long after the ar-
chive has shut for the day. Typically, the fever-more accurately, the pre-
cursor fever, the feverlet-starts in the early hours of the morning, in the 
bed of a cheap hotel, where the historian cannot get to sleep. You cannot 
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get to sleep because you lie so narrowly, in an attempt to avoid contact 
with anything that isn’t shielded by sheets and pillowcase. The first sign, 
then, is an excessive attention to the bed, an irresistible anxiety about the 
hundreds who have slept there before you, leaving their dust and debris in 
the fibers of the blankets, greasing the surface of the heavy, slippery cov-
erlet. The dust of others, and of other times, fills the room, settles on the 
carpet, marks out the sticky passage from bed to bathroom.
39
 
For Steedman, the literal archive fever of a historian encapsulates a naïve conviction 
according to which there is no single thing that has not been recorded; still, this con-
viction is accompanied by the sense of frailty and failure, as this all-encompassing 
knowledge does not seem to be graspable at all. The knowledge stored in archives 
backlashes with the anxiety of what else could have been found and what is still 
awaiting us.
40
 Recording countless accounts and lives, archives leave us with the 
sense that “I can never do these people justices”41 and “I can never get it done.”42 At 
the same time, archives with their temperature, humidity, and light create their own 
microclimates, which make adaptation to the external conditions impossible for a 
long time.
43
 Somewhat, archival work affects our bodies and imprints its own history 
on them. As Steedman recalls, prolonged work in the archives leads to the following 
thought: “You think, in the delirium: it was their dust that I breathed in.”44 Certainly, 
what Steedman projects here is a fantasy about a twisted proximity to the pasts of 
people investigated in the archives. As we immerse in her text, we discover that the 
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cultural history of dust transcends such fancies of coexistence, otherwise inaccessible 
to a modern scholar. 
The vibrancy of dust is visible in its intense agency turning against those who 
dare investigate the past. In the 19
th
 century Britain, as Steedman describes in detail, 
dust remained a serious risk to the rapidly industrialising society, which, in a way, 
could have made its dangers unrecognisable in other spheres: among others, in schol-
arly work. In point of fact, the rise of factories and industrialised production gave 
birth to the occupational diseases back then.
45
 In her article, Steedman reconstructs 
the cultural history of anthrax, showing how the factory work conditions of leather, 
wool, or paper industries facilitated spores to germinate and spread. Consequently, as 
she follows the case of Jules Michelet, she points out that famously diagnosed brain 
fever in the 19
th
 century, a disease of scholars of sorts, might be in fact rooted in 
misdiagnosed complications of anthrax spores present in dusty archives. We read in 
Steedman: 
We must seriously consider, as Jules Michelet was not able to, the ar-
chive as a harborer of the anthrax infection. We must take note of the 
significant number of cases of anthrax meningitis reported between 1920 
and 1950, when it became clear for the first time that the bacillus anthri-
cis could cause, or result in, meningitis (though, indeed, the incidence of 
the meninginal variant was infrequent). In its modern classification, men-
ingitis bears strict comparison with the brain fever described nearly two 
centuries ago, as attendant on the sedentary, airless, and fevered scholarly 
life, spent in close proximity to leather-bound books and documents.
46
 
For Steedman, archive fever – or the evil of the archives, to recall the ambiguous 
French title of Derrida’s work – is not only a matter of deconstructionist operation; 
rather, it encompasses the psychological and physical effects of archival work, which 
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transgress the frames of an aporetic reading. Even outside of the radical examples 
conjured up by Steedman, that is, the scholars who literally “breathed in it,” dust is 
an intrusive residue affecting us on the corporeal level. Exposed to it, skin on hands 
thickens, a throat becomes sore, a nose feels congested, and eyes begin to itch. Dust 
interferes with the senses, including those necessary to acquire knowledge and later 
to transfer it. As it also originates in a body, among others in decomposing hair, 
nails, or skin, dust is autoimmunological: it turns against the body itself, slowly 
transgressing its boundaries and affecting its functions. Consequently, there is some-
thing deeply trans-corporeal in dust, to recall Stacy Alaimo’s concept, for it involves 
remnants of both human and nonhuman worlds, piercing through our permeable bod-
ies, colonising them, and vibrantly transforming our corporeal sites.
47
 Although fur-
nished with culturally embedded meanings, dust transcends being simply a sign of 
the past to function as literal and material coexistence with various pasts and lives, 
which become graspable at the price of physical deterioration. 
“Ashes to ashes, dust to dust”; dust understood as an entity belonging to the 
nonhuman world and to the earth hardly signifies a peaceful return, despite the bsib-
lical connotations. An interesting context might be provided by Donna Haraway’s 
Staying with the Trouble, an experimental manifesto of coexistence and sympoiesis – 
“worlding-with, in company”48 – in the end times. Pursuing these logics, Haraway 
enacts provocative shifts; as she claims: “We are humus, not Homo, not anthropos; 
we are compost, not posthuman.”49 Implying not only togetherness but also succes-
sion, compost is above all material becoming; Haraway points out elsewhere: “Crit-
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ters – human and not – become-with each other, compose and decompose each other, 
in every scale and register of time and stuff in sympoietic tangling, in ecological evo-
lutionary developmental earthly worlding and unworlding.”50 Importantly enough, 
this dynamic tangling happens in the world that does not succumb to domestication 
and by no means is a safe haven. Instead, it is a chthonic realm manifesting itself in 
the dangers it brings from underneath the sea and underneath the earth, swarming in 
materialities, stinging with its tentacles in the dynamic de- and re-compositions, 
which human worlds are not excluded from.
51
 As I believe, dust belongs to this ten-
tacular and chthonic worldliness; precisely, it preserves and assimilates the pasts, 
nourishes human and nonhuman stories, crumbles with them, leaves smears on our 
skin, and forms airborne tendrils when breathed in. Eventually, dust becomes the 
residue of the past that is equally intrusive and promising, hostile and nourishing, 
material and symbolic. Inherent to any archive, it turns this space into that of vibrant 
coexistence and spreading transformations, entangling disparate timelines and trans-
porting difference. 
In Kantor, dusty archives are staged first and foremost in the opening instal-
ment of the theatre of death: The Dead Class. Wearing dingy uniforms, pale pupils 
sit among mannequins, whereas each face – alive or not – presents its worn-out and 
dusty countenance. Predominantly, The Dead Class stages its own fading photo-
graph, comprising of lives interrupted by the terrors of both world wars. Moreover, 
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this wounded generation with its decaying hopes and memories returns in the peculi-
ar coexistence of human and nonhuman actors: the poverty which Kantor is fascinat-
ed with. Richard Calvoressi notes that 
[t]he performance space is blocked with junk: heaps of dusty books, old 
newspapers, weird Tinguely-like machines, a fire-iron, a wooden school 
lavatory, a row of scratched benches. But these are not props in the nor-
mal sense; Kantor believes that they are simply there, on an equal footing 
with the actors. And there is a sense in which the objects in The Dead 
Class are actors, obstacles which threaten to take on a life of their own 
and dominate the human action.
52
 
These dusty books return also in Krzysztof Miklaszewski’s account of The Dead 
Class staged for the very first time, as he recalls its setting of “little wooden benches, 
littered with the debris of dusty school books.”53 Consequently, The Dead Class not 
only is crammed with derelict objects and spectres with painted and fading faces, but 
also turns into the dusty archive of cacophonic memories and quotations: snippets of 
nursery and counting rhymes, mythological and biblical fragments, or literary refer-
ences. Aside of staging the manifesto of the theatre of death, The Dead Class, there-
fore, depicts the fragmentariness of memories and their intrusive dehumanisation, 
since the behaviour of the human actors becomes mechanic, deprived of liveliness. 
At the same time, the work evokes a peculiar vibrancy of things, objects, and rem-
nants. Kantor’s piece encompasses numerous dispersed and ungainly stories reflected 
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in the dusty classroom, which mutually transform themselves to formulate both dead 
and affective message of the spectacle.
54
 
Similar to The Dead Class in its conceptualisation of memory, Wielopole, 
Wielopole is a work that takes place among the ruins of childhood. As might be ex-
pected, this reminiscence resists being recalled entirely, taking form of disconnected 
objects instead: there is a room, a door, a window, a wardrobe, some crosses, and a 
bed. In fact, these damaged and provisory objects are reorganised several times dur-
ing the performance, as if in a frail attempt to regain their actual order from the past. 
As Kantor writes in the introductory part of Wielopole, Wielopole, the room of his 
childhood is a space which he persistently arranges anew and which inevitably falls 
apart over and over again.
55
 Over ten years later, in one of his final texts entitled “My 
Room,” Kantor recalls once again his “Poor Room of Imagination.”56 As he admits 
there, his obsession with staging his own room stems from reading it as a limited 
intimate world, that is, the space capable of preserving individuality threatened by 
“the world ruled by the ruthless laws of collectivism, banality, and society.”57 Albeit 
tainted with elitism, Kantor’s remark points to his prevailing philosophy of the mat-
ter of an individual life, understood as the source of aporetic and vibrant force, ac-
cessible insofar as this detached life withdraws from “lively relations,” be it social or 
cultural.
58
 Eventually, the room becomes the figure of tension between the primordi-
al, intimate memory, and the social and collective histories, which I have commented 
upon in Chapter 2 in detail. 
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What has not been analysed there is the importance of dust in Wielopole, 
Wielopole. In fact, dust is a feature accompanying Kantor’s father, one of the recruits 
from the animated photograph analysed in Chapter 2. As I have pointed out there, 
infantrymen function as a “conceptual” bridge between human and nonhuman actors 
(not limited to mannequins) because of their mechanised movements, emotionless 
faces, and unified and fading appearances. Uncannily similar to the other soldiers, 
Kantor’s father marches vigorously across the stage; then, he breaks out of their col-
lective and intervenes with the memorised family members stuck out in their repeat-
ed habits. Wojciech Owczarski notes that excessive marching of Marian Kantor in 
Wielopole, Wielopole corresponds to Kantor’s vivid memory of his father’s boots. At 
the same time, Owczarski speculates whether these army boots are connected to a 
“family tragedy,” “military commitments,” or “fatherly mistakes.”59 Regardless of 
the lack of straightforward answers, the traumatic figure of Kantor’s father and his 
persistent march tempt us to rethink his boots in a more physical manner: namely, as 
the vehicles of dangerous dust. Dusty and dingy in his appearance, Marian Kantor 
spreads the dust of some irretrievable past stories in the childhood memory. Extract-
ed and intimate, the room cannot defend its inhabitants – members of the family and 
historical figures – from interaction with Marian Kantor, who threatens them and 
disorganises the memory. His marching and spreading legs, his convertible ruler, and 
his rifle with a bayonet resemble tentacles, feelers, and stingers, respectively. Conse-
quently, Marian Kantor’s appearance points to the chthonic entities that fascinate 
Haraway. Furthermore, his intrusive and dangerous dynamics, compared here to the 
dust his boots might have brought to the room, contributes to the re-composition and 
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de-composition of the memory. In fact, the archival work of Wielopole, Wielopole 
happens to be inseparable from its deadly content which returns from the grave of the 
photograph in order to coexist with the other inhabitants of the preserved memory 
and to vividly transform its fragile structure. 
Inhaled, dust amasses in the respiratory tract, not only causing difficulties in 
breathing and speaking, but also triggering intensely corporeal reactions, as one tries 
to discharge it in convulsive cough. Such an observation neatly corresponds to Mari-
an Kantor’s vows during the wedding with Helena Berger. Actually, not only is he 
covered in dust, but also his speech turns out to be “dusty.” Failed by his body, Mari-
an Kantor emits an incomprehensible flow of hoarse sounds, accompanied by the 
painful resistance of his throat and mouth. However, despite these difficulties, Mari-
an Kantor constantly talks until the priest forces him to close his mouth. As it turns 
out, he never articulates any intelligible line whatsoever during the performance, yet 
frequently commits himself to the aforementioned dead counterpart of speech: 
speech that is mechanised, dusty, and undecipherable. Interestingly enough, logor-
rhea as a figure of dust is also an intriguing motif in Beckett. Indeed, he numerously 
employs the tropes of ashes or dust within his aesthetics of reduction. In Endgame, 
Nell and Nagg live in the ashbins whereas the characters in Play protrude from the 
burial urns. Moreover, in That Time, the decaying memories are described as “all 
gone long ago all dust.”60 Still, it is the obsessive talking which Beckett briefly links 
to dust in The Unnamable in a striking resemblance to the logorrhea of Marian Kan-
tor in Wielopole, Wielopole. 
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The Unnamable consists of a neurotic monologue of the unknown narrator, 
whose prevailing preoccupation is that he is incapable of ending the story.
61
 The nar-
rator attempts to become unleashed from this verbal imperative only to discover that 
he unfolds new narratives, digresses, and gets involved in a series of meta-
arguments, none of which can satisfy him with an agency to finish. Significantly, it is 
in The Unnamable that this weird storyteller compares his own linguistic existence, 
or speech in general, to dust. We read:  
[I]mpossible to stop, I’m in words, made of words, other’s words, what 
others, the place too, the air, the walls, the floor, the ceiling, all words, 
the whole world is here with me, I’m the air, the walls, the walled-in one, 
everything yields, opens, ebbs, flows, like flakes, I’m all these flakes, 
meeting, mingling, falling asunder, wherever I go I find me, leave me, go 
towards me, come from me, nothing ever but me, a particle of me, re-
trieved, lost, gone astray, I’m all these words, all these strangers, this dust 
of words, with no ground for their settling, no sky for their dispersing 
[…]. 62 
In another passage, the storyteller admits: “they don’t know where I am, or what I’m 
like, I’m like dust, they want to make a man out of dust.”63 The Unnamable settles its 
own archive as a storage space for reverberating speech that constitutes its narrative 
world; what is archived then are multiplying permutations of stories and masks the 
storyteller wears in them, including Mahood, Worm, or Basil, whom he calls the 
“vice-exister[s].”64 Certainly, the words the storyteller uses are failing, inaccurate, 
and misleading; paradoxically, they turn out to be the only matter that construes 
these realms. Words are “strangers,” and words are “dust” which is kept in standstill 
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for any space it can be transported to originates in the very same language. Still, the 
more the storyteller exhales the dirt of words, the more of them he finds inside his 
lungs. After all, contrary to the biblical image of a man created out of clay, the narra-
tor’s existence stems directly from dust. Neither settling nor dispersing, the accumu-
lating words are vibrant and hostile matter contributing to the narrative deadlock of 
The Unnamable. 
Similarly to Kantor’s Wielopole, Wielopole, Beckett’s The Unnamable might 
thrive on the artistic re-conceptualisation of the compost. Originating in the narra-
tor’s pit “deep down,”65 the linguistic realm of the novel is a chthonic realm. Indeed, 
Beckett construes particular figures of the tentacles: walking sticks allowing legless 
Mahood to wander, his “virile [member]”66 that remains after he is dissected, finally, 
the common associations of Worm’s body. Apparently, the whole structure of the 
novel might be read as tentacular since it embraces seemingly endless and spreading 
sentences throughout rapidly changing narrative situations. The dust of words simul-
taneously nourishes the impulse to continue speaking and, simultaneously, functions 
as a remnant of the failed stories, incapable of fulfilling intentions and motivations of 
the narrator. Thus, The Unnamable traces the enclosed space of dynamic re- and de-
compositions, where coexistent worlds come to being and fall apart in a matter of a 
couple of sentences. Consequently, the narrating agency is entangled in the voices 
from other pits, materialising realms, and emerging stories that all come to being 
together within an intra-active web of re-negotiating self-reflectiveness of the novel. 
Read through the figure of dust and Haraway’s investigations into the 
chthonic compost, Kantor’s and Beckett’s selected works reveal themselves as vi-
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brant archives. We are still not that far away from the deconstructionist readings of 
the archive, and the tropes of storing and swallowing they point to. What is at stake 
here is an even greater agency of the archives accompanied with their excessive ma-
teriality. Equally nourishing and preserving, intrusive and passive, dust manifests the 
vibrancy of the archives, turning them into conceptual spaces of coexistence, where 
human and nonhuman agencies both come to being and meet each other. Eventually, 
what is construed is a liminal place at the junctions of bygone times and fragmentary 
spaces, where human agency is only one of the many fragile instances. Dusty ar-
chives turn into powerful (re)presentations of vulnerable coexistence which makes 
lively processes of becoming and transformation possible, yet at a high price.  
Elevating the Rags 
Delving into the onto-epistemology of dust, this chapter also has to visit the 
territories of its counterpart, that is, rags, which contribute to a recurring and parallel 
motif in both Beckett’s and Kantor’s oeuvres. Aside from accumulating dust, imply-
ing the symbolic and physical coexistence with the past, archives as structures con-
jure up rigid organisation, indexation, and clear arrangement. Furthermore, our con-
voluted operations on the archive – inspired predominantly by Derrida – boil down to 
positing it as a figure of erasure; in fact, archives clean themselves, re-write content, 
and doom particular records to be lost, deleted, or simply unsaved. In a sense, this is 
reflected in their pseudoetymology of arkheion pointing to the means of control 
which any archive equally relies on and subtly evades, as it has been mentioned ear-
lier. Rags, which I would like to refer to, are things used for dusting in a double 
sense of this word. Firstly, they are employed to wipe out dust accumulating on ob-
jects and to carry it away. Secondly, in doing so, rags only partially assimilate dust 
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(which now touches and merges with their texture) and disperse it (hence allowing 
dust to settle somewhere else). Because of that, rags – just as dust – are involved in a 
peculiar economy of remnants and the afterlife of things: they redistribute boundaries 
anew. Taking part in human activity, both dust and rags emphasise their own agen-
cies, which autonomously, albeit in tight intra-action, shape human and nonhuman 
worlds.  
Rags are weird entities; themselves remnants of disposed clothes or sheets, 
they are processed to function as cleaning tools. Damaged, stained, worn-out, these 
cloths gain afterlife as poor, hidden, and disrespected things, which, nevertheless, 
might become even more indispensable than the textiles they are derived from. To 
put it bluntly, they become necessary and useful. A Polish philosopher, Jolanta 
Brach-Czaina notes that they are literally “down-to-earth.”67 According to her, rags 
indicate both the repetition of events, visible in the way we move them across the 
floor, and the recognition of everyday history in its passing, manifested in the deteri-
orating condition of the fabric.
68
 At the same time, she attaches a counterintuitive 
dignity to their existence. Precisely, rags are the devices of hope and purification,
69
 
cutting through the everyday life and its recurring events. Brach-Czaina writes: “A 
rag […] with its functional simplicity symbolises the possibility of clearing the 
whole surface. Even though it is incapable of reaching deeper, the rag raises hope, 
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but also disgust. After all, while cleaning, it takes all the dirt, gets soaked with it, 
stinks, and becomes repulsive.”70 Later on, she adds: 
 [W]hat we realise is that something engaged in cleaning practices might 
also become disgusting, and require cleaning or purification. We reach, 
therefore, the processes devoid of distinguishable closure. We note that 
cleanliness and clarity [czystość] should not be opposed to dirt. Rather, 
they merge and muddle, just as blackness and whiteness blend in the grey 
rags.
71
 
Eventually, rags are entangled in vivid and dynamic exchanges of their particles and 
matter that wears out with every single use. These precious fabrics intra-act with 
dusty spaces, assimilating and discharging what they wipe away, redistributing their 
own boundaries, and exhausting the binary divisions. All in all, cleanliness they as-
pire to happens to be a surficial effect that excludes the deeper connections rags 
might make. 
Fostering on these ambiguities, The Dead Class and Wielopole, Wielopole 
employ the figure of an insidious cleaning woman equipped with either a mop or a 
rag. In both cases, more significantly, she is the figure of death, who fulfils the role 
of an usher to the exhausting reality of Kantor’s theatre. In The Dead Class, she fe-
verishly accompanies the dead, but also washes the faces and the bodies of the dusty 
pupils from the fading photograph.
72
 Kantor notes: “She washes the corpses, wrings 
the rag; dirt water drops onto the ground.”73 Comparably zealous and devoted, the 
cleaning woman in Wielopole, Wielopole uses a dirty rag to wash her own hands and 
then wrings it, right before the usage of the camera-machine gun. As we can see, rags 
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form tactile links with the actors, preserving their in-between state in the theatre of 
death. Consequently, these cloths become poor objects, depriving the mentioned in-
dividuals of dignity the stage should have guaranteed. In doing so, however, rags 
participate in the celebratory quality of Kantor’s works,74 an ascendance of death and 
its ritualistic devotion to the act of stripping cultural and social relations away. The 
dust of the past and the dirt covering the bodies are directly poured onto the stage, 
ceding the power over the death on the medium itself. Because of that, hands also 
have to be washed: the responsibility over the course of the spectacle, fractured 
memories, and the collapse of childhood memory is no longer a matter of a single 
being. Rather, what is at stake is the growing agency of death as a process of empty-
ing life, of making it worthless and poor. Simultaneously, the dirty/clean relations are 
also challenged; the rag assimilates the particles of these two states, individual time-
lines, and personal histories, turning into yet another medium for coexistence and 
material redistribution. 
The dignity of the rags Brach-Czaina opts for is recalled in I Shall Never Re-
turn. In this piece, a rag is no longer a prop of the infernal usher to the theatre of 
death; instead, it is possessed by the cleaning woman in the inn, resembling one of 
the members of the mob Kantor recurrently portrays. In the opening scenes, we can 
find her as she anxiously and persistently washes the floor with a rag. Yet, when 
Kantor’s final emballage is constructed at the end of the play, she replaces the rabbi 
to sing “Ani ma’amin” among the amassing corpses known from The Dead Class. 
“Ani ma’amin,” or “I believe,” is a Jewish prayer that turns into the creed of the real-
ity of lowest rank when it is sung by the cleaner, a member of the mob whom Kantor 
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also equates with a prostitute. What is more, this prayer was reportedly sung by Jews 
entering the gas chambers, which points to the Holocaust connotations.
75
 As Kantor 
proposes, the cleaner thus becomes “the symbol of the Promised Land.”76 Hence, 
“Ani ma’amin” indicates Kantor’s well-known tropes of ruptured space of history 
and memory, lost innocence, and the traumatic burden of the 20
th
 century genocides. 
Just as a rag happens to symbolise hope, this prayer returns as the frail resistance 
against the course of history. When diminished in its form to the poor reality and 
deprived of all sanctity, “Ani ma’amin” might regain a powerful affective charge of 
the historical trauma. The act of cleaning – or purifying, to be precise – becomes 
stained itself with death and trauma; yet, in being such it retrieves a possibility of 
opening them. As the theatre of death has been mostly preoccupied with the nonhu-
man vitalism since its very beginning, the aforementioned opening might release the 
lively power of things which the affective re-working of history might be founded 
on.
77
 
In the lieu of a coda, it should be noticed that the tension between lower reali-
ty and elevation of the rags might be also found in Beckett’s Endgame. At the very 
end of the play, Hamm delivers a closing monologue which is followed by the act of 
covering his face with an old handkerchief he has just used for wiping his glasses. 
Before he freezes onstage, Hamm says: “Old stancher! [Pause.] You… remain.”78 Is 
it also a rag? Is it that after the closing catastrophe of Endgame, rags are the only 
things that remain, just as they seem to save the world when the world is actually 
gone in Kantor’s works? Having no effect on Hamm’s vision, this rag seems to con-
vey the symbolic meaning via the metonymy with the veil of Saint Veronica, used to 
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wipe out blood from Jesus’ face according to the gospel. The “old stancher,” there-
fore, encompasses both suffering and comfort; it veils the identity and preserves it, 
just as the bloody imprint on Saint Veronica’s fabric. Physically, it touches upon the 
worn-out face when everything is, according to the opening lines of the play, “nearly 
finished.”79 Covering his face as if he were dead, Hamm’s handkerchief points to the 
hope of the hopeless at the end of times, suggested by the imminent horizon of End-
game, according to which no chess move might change the outcomes. Still, Hamm 
does not cease to play, even if the play can be upheld only on the surface level. Re-
gardless whether no move can be made or not, the gesture of covering a face brings 
an uncanny sense to the expectable course of the events in Endgame, keeping its 
nearly closed structure unfinished. Hamm’s standstill is also a form of playing, 
whereas entangling his countenance with the fabric provides an opening to the dead-
lock presented in the play. Importantly, just as the “stancher” assimilates the dust 
from his glasses, it also becomes stained with the logic of Endgame: it turns into a 
vibrant nonhuman actor which begins to play. As a sign of hope and comfort, it does 
not change Endgame, which eventually ends, yet by fuelling the dynamic exchange 
at the moment of nearly absolute stillness, it suspends the closure of the drama. 
Neither 
Just as their interweaving fabrics, rags constitute material relationships with 
the world and contribute to setting and redistributing boundaries on its surface. Be-
cause of that, there is something hopeful in these otherwise deteriorating cloths and 
the economy of remnants they depend on. An act of cleaning is never immunised to 
contamination with the matter that rags attempt to wipe away. Deep down, rags 
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transcend our intentionality and become entangled in “more-than-human” realities, 
carrying and dispersing dust, turning into the vehicles of death, or breaking the 
standstill with their subtle dynamism. Perhaps rags are dignified, and in this sense 
they connote the method of negative theologies, as they strip the religious from its 
acquired idols and confront it with the derelict and worn-out realities of things; con-
sequently, by means of this negation, they are capable of regaining a transgressive 
and excessive moment, which religious experience cherishes the most. In this sense, 
they might function as breaches and openings, ironically represented in their holed 
fabrics. Most of all, rags are the props of neither: they neither clean nor contaminate, 
but inherently suspend this binary, they bring neither hope nor disgust, but unfold 
one in another, they neither break out of the mundanity of everyday life nor are in-
scribed in its repeating events. As it turns out, rags are similar in this respect to the 
figures of dust and archive explored above. In fact, dust stems from neither in its 
constantly negotiated temporal relations, its bodily and textual existence, and, pre-
dominantly, its weird belonging to the “down-to-earth” reality and the chthonic one 
“underneath-the-earth.” Finally, archives are founded on neither, as well; they mud-
dle the past of the records with the future of retrieving them, they negotiate being in 
control and being controlled, and they neither preserve things unchanged nor eradi-
cate them entirely. 
In this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate how living in an uncanny 
home – or an unhomely home per se – is realised in Kantor’s and Beckett’s works, 
perceived through the new materialist lens. In both cases, these loci strike us with 
their ruinous landscapes and the sense of catastrophe, be it a bygone disaster or that 
looming at a distance. As I have tried to show, the sense of loss accompanied by be-
longing to weird spaces structurally reminds us of the experience of living in the An-
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thropocene. Although Kantor and Beckett were unable to recognise this shift, and 
this is the reason why the Anthropocene is mentioned briefly in this chapter, their 
sense of catastrophe, their focus on the economy of remnants, their attentiveness to 
things and nonhuman agencies, and their preoccupation with inheriting and remem-
bering contribute to similar processes. As deconstruction teaches us, losing the indi-
vidual world entails the archival relation; following this hypothesis, I have begun 
with investigating archives in Kantor’s and Beckett’s works. Aiming at an investiga-
tion of liminal spaces, I have turned to less deconstructionist and more vibrant fig-
ures inspired by the archive, that is, dust and rags. These two types of things connote 
archival practices, and, at the same time, belong to homely landscapes. In my read-
ing, inspired by Haraway and Brach-Czaina, dust and rags constitute a dynamic and 
threatening coexistence of human and nonhuman agencies, relying on sympoietic 
tangling. Differing in realisation and implications, they form the chthonic realms in 
which the liminal homelike spaces and weird senses of belonging come to being. 
Eventually, I have demonstrated that nonhumans are a vital and vibrant part of the 
unspeakable homes of both authors, and in this respect they deserve utmost attention 
and investigation. 
  
CHAPTER 4  
Aristeus and Thanatos 
Insects, Mannequins, and the Death of the Nonhuman 
 
Creepy mutants; vermin emerging from 
the sewerage; resilient survivors; tentacu-
lar left-overs from a previous evolution-
ary era; one of the seven plagues in Saint 
John’s Apocalypse; signs of the wrath of 
God as the biblical locusts; insects cover 
a number of staggering signifying prac-
tices.
1
 
[T]o hell with animals.
2
 
 
Sound and Vision 
Since the question of how nonhumans tend to inhabit the (un)homely spaces 
in the works of Samuel Beckett and Tadeusz Kantor has been covered, the immer-
sion in the realms of these nonhuman entities seems to be the next and necessary step 
forward. Indeed, this chapter in the broadest possible sense is devoted to the figures 
of nonhumans, including their convoluted connection with death. Significantly, it is 
death with its conceptual excess which among all is the nonhuman per se, as Rosi 
Braidotti aptly suggests.
3
 Beckett and Kantor approach it differently, nonetheless; the 
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former deploys the detailed references to nonhuman animals,
4
 predominantly insects 
and vermins, whereas the latter puts forward the mannequin: the uncanny figure of 
nonhuman human, so to speak. Despite this foundational discrepancy, I endeavour to 
demonstrate how both takes on the nonhuman interweave and open each other in a 
productive artistic dialogue. I intend to begin with Kantor’s manifesto of the theatre 
of death. My aim is to confront his theory of the mannequin as a heretic means to 
exhaust the relations that bind the living together. Thereafter, Giorgio Agamben’s 
concept of the anthropological machine is introduced and de-historicised, so that it 
can be developed into an interpretative device diagnosing the status of the nonhuman 
in Kantor’s and Beckett’s works, which, as I argue, is tightly connected to the peculi-
ar figure of death. As it will be shown, this machine works similarly in both cases 
when it comes to extracting the empty space of death and to delineating the bounda-
ries of the nonhuman. What is interesting, though, is the fact that whereas in Kantor 
this operates on the human / mannequin dyad, in Beckett it is the binary of insect and 
human that should gather our attention. Following the writings of Alain Badiou, Rosi 
Braidotti, Steven Connor, and Jane Bennett, I attempt to discuss how both Kantor 
and Beckett tend to divert from the logic of the individual nonhuman, which they so 
eagerly postulate, and turn to the logic of the swarm instead. In the concluding sec-
tion, the possible hints at the relations between insects and technology in Beckett’s 
works will be indicated. 
Put forward by Moran in Molloy, the other motto of this chapter alludes to 
Beckett’s complex relation with animals and animality in a twisted and rather per-
verse way. Anchored in the Modernist zeitgeist and the ruptures both World Wars 
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with their industrialised genocides enacted, Beckett’s works have tended to be read 
within strictly anthropocentric frameworks: the degradation of the Cartesian dualism, 
the inability to acknowledge one’s subjectivity, the failure to connect language with 
either intention or thought, and so forth.
5
 This highly intrapersonal perspective, mo-
tivated by scarce depictions of the desolate spaces dwelt by equally wretched – albeit 
often universalised – creatures, has been thoroughly explored by the theory-oriented 
scholarship of 1980s and 1990s rooted in the linguistic turn.
6
 At the same time – and 
this is the moment when the perverse side of the motto unfolds – Beckett seems to be 
obsessed with thinking of and by means of animal figures, which vividly populate 
otherwise decaying spaces of his imagination. Steven Connor points out that 
[i]t is surprising to find a fictional landscape as recurrently bleak and in-
hospitable as that of Beckett’s so well-stocked with animals. His work 
contains references to horses, goats, pigs, hens, parrots, sheep, mules, 
dogs, apes, rabbits, slugs, worms and hedgehogs, as well as a lobster and 
a llama.
7
 
Although environmental readings still contribute to the peripheries of Beckett stud-
ies, the animal-oriented approaches appear to prevail, thriving on the plethora of 
specimen Connor meticulously enumerates.
8
 This critical path, which my argument 
                                                             
5
 Ihab Hassan claims that what we encounter in Beckett is “the negative echo of language, autode-
structive, demonic, nihilist.” See: Ihab Hassan, The Dismemberment of Orpheus: Toward a Postmod-
ern Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 248, quoted in: Shane Weller, “Beckett 
and Late Modernism,” in: The New Cambridge Companion to Samuel Beckett, ed. Dirk van Hulle 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Weller himself, following Tyrus Miller and Frederic 
Jameson, among others, conjures up various anthropocentric tropes in his reading of Beckett, includ-
ing the focus on the (dissolution of) the authorial instance. See also: Simon Critchley, “Know Happi-
ness – On Beckett,” in: Simon Critchley, Very Little… Almost Nothing. Death, Philosophy, Literature 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2004), Anthony Uhlmann, Beckett and Poststructuralism (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Hugh Kenner, “The Cartesian Centaur,” in: Hugh Kenner, 
Samuel Beckett: A Critical Study (Berkley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 
1973). 
6
 Dirk van Hulle, “Introduction,” in: The New Cambridge Companion to Samuel Beckett, ed. Dirk van 
Hulle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. xviii. 
7
 Steven Connor, “Beckett’s Animals,” Journal of Beckett Studies, No. 8 (1982). Not paginated. 
Available at: http://128.186.130.50/jobs/num08/Num8Connor.htm (access: 1 July 2018).  
8
 Aside from Connor’s numerous papers and talks on Beckett and animal studies, see, for instance: 
Mary Bryden, ed., Beckett and Animals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Shane 
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follows as well, cherishes the fact that the barren and deserted spaces which Beckett 
so eagerly stages or depicts are dwelt by a great variety of animals. Their abundance 
(contrary to other figures, isolated or at best gathered in pairs or groups of threes) 
and vividness (against the Beckettian view on the exasperated human condition) are 
at least surprising. What is thus the purpose of such intense animality and numerous 
nonhuman animals in the constantly dying worlds of Beckett’s? How do animals 
differ in their practices of living (and dying) among the tortured human figures? Do 
animals also die in Beckett’s realms, which always exist on the verge of desolation? 
Moran’s harsh attitude also, in a sense, caricatures Tadeusz Kantor’s relation-
ship with animals, which – contrary to Beckett’s – is more straightforward. The thea-
tre of death has never ceased to be interested in nonhumans, from wrecked and aban-
doned objects, through bio-objects (the assemblages of human actors and mechanical 
contraptions), to wax mannequins. Still, animals are not frequent inhabitants of Kan-
tor’s otherwise crammed spaces, Let the Artists Die being a valuable exception. In 
this work, a young boy dressed in a military uniform, “I – at the age of six,” enters 
the stage riding a wooden toy bicycle. He is not alone, though; the child is followed 
by the bleak tin-like soldiers led by the marshal – most presumably, the wraith of 
Józef Piłsudski – mounting the skeleton of a horse. Spectacular yet flamboyant, the 
image is abundant in meanings that mesh with narratives, fantasies, and traumas, and 
merge temporal planes. Once again, the innocent and the particular are confronted 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Weller, “Not Rightly Human,” Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd’hui, Vol. 19, Borderless Beckett / 
Beckett sans frontiers (2008), pp. 211-221. For other ecocritical readings of Beckett, see, for instance: 
Paul Saunders, “Samuel Beckett’s Trilogy and the Ecology of Negation,” Journal of Beckett Studies, 
Vol. 20, No. 1 (2011), pp. 54-77; Steven Connor, “Beckett’s Atmospheres,” in: Beckett after Beckett, 
eds. Stanley E. Gontarski and Anthony Uhlmann (Gainsville: University of Florida Press, 2006), pp. 
52-65; Paul Davies, “Strange Weather: Beckett from the Perspective of Ecocriticism,” in: Beckett 
after Beckett, pp. 66-78; Greg Garrard, “Endgame: Beckett’s ‘Ecological Thought’,” Samuel Beckett 
Today / Aujourd’hui, Vol. 23 (2011), pp. 383-397. Available at: 
https://www.academia.edu/350917/_Endgame_Becketts_Ecological_Thought_ (access: 2 June 2018). 
Indebted to some of these perspectives, yet another reading of Beckett’s selected works in the vein of 
environmental criticism is presented in Chapter 5. 
137 
 
 
 
 
with the historical, which bears no interest in an individual life. Consequently, the 
scene renders itself as both a promise or an expectation haunting the boy’s life (em-
phasised by the metonymy of the marshal on a horse and the child on a bike) and his 
doom to fail (implied in the equine cadaver and mechanical revenants). Moreover, to 
an extent, Kantor’s autobiographical gesture also points to the national mythology 
and the marshal – the formative tale and the father figure respectively – in the ab-
sence of actual fathers, thus merging the private issues of abandonment with the 
greater trauma of loss and war.  
Excessively portrayed in Let the Artists Die, a horse is also the unique figure 
of the nonhuman animal which historically has been intensely involved in practices 
of domestication. Horses have indeed functioned as various human extensions, serv-
ing as weapons, workforce, or vehicles, but at the same time being widely used for 
meat production. We can observe this dependence even in Kantor’s abovementioned 
work, where the marshal and its mare correspond to the boy and his bike. As more 
effective machines were gradually replacing equines, these animals have been re-
duced to metaphors: abstract points of reference preserved in the notion of horse-
power. Therefore, horses have been involved in practices that contributed to their 
linkage with the mechanical.
9
 At the same time, the very same practices have em-
ployed equine imagery in the absence of horses: equine beings are constantly else-
where serving some other or the other’s purposes. They are indeed domesticated 
                                                             
9
 Since the figure of a horse is deeply rooted in literary tradition and imagination, and involves a 
plethora of cultural affects, my brief remarks do not aim at providing an all-embracing study; instead, 
they follow an interpretative path emphasising those aspects which correspond to the characteristics of 
nonhumans that are employed in both Kantor and Beckett. Because of that, the motifs associating 
horses with wisdom, empathy, gentleness, power, or freedom are not taken into consideration. Simi-
larly, the choice of domesticating practices is also one-sided; it avoids such issues as, for instance, 
training understood as inter-species communication (and not necessarily the embodiment of power 
relations). This aspect is interestingly tackled by Paul Patton in its both theoretical and practical di-
mensions. See: Paul Patton, “Language, Power, and the Training of Horses,” in: Zoontologies. The 
Question of the Animal, ed. Cary Wolfe (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 
2003), pp. 83-99. 
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animals, yet – as we should already know too well – entering the homely spaces in 
Kantor’s imagination is by all means a disruptive process. In the weird space where 
the intimate memories intersect with the national myths while childlike innocence is 
splintered by the inevitability of war, Piłsudski’s mare appears as a dead, absent, 
mechanical, and artificial entity: a manmade skeleton, which, after all, is a manne-
quin.
10
  
Since we have already noticed that Beckett’s secluded and minimalist spaces 
are widely stocked with animals, the presence of horses among them should not sur-
prise us. What, however, should strike us is the fact that despite the foundational dis-
crepancy between the two authors reflected in the motto of this chapter, Beckett’s 
imagery of horses seems to meet the skeletal mare of Let the Artist Die in a spectral 
encounter. Interestingly, in Beckett’s Embers not only are horses linked with death, 
but they also predominantly rely on absence and the mechanical.
11
 In a nutshell, in 
the play, even the most miniscule particle of its audial realm seems to be subdued to 
the voice of its protagonist, Henry. His vivid memories are materialised “on air” the 
very moment he articulates them, whereas particular sounds are played following his 
commands. Even Henry’s first word, “On”12 – playing on the ambiguity of “going 
on” and “turning on” the radio – posits him in an asymmetrical relation to the rest of 
the content recorded on the reel; indeed, Henry appears to be the person operating the 
                                                             
10
 In this chapter, I will continue to associate this image with the category of mannequin despite inac-
curacies such a move might cause and the problematic etymology resurfacing when it comes to non-
humans. As I will show later on, this particular case of a bio-object shares many similarities with 
mannequins theorised and staged throughout the theatre of death. 
11
 Horses understood as the vessels for the thanatic content might also be found in The Expelled. In 
this short story, the equine gazes “initiate the crisis of self-identification,” as Joseph Anderton notes. 
See: Joseph Anderton, “‘Hooves!’: The Equine Presence in Beckett,” in: Beckett and Animals, ed. 
Mary Bryden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 159. See also: Samuel Beckett, 
“The Expelled,” in: Samuel Beckett, The Complete Short Prose, 1929-1989, ed. Stanley E. Gontarski 
(New York: Grove Press, 1995), pp. 46-60. 
12
 Samuel Beckett, Embers, in: Samuel Beckett, The Complete Dramatic Works (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1990), p. 253. 
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medium from behind and from inside. Since everything relies on Henry’s demands, 
horses are doubly disembodied in Embers. On the surface level, they are disembod-
ied since the very medium employed in this play – the radio – is capable of preserv-
ing sounds exclusively. Still, there is a deeper level of their absence; aside from the 
brief scene of Addie’s horse riding lesson, they recur as the recorded sound when 
Henry requests the metonymic “hooves,”13 compared to the stomping “ten ton 
Mammoth,”14 an extinct species itself. This unclear yearn for the sound of hooves 
might be explained by Henry’s reflection on whether it is possible for a horse “to 
mark time.”15 As it turns out, just as Henry wants to shoe the horses in order to allow 
them to do so, he equally wants to shoe the aforementioned Mammoth so that it can 
“tramp the world down.”16 Thus, he seems to be interested in marking time only in-
sofar as it indicates the end of time. Hooves point to the trope of the physicality 
which is both entirely alien to the audial world of Embers and deeply apocalyptic. 
Precisely, this materiality or physicality functions simultaneously as Henry’s remote 
and unattainable object of desire, and as a powerful notion capable of obliterating the 
reality he resides in. What remains of the horse is but a sound. 
These two examples, albeit marginal, do not necessarily prove that there is an 
inherent correspondence between the figures of nonhuman in both oeuvres; rather – 
as I intend to show – they lay the foundations for the dialogue in which both Kantor 
and Beckett might meet with their distinct understandings of the nonhuman. What 
binds such a dialogue together is a shared inclination of both authors to not only allo-
cate the nonhuman within the realms of the mechanical, the dead, or the absent, but 
also – despite these qualities – emphasise their unexpected vividness. Created in that 
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 Beckett, Embers, passim. 
14
 Beckett, Embers, p. 253. 
15
 Beckett, Embers, p. 253. 
16
 Beckett, Embers, p. 253. 
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paradoxical way, mannequins astonish with their material agency, which displaces 
efforts attempting to put them within an anthropological frame. No less paradoxical, 
animals in Beckett’s oeuvre – especially insects and vermins this chapter is devoted 
to – tend to become de-animalised in order to function as vivid materiality instead. 
The tropes of sound and vision – of disembodied sounds in Beckett and excessive 
images in Kantor – will lead us through this realm of the vibrant yet material entities 
and the processes which the nonhuman agencies are entangled in. 
The Heretic Machines 
The theatre of death is first and foremost the theatre of mannequins. Although 
Kantor endorses their crucial role in the theatrical performance, and in this sense he 
is an heir to the modernist canon of marionette theatres, he is at odds with the central 
figures of the very sane canon; as he argues, “I do not share the belief that the 
MANNEQUIN (or WAX FIGURE) could replace the LIVE ACTOR, as Kleist and 
Craig wanted.”17 Albeit separately, both Heinrich von Kleist and Edward Gordon 
Craig are captivated by the idea of depriving a human actor of his or her physiologi-
cal and psychological traits. If those were abandoned, as they believe, the theatrical 
performance would achieve its remarkably complete form, immunised to the risk of 
being interfered with the external and non-theatrical factors. Von Kleist, for one, is 
convinced that this daring task might be realised through the figure of a puppet, 
which not only is dependent on the laws of mechanics that properly de-individualise 
it, but also belongs exclusively to the theatrical reality.
18
 In his own theory, Craig 
                                                             
17
 Tadeusz Kantor, “The Theatre of Death,” in: Tadeusz Kantor, A Journey through Other Spaces. 
Essays and Manifestos, 1944-1990, ed. and trans. Michal Kobialka (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Lon-
don: University of California Press, 1993), p. 112. 
18
 Heinrich von Kleist, “On the Marionette Theatre,” trans. Idris Parry, Southern Cross Review, Vol. 9. 
Available at: https://southerncrossreview.org/9/kleist.htm (access: 11 September 2018).  
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goes even further; indebted to Friedrich Nietzsche, Craig postulates that an imperfect 
actor has to be replaced with what he calls the “Über-marionette,” liberated from the 
shackles of realism and individual will.
19
 Kantor indeed shares with von Kleist and 
Craig an aspiration to preserve nearly absolute control over the performance, but he 
has never abandoned his faith in the necessity of human performers. These are cru-
cial for making it possible to capture the transgressive potentiality of the theatre; 
however, their significance must be rethought in relation to nonhuman mannequins 
that from now on have to become “model[s] for the Live ACTOR[s],”20 to use Kan-
tor’s terms. 
As it has been mentioned in Chapter 2, the theatre of death predominantly 
aims at re-creating the primordial shock of the theatrical encounter. Because of that, 
it is founded on the mythic yet entirely subjective realisation: the traumatic discovery 
that the actor onstage who is deceptively similar and close to the spectator turns out 
to be disconnected and distant, as if he or she occupied an entirely separated reality.
21
 
Mischa Twitchin claims: 
In the theatre of death the question of likeness (and presence) touches up-
on an affect – a “metaphysical feeling,” or “shock,” owing to the uncanny 
in mimesis – where the actor’s appearance itself figures (a return of) the 
dead for an audience (in an art of theatre so conceived). Through the me-
dium of the (present) actor – in the staged appearance of this return (from 
one world to another) – the audience is touched by an intimation of the 
threshold between the visible and the invisible, between “this world” and 
its double.
22
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 Edward Gordon Craig, “The Actor and the Über-marionette,” The Mask, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1908), pp. 
11-12. 
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 Kantor, “The Theatre of Death,” p. 112. 
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 Kantor, “The Theatre of Death,” p. 114. 
22
 Mischa Twitchin, The Theatre of Death – The Uncanny in Mimesis. Tadeusz Kantor, Aby Warburg, 
and an Iconology of the Actor (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 34. Emphasis in the original. 
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Relying on this singular affect, the theatre of death might reveal its self-contradictory 
admiration and sincere concern for the individual life. Why is it so? According to 
Kantor’s genealogy of the theatre, this medium has changed considerably since the 
times of its beginnings. It has become a prisoner to passing and emerging conven-
tions that have set the fixed limits of the familiar and the unfamiliar, neutralising the 
uncanny force of the performance.
23
 Conventionalised and familiarised, theatre for 
Kantor has turned into the phenomenon for the masses, detached from its founda-
tional event. When Twitchin thus refers to the return from the dead, what he points to 
is the return of the theatrical experience that has been culturally repressed. 
When human individualism has been dissolved in the mass and universalised 
reception, a suitable decoy is demanded: a mannequin.
24
 First, mannequins have al-
ways been perceived as mere outcasts or “CURIOSITIES”25 belonging to the unoffi-
cial culture. As Kantor reminds us, “[T]hey occupied places in FAIR BOOTHS, sus-
picious MAGIC CABINETS, far from the splendid temples of art […].”26 Second, 
mannequins are artificial and hollow objects in spite of their striking resemblance to 
human beings. In this sense, the presence of mannequins among live actors aims at 
triggering disquietude similar to the foundational shock described in “The Theatre of 
Death”; the noticeable yet minute difference in the appearances of both nonhuman 
mannequins and human performers defamiliarises the theatrical experience and tam-
pers with the boundaries of the genre or the medium. Focusing solely on this aspect 
would be reductive insofar as it would not include Kantor’s deeper investigations in 
what might be called the ontology of the nonhuman, and what in his case is not only 
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 Kantor, “The Theatre of Death,” p. 112. 
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 It might be bluntly assumed that mannequins have been adopted to the theatre of death also because 
of the pragmatic issues, as they make it possible to stage such scenes as those including crowds or 
immense brutality without much effort. 
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 Kantor, “The Theatre of Death,” p. 111. 
26
 Kantor, “The Theatre of Death,” p. 111. 
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the ontology of the dead, but also – paradoxically – the ontology of the individual. 
Kantor argues that human beings might be defined by their capability of entering 
various “life relationships”27 with one another. Yet, if this interconnectedness is in-
deed such a defining mechanism, its work has to be conditioned by the “complete 
lack of differentiation, […] indistinguishability, [...] universal similarity”28 that all 
people share. It is therefore the dead who are outside of these connections, unable to 
make ones and prevented from being included in them. A defect of sort, their incom-
pleteness makes them different and particular. Seemingly de-individualised, the dead 
“become (for the living) noteworthy […], achieving their individuality, distinction, 
their CHARACTER.”29 Consequently, when the regimes of the living have grown 
stale, just as the theatrical performances, the encounters with the dead – “the absence 
of life”30 – turn out to be a powerful means to regain the vibrancy of life itself. 
Since the whole history of theatre is founded on a heresy, as Kantor claims, 
there is also something deeply heretical in his own turn towards the dead and the 
mannequins. Both in “The Theatre of Death” and in the essay on repetition discussed 
in Chapter 2 in detail, Kantor links the mythical birth of the theatre with the revolt of 
a particular kind, that is, the moment when the actor enters the stage for the very first 
time; we read:  
From the common realm of customary and religious rituals, common cer-
emonies, and common people’s activities advanced SOMEONE who 
made the risky decision to BREAK with the ritualistic Community. He 
was not driven by conceit (as in Craig) to become an object of universal 
attention. This would be too simplistic. Rather it must have been a rebel-
lious mind, sceptical, heretical, free, and tragic, daring to remain alone 
with Fate and Destiny. If we add “with its ROLE,” we will then have be-
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 Kantor, “The Theatre of Death,” p. 115. Emphasis in the original. 
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 Kantor, “The Theatre of Death,” p. 115. Emphasis in the original. 
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 Kantor, “The Theatre of Death,” p. 116. Emphasis in the original. 
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fore us the ACTOR. […] This ACT was undoubtedly seen as disloyalty 
to the old ritualistic traditions and practices, as secular arrogance, as athe-
ism, as dangerous subversive tendencies, as scandal, as amorality, as in-
decency; people must have seen in it elements of clownery, buffoonery, 
exhibitionism, and deviation.
31
 
If the purpose of the theatre of death is to stage the aforementioned primeval encoun-
ter, then the re-education of the theatre by means of mannequins becomes equally a 
subversive act and yet another heresy. In “Treatise on Tailor’s Dummies,” Bruno 
Schulz – Kantor’s literary father-figure – reinterprets matter as vivid substance or 
energy whose creative power is by no means restricted to God or Demiurge. Human 
beings are incapable of achieving the perfection of the originary act of creation; still, 
they are encouraged to master the matter in their own way and to embrace their infe-
rior, wretched, and faulty creations.
32
 What is even more interesting, Schulz’s para-
phrase of The Book of Genesis postulates that the man has to be created anew “in the 
shape and the semblance of a tailor’s dummy.”33 It might be therefore argued that 
actually Schulz somewhat ventriloquises Kantor and “The Theatre of Death”: after 
all, for Kantor the mannequin is “[a] model for the Live ACTOR.” Kantor’s double 
heresy connects the imperfect repetition of the creative act with the awareness that its 
predominant purpose is to make the revolt of doing something on one’s own possi-
ble. This possibility breaks the “sacredness” of community and its rituals for the sake 
of the individual; simultaneously, it boils down to what is excluded and prohibited by 
the divine act of creation by design: the rejection of its uniqueness. In “The Theatre 
of Death,” Kantor puts forward a detailed study on the restoration of theatrical ex-
pression, and the bold manifesto concerning affects and nonhumans. He diagnoses 
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 Kantor, “The Theatre of Death,” p. 113. 
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 Bruno Schulz, “Treatise on Tailors’ Dummies or The Second Book of Genesis,” in: Bruno Schulz, 
The Street of Crocodiles and Other Stories, trans. Celina Wieniewska (Toronto and London: Penguin, 
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and discusses how the living are entangled with the dead and how humans enter nu-
merous connections with the nonhumans; still, to a great extent, these reflections are 
anchored in the anthropocentric framework.  
Although it is devoted predominantly to the relation of nonhuman animals 
and human beings, Giorgio Agamben’s anthropological machine might serve as a 
useful tool for opening Kantor’s mannequins. Abstract yet historically grounded, this 
conceptual machine sets the limits of human and nonhuman (animal) in the process 
of anthropogenesis. For Agamben, the emergence of a human being depends on his 
or her relation to animality and the extent this sphere is either appropriated or elimi-
nated in the process of self-recognition.
34
 Let us delve into this process. Empty in 
itself, the anthropological machine is a biopolitical device that establishes the bound-
aries of life and death, creating the divisions between human and nonhuman; in do-
ing so, the machine enforces “a kind of state of exception, a zone of indeterminacy in 
which the outside is nothing but the exclusion of an inside and the inside is in turn 
only the inclusion of an outside.”35 In its modern variants, it “animalis[es] the hu-
man” and “isolates the nonhuman within the human,”36 so that the internalised hu-
man being becomes the matter of exclusion, creating the provisory outside. The pre-
modern machine, on the contrary, supplements the human by means of appropriating 
the external animal aspects, as it functionally includes the outside.
37
 By means of 
these mechanisms, Agamben shows how negotiating of the boundaries between the 
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 Giorgio Agamben, The Open. Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford University 
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 Agamben, The Open, p. 37. As Agamben notes, the modern machine, excluding the human aspect, 
applies to neomorts and some cases of comatose people, but also to Jews and their tragic history. The 
premodern machine, including animality, embraces such cases as barbarians, slaves, or enfants 
sauvages. 
146 
 
 
 
 
human and the nonhuman contributes to extracting bare life that is deprived of the 
right to live. In fact, his theory maps the historical processes of the late 19
th
 and early 
20
th
 centuries, which not only have redefined the understanding of the human being, 
but also activated the discourses of violence that in the broadest sense contributed to 
the dehumanising practices. As I believe, however, the anthropological machine can 
be a useful device to analyse the particular works of Kantor and Beckett. In fact, both 
of them tend to organise their often anthropocentric oeuvres around the clashes of the 
human and the nonhuman, and the tensions between the alive and the dead; at the 
same time, such ongoing redistributions of these limits are commonly motivated by 
the yearn for what would emerge when such a machine crashed. 
The principles established in “The Theatre of Death” expect human beings to 
respond to the void of the mannequin and to relinquish their ability to connect with 
other people, since this trait accumulates all of them within an undifferentiated mass. 
Both of these acts happen at the point where the existence of the mannequin and that 
of a human being intersect. The mannequin is created in a direct relation to the hu-
man, whereas the human loses his or her qualities. Accordingly, this coexistence be-
comes the matter of renegotiating the boundaries of the humans and the mannequins 
through one another and of redistributing the inside and the outside anew, so that 
different limits might be determined. The machine is working, achieving two differ-
ent and, somehow, complementary orders. If such social or lively connections remain 
outside of the mannequins, then the human behaviour has to become its own inferior 
copy or mimicry bringing it closer to the artificiality of a dummy. For that reason, the 
human gestures are supplanted by the mechanised repetitions opposing the sponta-
neity of life, and their voices are stifled by the looped lines breaching the teleology 
of the speech. Human and lively relations are therefore tackled by the nonhumanity 
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of the mannequin that has been included, which is manifested in the defamilarised 
play of human actors. Kantor offers us a more radical machine, nonetheless. In the 
course of this other process, what remains inside is vacuum and death, a locus of 
pure nonhumanity, which in the absence of any suitable form takes that of the man-
nequin. Then again, the machine allows us to focus on a noteworthy twist; the 
aforementioned practices of imitating and glorifying death are reversed to stand for 
the transgressive power of life, whereas the biologically alive human beings remain-
ing outside are condemned to vaporise because of – and not in spite of – the matters 
of the living they are so eagerly concerned with. In both cases, human beings in Kan-
tor’s artistic universe have to open themselves to the ultimate heresy, according to 
which losing one’s life, visible in one’s ability to make connections, is the way to 
save or even regain life, understood as an affective force.
38
  
Dying Is Never Death 
The effect of the anthropological machine brings Kantor’s thinking on the 
nonhuman closer to that of Beckett; however, before we proceed to further analyses, 
it would be vital to confront the influential reading of Beckett’s oeuvre by Alain 
Badiou. In “Tireless Desire,” Badiou notes that the human protagonists of Beckett’s 
plays and prose, identified as mutilated vessels of tortured cogito, gain their peculiar 
and twisted appearances in order to be reduced to “[their] indestructible functions.”39 
Mechanic and dehumanised, they articulate endless flows of words in order to silence 
themselves, they declare movement without either an intention or a capacity to leave 
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their places, or simply they flee from the other’s vision without a recognition that this 
flight has already been anticipated. Such contradictions expose these beings as re-
flective instances of, among others, vision, hearing, voice, and mobility. Of these 
functions, the last one is especially interesting. Badiou continues: 
Immobility would thereby find its complete metaphor in the corpse: “dy-
ing” is the conversion of all possible movement into permanent rest. But 
here again, the irreducibility of the functions means that “dying” is never 
death.
40
 
Hamm, Krapp, Mouth, Malone, Mahood, and many other blinded, deafened, tor-
tured, and mutilated members of Beckett’s miserable pantheon are beings who are 
stripped of their humanity to but functions. Emblematic for Beckett, the mobility / 
immobility dyad has already occupied the criticism in 1990s and even 1980s, fasci-
nated with the caricaturised images of beings locked up in urns, dustbins, rubber cyl-
inders, or transparent cuboids, and the notions of roaming by means of sticks, hacks, 
or wheelchairs. Still, the manner in which Badiou puts forward his argument de-
serves attention. Subsuming absolute immobility with a corpse under the indestructi-
ble function extracts death as a state that can never be achieved, exposing Beckett’s 
creations to the liminal state a priori on the verge of death beyond the death itself. 
Similarly to his project inaugurated in Being and Event, Badiou’s reading of 
Beckett’s works covers an entirely anthropocentric perspective, neglecting the ques-
tion of the nonhuman. Just as Stephané Mallarmé before him, Beckett serves Badiou 
as a paragon for what he sees as the art condition of philosophy: a site of infinite po-
tency.
41
 Because of that, Beckett’s works alone are holding the possibility of a pure 
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being.
42
 A crucial category for Badiou’s ontology, an event marks the radical rupture 
within the actual state of things, releasing the excess that might be implemented as a 
real – and not only symbolic – change revealed in a new order of counting, new 
body, or new world, to use Badiou’s terms. Since an event is empty and means noth-
ing in itself, it requires a subject faithful to it who will carry and embody the promis-
ing excess it holds. This is where Badiou’s mathematical Platonism hints at its Marx-
ist and psychoanalytical roots; his thought has to stage the bearer of a subjective yet 
prevailing truth, whose fidelity, axiomatically guaranteed, externalises the internal 
revolution, be it artistic, political, scientific, or amorous. Although Badiou’s sophisti-
cated thought exceeds this brief summary, even in this form its anthropocentric 
agenda is easily recognisable. Now, in “What Is It to Live?,” a closing chapter of 
Logics of Worlds, Badiou synthesises the ethical obligation to follow the event as a 
possibility of unfolding life in its true and superior form; as Badiou argues, embrac-
ing the infinite potency of an event and its eternal truths opens one to live “as immor-
tal.”43 Moreover, in Ethics, Badiou juxtaposes fidelity to an event with the dangers of 
betrayal, simulacrum, terror, or a distaster
44
; in Logics of Worlds, where these cate-
gories are developed, the resistance to an event turns into a biopolitical cut, deciding 
upon what deserves to be considered as alive and what does not.  
Although the nonhuman is excluded from Badiou’s thought even before he 
enacts the straightforward cut in Logics of Worlds, the anthropological machine is 
capable of providing a suitable opening of this reading if we bear in mind the way in 
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which we have already de-historicised Agamben’s device while discussing Kantor.45 
This time, however, the machine returns to its theoretical origins renegotiating the 
boundaries of human and nonhuman animals. In Badiou’s remark on immobility, we 
can notice how the “indestructibility of the functions” also enforces a state of excep-
tion, albeit a literary one. Human beings are defined by functions – with a special 
emphasis put on immobility – which deprive “dying” of its ultimate event of death; 
this process is thus turned into a prolonged agony or torture, whose liminality opens 
up infinite potency instead of the finite demise. Excluding death as a point in time 
allows us to associate it with the nonhuman which has also been not counted in the 
relation; especially for Beckett, nonhumans are also based on the contradictory met-
aphors of movement.  
Paul Stewart delineates the relation between animals and death in Beckett as 
follows: “According to Arthur Schopenhauer, arguably Beckett’s favorite philoso-
pher, ‘[t]he animal learns to know death only when he dies.’ The human figure, how-
ever, ‘consciously draws every hour nearer his death’.”46 Even though what one en-
counters here is yet another anthropological machine, the division between animals 
and humans it establishes might paradoxically complete our theoretical considera-
tions and be read in a more affirmative manner. It would then stage Beckett’s human 
protagonists as experiencing the linear and persistent agony without a definite hori-
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zon of its end, and animal death as something purely nonhuman: an affective charge 
resisting or disturbing signification, or even a void. In a sense, insects and worms in 
Beckett’s universe tend to cling to the situation diagnosed by Badiou, yet realise it 
inversely: they are locked within the realm of death, struggling with living and life 
but never reaching this state entirely. 
Neither an insect nor a worm per se, Worm has been regarded as one of the 
most mysterious entities in Beckett’s works. The Unnamable, whose realm Worm 
inhabits, articulates a neurotic and dynamically spreading monologue of the narrator: 
a wicked creature devoid of an identity who calls everything “he”47 himself states 
into question. Seemingly deprived of motives and goals, the narrator is driven solely 
by the desire to finish the story he tells and thus stop the logorrhoea he suffers from; 
as it turns out, it is not possible whatsoever. The monologue itself is cut and dis-
persed. One of the means fuelling this state is the gesture of dividing the narrator into 
his “vice-exister[s],”48 as he himself calls them, that is, Mahood and Worm. As for 
the former, it is revealed in the course of two contradictory stories the narrator tells 
about him that Mahood is a universal figure of humanity, corresponding to the condi-
tions Badiou delineates: at first, he is a legless man roaming the world, and then – an 
eerie entity held captive in a jar. Furthermore, his name connotes the noun manhood 
and can be divided into my-hood, which simultaneously refers to the particular 
“selfness” and to the act of hooding this identity. To an extent, Mahood designates 
the linguistic incapacity of expressing one’s identity: a human being encapsulated in 
the misleading and imperfect language. 
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Worm, on the contrary, connotes a “thing-in-itself,” as his being is immedi-
ately interrupted in the very moment language attempts to capture it. As the narrator 
points out, Worm is the “anti-Mahood,”49 an element that cannot be comprehended 
in linguistic terms as he exists before and beyond them, being also an entity who has 
no forms other than the negation itself. Worm is the matter of being yet created, 
which slips our recognition and is always somewhere else. In a heretic negation, the 
language has to turn against itself to create a glimpse of what Worm might actually 
be. In order to seize him, we must abolish the authority of the narrator and seek 
Worm outside of the all-embracing structure of the novel. After all, The Unnamable 
has no other realm, and this void might be a suitable means to grasp that of Worm. 
Let us immerse in a passage depicting his elusive nature: 
Yes, now that I’ve forgotten who Worm is, where he is, what he’s like, 
I’ll begin to be he. Anything rather than these college quips. Quick, a 
place. With no way in, no way out, a safe place. Not like Eden. And 
Worm inside. Feeling nothing, knowing nothing, capable of nothing, 
wanting nothing. Until the instant he hears the sounds that will never 
stop. Then it’s the end. Worm no longer is. We know it, but we don’t say 
it, we say it’s the awakening, the beginning of Worm, for now we must 
speak, and speak of Worm. It’s no longer he, but let us proceed as if it 
were still he, he at last, who hears, and trembles, and is delivered over 
[…].50 
While indeed the narrator refers to Worm as “he,” he does so in order to temporarily 
identify with the entity or to appropriate his position and, consequently, to gain ac-
cess to the void Worm dwells in. This is, however, the moment of a sound, or the 
articulation of his name, that wipes Worm away. What Worm is hearing will never 
stop, precisely because it will constitute his displaced being within the linguistic 
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terms. In other words, the sound will turn Worm into the word. If we keep in mind 
this inevitability of death preceding and prevailing over any moment of coming into 
life, we might be struck by the fact that Worm is presented as “a pure ear”51 – an ear 
which Jacques Derrida describes as “the most tendered and most open organ.”52 
Wary and waiting, Worm seems to be attuned to sudden and instant death that leaves 
one only with a possibility of pretending that he remains here nonetheless. It encap-
sulates, therefore, a strange figure of mobility. Worm is radically immobile, since 
any attempt of thinking (of) him in terms of movement and standstill would impose 
notions from the outside on him; simultaneously, however, Worm is constantly flee-
ing, occupying conceptual spaces different than those one is assigning to him at the 
precise moment. 
Never breaching into life, Worm occupies the realm of permanent death. The 
narrator captures this nuance: “Mahood I couldn’t die. Worm will I ever get born?”53 
Worm is “singular”54 and “the first of his kind.”55 His existence relies on the imper-
fect act of creation of the faulty narrator; still, he cannot be captured otherwise than 
by a relation to a linguistic being, a human, even though at a cost of losing Worm 
once again. Worm embraces a radical liminality which, as it will be shown further 
on, will be shared by the selected cases of insects in Beckett’s works. Certainly, 
worms are not insects; still, the correspondence between them and Worm allows us 
to think them together. Importantly enough, Connor points to the etymology of an 
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“insect” – “insectare,” that is, something cut or split.56 This brilliant remark reflects 
on Worm in a twofold way. First, it emphasises the previously described manner in 
which he exists on the limits of life and death, a name and an unthinkable image, 
mobility and immobility. Second, it signals his necessity to exist on another verge, 
separating Worm’s uninterrupted existence in the unreachable and absent space from 
the attempts to incorporate this strange entity within the tale of the narrator; even 
though this act legitimises Worm’s absence instead of making him present, at the 
same time it induces a change in the narrator, puncturing his otherwise impermeable 
linguistic limits. In The Posthuman, Rosi Braidotti emphasises that death – in its re-
sistance to being comprehended, sensed, or represented – is nonhuman per se. Per-
haps, this is the reason why Beckett chooses Worm as an aporetic figure of death; in 
order to render that which is absolutely nonhuman, a nonhuman species is demanded. 
For Braidotti, such a hollow form of death nevertheless facilitates human becoming 
and vibrant transformations within the boundaries of life.
57
 In other words, death 
understood as a model nonhuman entails such a mode of life that is not linked to a 
particular being, but rather transcends the physiological and bodily limits of an indi-
vidual. Death, thereby, makes it possible to reach life as a transformative force.  
The Logic of the Swarm 
Previously, we have commented upon two seemingly different yet surprising-
ly similar artistic and literary figures of nonhumans: the mannequin and the insect or 
the worm. For Kantor, the site of nonhumanity relies on the visual; the mannequin 
becomes the model entity whose inferiority and artificiality are supposed to be the 
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objects of one’s desire insofar as one endeavours to be affected by the force of life. 
Consequently, this cult of the secondary aims at mechanising and defamiliarising life 
that is expressed in repetitions, loops, and imitative acts. Beckett also connects non-
humans with the remote realm of death and converts it with regard to his vitalist aspi-
rations. Interestingly enough, he deprives them of the visual representation, or rather 
he provides them with an audial image. Worm is an object of the ongoing negotia-
tion, whose performatives – intending at pinpointing him – result in the ceaseless and 
traumatic sound that obliterates him once and for all. In this respect, both Kantor and 
Beckett put forward projects that are equally critical and affirmative. Although dis-
similarly, each of the authors emphasises the struggle for extracting a conceptual 
space which is to serve as the pure nonhuman: death. Its remoteness, however, condi-
tions the further strives for deconstructing the stale practices of the living that are 
separated from vibrancy and affective force that reside in the material.  
I finally recourse here to the materialist perspective. Indeed, the dead realms I 
investigate lead us to such thinking of the nonhuman that acknowledges the vibrant 
and transgressive aspects of the material. Still, from the new materialist angle, both 
Kantor’s mannequin and Beckett’s “worms” are, just as Agamben’s anthropological 
machine, the instances of the anthropos, created in relation to it and therefore in-
stalling a more or less evident subject, if not the “Subject.” Contrary to them, new 
materialism cherishes numerous agencies of the material, entangled in transformative 
encounters. As I believe, this other thinking of the nonhumans in Kantor and Beckett 
is also justified, and it might be traced if we refer to the logic of the swarm.  
Connor’s aforementioned turn towards etymology in his study on flies in 
Beckett is not the only philological act he commits; along with probing the word 
156 
 
 
 
 
“insect,” he also plays on the association of “entomos” with “atomos.”58 After all, 
insects mostly come in swarms. What is particularly interesting is that Jane Bennett 
uses this form of organisation as a metaphor to defend the agencies of matter and 
things. We read:  
A theory of distributive agency, in contrast [to the traditionally under-
stood agency], does not posit a subject as the root cause of an effect. 
There are instead always a swarm of vitalities at play. The task becomes 
to identify the contours of the swarm and the kind of relations that obtain 
between its bits. To figure the generative source of effects as a swarm is 
to see human intentions as always in competition and confederation with 
many other strivings, for an intention is like a pebble thrown into a pond, 
or an electrical current sent through a wire or neural network: it vibrates 
and merges with other currents, to affect and be affected. This under-
standing of agency does not deny the existence of that thrust called inten-
tionality, but it does see it as less definitive of outcomes.
59
 
Bennett postulates a theory that posits humans and nonhumans within a greater net-
work whose parts – regardless of being alive or not, conscious or not, sentient or not 
– are capable of affecting or even transforming each other. Humans and nonhumans 
form dynamic assemblages: the “groupings of diverse elements, of vibrant materials 
of all sorts.”60 These assemblages “have uneven topographies, because some of the 
points at which the various affects and bodies cross paths are more heavily trafficked 
than others, and so power is not distributed equally across its surface.”61 They there-
fore become agentic, or swarmlike, due to the vibrant materials that constitute them. 
Now, the figures of the mannequin and Worm are not self-sufficient entities, but ra-
ther might be read as the rhetorical models which will allow us to “identify the con-
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tours of the swarm[s]” of Beckett’s and Kantor’s more precisely. While facing the 
nonhuman, both oeuvres tend to use the structures of swarms or assemblages, in spite 
of their trademark and shared cult of the individual that is often at play. 
Let us begin with an assemblage that originates in the actual swarm; most 
presumably aware of Karl von Frisch’s discoveries, Beckett includes a detailed anal-
ysis of waggle dance in Molloy. By the end of the novel, Moran ponders upon the 
fate of his bees, reminiscing himself about the manner they danced in the past. Me-
ticulously, he points at various nuances of this phenomenon: the distances between 
the bees, the significance of their ascending and descending, the hum they produce, 
and the varying rhythms and figures. What, however, seems to fascinate Moran the 
most is the fact that even though he is convinced that he has rightly read this phe-
nomenon as a mode of sign communication, he is equally sure that he is incapable of 
understanding the intricacies of the waggle dance fully.
62
 He admits, “I was more 
than ever stupefied by the complexity of this innumerable dance, involving doubtless 
other determinants of which I hand not the slightest idea. And I said, with rapture, 
Here is something I can study all my life, and never understand.”63 For Moran, the 
bees are the objects of contemplation, yet at the same time they, just as his memory 
of waggle dance, happen to be “the nearest thing to comfort.”64 Eventually, this reali-
sation is painfully contrasted with Moran’s discovery as he finally returns home; he 
finds his bees dead, grabs a handful of them, and carefully hides them in his pocket. 
The bees, which have “weighed nothing,”65 are turned into “[a] little dust of annulets 
and wings.”66  
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After their demise, not only do bees “[weigh] nothing,” but also they move 
towards nothing and reside in nothing. By the peculiar word choice, Beckett disal-
lows us to simply think of their remains in terms of insect morphology.
67
 Nor does 
the linear logic of passing seem to apply here. Instead, annulets employed as an im-
age of a corpse suggest the link to the basic meaning of a different word, “annul,” 
whose etymology traces the movement ad nullum – to nothing.68 The aliveness of the 
dancing bees has been preserved in the space of memory intact, where their vigorous 
movements serve primarily communicative purposes, realising an indecipherable 
code. The purposeful motion ascribed to them is therefore at odds with Beckett’s 
excessively mobile human characters, whose striding, roaming, rushing, or waiting 
merge the inevitability of escaping absurdist deadlocks with the inability of ceasing 
to do so. Indeed, the bees move – they dance – but this motion is deprived of a pre-
supposed destination or an intention to change place. Moreover, finding them coex-
ists with the inability to recognise their state in the dark
69
; the final recognition, in 
turn, is decided solely on their remnants after Moran has transported a handful of 
them outside of a hive. Importantly, they are hidden from the senses while being rec-
ollected in darkness, and then they disintegrate into dust the very moment Moran 
interacts with them: after all, he imposes a new form of movement on the bees, 
transporting a handful of them outside of the place they belong to. 
The association of the bees with nothingness goes even further as they also 
mean nothing.
70
 Similarly to Worm and any “insect life,” the bees may mark “an 
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alien presence that we can neither assimilate nor expel,”71 to put it in Steven Shavi-
ro’s words. In fact, any attempt to frame them within coherent signifying practices 
unfolds the resistance they stand for. In The Unnamable, the closing instalment of the 
Trilogy inaugurated with Molloy, the poetics of abstraction embodied in Worm stag-
es Beckett’s radicalised stance on nonhumans in his works. More representation-
oriented, Molloy seems to provide us with a comparable schema. As long as Moran 
gains pleasure or is lost in the contemplation of waggle dance, the bees as the objects 
of his imagination and intention remain vigorous, even if their intricacies breach 
through this vision. Then, Moran discovers his dead bees yet he does not identify 
them; this is a situation which deteriorates even more after he decides to move and 
scrutinise them later. Hence, when Moran interacts with the otherwise remote realms 
of nonhumans, the bees cease to exist. Once again, the human prolonged dying is 
juxtaposed with the lacunae of pure death, inaccessible to human beings. To play on 
“annul” a bit longer, we might say that what happens here is not so much their de-
mise as the annulment of their relation or communication pact with Moran. Still, the 
cut of this relation imposes significant differences on the order of death or dying and 
the split between human and nonhuman that Beckett emphasises. 
Despite the fact that in Molloy waggle dance is interpreted as a mode of 
communication, and even in The Unnamable the words “swarm and jostle like 
ants,”72 Beckett also deploys collective insect metaphors that do not become the fig-
ures of language or code. As will be shown below, just like the dead bees exist 
through the metonymy of wings in Molloy, the deadly potential of insects is con-
veyed by yet another metonymy – the noise their wings produce. Waggle dance thus 
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finds it counterpart in insect music.
73
 In Not I – a work equally concerned with 
“speaking oneself” as The Unnamable – it is buzzing which distracts the neurotic 
speech of Mouth. Moreover, this noise – audible solely to Mouth – is only “so 
called,” and is always referred to as if in a response to the unsaid reminiscence.74 In 
All that Fall, similarly to Not I, buzzing recurs, implied by Mrs Rooney’s association 
with wasps.
75
 Finally, in The Unnamable, the narrator is haunted by an ineffable 
thought which reaches him as aggressively as “hornets smoked out of their nest.”76 In 
each of these cases, the motif of communication resurfaces, although differently to 
that introduced in Molloy. Here, it belongs entirely to human and anthropomorphised 
creatures and is disturbed by the thoughts or events that cannot be put into words. 
Instead, these thoughts interrupt the flow, conjuring up traumatic, if not thanatic, 
content. Similarly to a swarm that multiplies and spreads beyond control, these 
thoughts resist linguistic domestication, leaving only the animal trace of insect me-
tonymy – the ominous buzzing. Insects once again cover remoteness and distance; 
even though they do not die, they transfer a deadly element to otherwise coherent 
anthropomorphised protagonists and disturb the flow of words or thoughts. Unlike 
insects to human beings (if we consider Mouth as such, too), the latter are continu-
ously reachable to the former. Owing to this asymmetry, insects tamper with peo-
ple’s consciousness and tales, mind and cognition, opening them to the sudden bursts 
of alien excess. This excess, finally, stems from the nonhuman place of pure death, 
which never takes place as an event, and its contrast with the prolonged dying of a 
human being, widely represented in Beckett’s works.  
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In When Species Meet, Donna Haraway refers to Karen Barad’s intra-action 
to emphasise the originary ground for the companionship between species. Since it is 
hard to speak of such a partnership in the cases this chapter analyses, I would again 
like to turn to Barad’s different category – that of diffraction. Not only a feminist 
scholar but also a physicist, Barad notes that with regard to quantum mechanics dif-
fraction is not solely a process of superimposing waves, be it a sound or a ray of 
light. Instead, this phenomenon is an intrinsic capacity of any single particle and a 
crucial boundary-making process.
77
 As I believe, the effable moments which Worm, 
hornets, or buzzing cover are included in Beckett’s works to resonate with the narra-
tive that attempts to appropriate them on its terms; after all, the sonic also forms a 
wave. The play they enter together posits and transgresses limits, as the language 
begins to twist and collapse in order to grasp the foreign intruders even though it 
finally reduces “worms” to “words.” However, these entities, although deprived of 
their existence and replaced with empty referents, have already inscribed their deadly 
potential on the Beckettian realms; these, depending mostly on monologues and ta-
les, have to face hesitation and distraction, qualities interrupting the flow of words 
and, thus, the looped construction of Beckett’s literary worlds. In a sense, the insect 
and vermin tropes are included as the counterpart of the ceaseless torment of Beck-
ett’s protagonists; as the loci of death unthinkable from the perspective of the au-
thor’s all-embracing narratives, insects and worms paradoxically guarantee that the 
dying of human beings will not be completed by the event of death and puncture par-
ticular places within the narrative, so that it has to continuously revise itself. Unlike 
humans, who are on the verge of death, these tropes are figures of death per se, yet 
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regularly breaching the wall of life. Beckett’s insect assemblages employ the relation 
between humans and nonhumans, opening the former to the excess of materiality the 
latter stand for. In this sense, when communication and nonhuman sounds turn into 
the resurfacing motifs, the vibrancy of swarm marks the struggle for mapping, if not 
expressing, the traumatic in the work of art, the traumatic known by means of vari-
ous and purified concepts: death, void, noise.  
In such a reading, the struggles between Beckett’s protagonists and nonhu-
mans turn out to correspond to those devised by Kantor, who employs the logic of 
the swarm in order to rethink the school class, the army, and the mob. In The Dead 
Class, the foundational juxtaposition of human actors and mannequins seems to mir-
ror the assumptions put forward in Kantor’s foundational manifesto and implement 
them within the theatrical performance. A doubtful spectator, perhaps, might argue 
that the mannequins are employed to literally fill the classroom. Indeed, we should 
not forget that mannequins are “handy,” so to speak, when it comes to Kantor’s ex-
travagant visions. I would, however, firmly defend the vibrancy and the ontological 
system behind the dummies. As Michal Kobialka aptly points out, The Dead Class 
embraces the cloistered and impassable space of an individual recollection which by 
mimicking the dynamics of memory facilitates the deterioration of the self and the 
mind that strives for holding them captive.
78
 As years pass, memory rearranges and 
simplifies things, so that it merges the temporal planes and wipes out the individual 
details. Some distinctly familiar places are now foreign, some actual conversations 
reverberate only as random words out of context, and, finally, some names that we 
have used every day can be hardly remembered. When the mannequins are noticed 
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among the pupils, the fixed mental image is exposed as a product of selection and 
artificiality. These nonhuman actors become connected with the human spectators 
behind the barrier and the vibrant material planes where the forgotten is stored come 
into play. Consequently, Kantor transforms his nonhuman actors into the ushers of 
the traumatic realm, whose violent processes destabilise the safe position of the audi-
ence, yet at the same time are not necessarily linked with the disruptive memories 
per se. Rather, the whole memory happens to be the site of trauma. 
A more developed and improved variant of the strategy manifested in The 
Dead Class is deployed in Wielopole, Wielopole. In this work, the audience is no 
longer separated from the stage by means of a screen, whereas mannequins are ac-
companied by the human actors participating in becoming nonhuman. Arguably, 
these two decisions shift the attention from the materialisation of memory as a trau-
ma in The Dead Class into the materialisation of a traumatic memory in Wielopole, 
Wielopole. Respectively, the traumatic charge endangering the safe position of the 
audience, becomes supplemented with an actual attempt to work through the individ-
ual trauma onstage. If we stick to the figure of the swarm, it is the infantry that de-
serves considerable attention. Resembling tin or toy soldiers, robust footmen roam 
across the stage randomly after being resurrected and liberated from the photograph 
by means of a camera. Devised in the image of dummies, they turn against their own 
kind and inflict extreme violence against the mannequins of the Priest and Mother 
Helka. With pale faces and dingy uniforms, they behave both as mechanical entities 
– repetitive and clumsy – and as members of a circus troupe – erratic, exaggerated, 
and imitated. Helka becomes the victim of a rape signified by tossing her mannequin 
between the soldiers; Priest Józef is condemned to be crucified. Emphatically, such 
obscene images frame the imagination of a child – if we bear in mind what we have 
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said about Wielopole, Wielopole in Chapter 2 – which is ruptured by the trauma of 
war. Therefore, recollecting this shattered period is a perilous task that results in the 
dehumanising and mechanising practices, incorporating war in carnival and as ma-
chine. Reminiscence happens to be uncontrollable, nonetheless; the space of the 
memory is being subdued and ruptured again and again by the infernal porters of the 
traumatic times. 
These two nonhuman sites – memory as trauma and a traumatic memory – 
meet in Let the Artist Die, a collage of negatives, as Kobialka calls it,
79
 and a study 
of “bestiality and martyrdom.”80 In the final parts of the spectacle, different repre-
sentatives of the mob – be it a bigot, a hangman, or a prostitute – appear onstage de-
termined by various bio-objects – a desk, a gallows pole, and a cross, respectively – 
locked in repeating a single action over and over again. When Master Vitt Stoss, 
dressed as Kantor’s alter ego, joins them, the spectacle of cruelty begins. The man-
nequins seem to be replaced with live actors behaving as if dead and artificial, or as 
if suddenly brought back from the grave of memory in that one scene that was im-
printed in it years ago; then, Stoss summons two demonic men with pale faces, 
whose outfits conjure up those of engine drivers or gravediggers. Without a further 
ado, these men begin to construct Stoss’ new altar; they capture and torture the 
members of the mob and other characters of Let the Artists Die in order to finally 
immobilise and imprison them in wooden bio-objects. Importantly enough, we 
should not forget that previously in this performance we encountered Kantor’s other 
alter ego accompanied by the marshal on the skeleton horse and mechanical soldiers: 
“I – at the age of six.” Then, the boy is engaged in violence against the soldiers, 
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bumping at them, as if in a childish play. Now, Stoss commits an unbearable brutali-
ty against the creations of the author’s mind. This endeavour accomplishes his mas-
terpiece – connoting Stoss’ altar in the Marian Church in Cracow – in the company 
of the angel of death waving a black flag, just as the woman from Eugène Dela-
croix’s Liberty Leading the People. Death becomes both the condition for artistic 
practice and its greatest enemy. On the one hand, the masterpiece presented is inevi-
tably rooted in the act of tormenting and torturing one’s creations stemming from the 
superior control over them. On the other hand, these creations eventually leave the 
machines they are stricken with, and are led not by the creator but by the angel of 
death understood as a figure of their liberation and revolt. Therefore, artistic practice 
turns out to be conditioned and motivated by the traumatic experience of war: by 
either the retaliation for the lost innocence or the displaced thanatic fantasy. Nonhu-
mans inhabit the site of the traumatic, equalising the products of artistic imagination 
with those of experiences of war. The realm of pure death – as a foundational con-
cept – holds the power of pure death or of a void which is brought back in the canvas 
of individual history. Just as in Beckett, this dominant figure of the nonhuman reach-
es its temporary vehicles to deconstruct the soft power of testimony in favour of 
breaching the walls of life affectively. Nonhumans and humans coexist and cooper-
ate in vibrant production of the forgotten reality, material and unjustifiable in linguis-
tic terms. 
Insect Technologies, or the Intermezzo 
Instead of a conclusion, I propose an intermezzo, devoted to the technological 
stratum of the nonhumans in Beckett. Kantor’s view on technology and memory has 
already been discussed in Chapter 2, as photography, I argue, forms a dominant and 
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comparatively broader figure in his artistic project. Moreover, Beckett’s relation to 
technology has been already hinted at in Chapter 3. Let this figure of the intermezzo 
be a frail attempt to justify this separated yet important note to Beckett’s understand-
ing of insects. After all, mezzo reminds us about insects being nonhuman musicians 
in the posthumanist times, as Braidotti has it.
81
 
In the previous readings, the trope of metonymy happened to be a central fig-
ure; in fact, buzzing might construct yet another one, emphasising its own congru-
ence to technology and media as presented in Beckett’s works. While the connection 
between media and insects is perhaps not new, the intensity of the bond between the 
two has not lost a bit of its promise: the promise anchored in the fact that both tech-
nological media and insects are deeply nonhuman.
82
 The very same bond corre-
sponds to two works of Beckett in a diachronic way. Aside from Not I finished in the 
early 1970s, Molloy and The Unnamable were written in French and English in the 
1950s, whereas All that Fall was broadcast for the very first time in 1957. In the fol-
lowing two years, Beckett published two more works interesting from our perspec-
tive: Krapp’s Last Tape in 1958 and Embers in 1959. Such a configuration encour-
ages one to think that Beckett, having exhaustively exercised the linear narrative of a 
novel, has turned to the medium which – in spite of a similar linearity of transmis-
sion – is also affected by the events of recording, replaying, preserving, and even 
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sampling its content. These last two pieces are devoted nearly entirely to the disper-
sion of the human protagonists as presented via the dislocating and dividing practices 
made possible by the recording devices of radio media. Furthermore, the same two 
works stage the noise as ominous as the buzzing mentioned earlier. In Krapp’s Last 
Tape, the damage done by the neurotic splits and recollections of Krapp’s identities 
is not followed by the sufficient catharsis; instead, the stage is filled with the buzzing 
sound of the reels “running on in silence.”83 In Embers, Henry legitimises the noisy 
radio soundscape in the background as the sea, admitting himself that this proclama-
tion depends solely on his word and the lack of vision of the audience.
84
 Still, this 
“white world, not a sound”85 is clearly distinguished from the remaining internal re-
ality of Henry presented in Embers; it signifies an excessive residue disturbing the 
coherence of the subjective plane and the audial reality of the radio play.
86
 
Although the congruence of noises is striking already in the strictly diachron-
ic perspective, this juxtaposition is more intricate and deserves further attention. In 
The Unnamable, Worm serves as a “pure ear” attuned to the noise which “never 
stops,” connoting both his temporary recognition and death. In Molloy, bees are cho-
sen because of both their fragility and the intricacies of their communicative skills; 
this choice, however, implies also a certain affection to their hard work and persis-
tence. The buzzing reverberating in Not I, All that Fall, and The Unnamable covers, 
also by means of “hornets” and “wasps,” a sudden disturbance haunting those ex-
posed to it. All of these seem to contribute to Beckett’s understanding of radio me-
dia. First, these media have been intended to be used for communication purposes yet 
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reveal their potential outside of them. Second, they function as “pure ears” (because 
of their capacity to record), and after that the “noise” destroys them completely (fill-
ing the emptiness of the reel and privileging the record itself). Third, they emit a con-
tinuous noise either interrupting the silence of the empty reel or accompanying other 
events as the inevitable, although not intended, background. Finally – which Krapp’s 
Last Tape and Embers prove the most – nonhumanity inherent to the media disturbs 
human beings they affect, dispersing their otherwise coherent identities. 
In this chapter, I have endeavoured to explore the nonhuman tropes in Samuel 
Beckett’s and Tadeusz Kantor’s selected works. Kantor is an insightful theoretician 
of the nonhuman positing it as a means of theatrical expression and as a central fig-
ure of his ontology. The nonhuman mannequins point to the heretical origins of the 
theatre and are devised as autonomous instances of recreating its foundational shock. 
Sieved through Bennett’s theory, they form vibrant assemblages of the human and 
the nonhuman, the personal and the artistic, the mechanical and the machine-like, the 
artificial and the absent or forgotten. The mannequins originate in the void or death, 
yet they surprise us with their unique access to transgressive vitality. The Dead 
Class, Wielopole, Wielopole, and Let the Artists Die represent the shift of thinking in 
terms of these material assemblages from the memory as trauma, through the trau-
matic memory, up to the traumatic origins of art and the equally traumatic working-
through. 
In Beckett’s The Unnamable and Not I, the nonhuman figures happen to be 
intrinsically linked with the narrating human beings, pointing to the places and 
events that evade linguistic cognition. Similarly to human beings in Badiou’s read-
ing, they are often stripped of their actual animality so that particular functions of 
their being or existence are emphasised; however, unlike human beings, they reside 
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in the realm of death, never reaching life, subtly struggling at its surface instead. De-
spite condemning them to this death without dying (the event of dying being ascribed 
exclusively to human beings), Beckett contributes immensely to the relation between 
the human and nonhuman, even if the latter is posed only provisionally. In order to 
understand this tension, what is demanded are not only nonhumans, but also that 
which is entirely beyond human, or nonhuman per se: death and technology. Only 
then, according to Beckett’s “entomopoetics,” the beneficial transformations and 
openings might take place; after all, Mahood never dies, and Worm never gets born.  
 
  
CHAPTER 5  
Vulnerable Landscapes 
The Ecology of Exhaustion and the Aesthetics for the  
Anthropocene 
 
The text, for material ecocriticism, en-
compasses both human material-
discursive constructions and nonhuman 
things: water, soil, stones, metals, miner-
als, bacteria, toxins, food, electricity, 
cells, atoms, all cultural objects and plac-
es. The characteristic feature of these ma-
terial configurations is that they are not 
made of single elements, isolated from 
each other. Rather, they form complexes 
both natural and cultural, and in many 
cases human agency and meanings are 
deeply interlaced with the emerging 
agency and meaning of these nonhuman 
beings.
1
 
 
A Tree with too Many Leaves 
A well-known anecdote has it that after the Polish production of Waiting for 
Godot in 1957, Samuel Beckett commented that, judging from the photographs, the 
performance was overall well-prepared except for an unreasonably high number of 
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leaves that popped up in the second act.
2
 This story reminds us of two significant 
issues. First, Beckett meticulously delineates and annotates his imaginary places – 
sometimes even with mathematical precision – in an endeavour to protect them from 
accidental and hasty readings. Secondly, instead of expanding these spaces, such 
profuse guidelines have a tendency to condense them into dens, abysses, or voids, 
founded on the aporetic imagery; in fact, these desolate landscapes can be easily pin-
pointed and organised onstage, yet our knowledge of their physical setting is scarce. 
In a sense, even though Samuel Beckett has never ceased to exercise the spatial di-
mension of his works, he seems to be disinterested in the actual surroundings the 
protagonists of his plays and prose reside in. Shane Weller suggests that Beckett – 
perceived as a representative of Late Modernism – cherishes the abandonment of 
spatial limitations the convention puts on him in his radical redefinition of literature 
and theatre.
3
 To an extent, this artistic decision has allowed him to precede postmod-
ernist meta-artistic tendencies in one of the most self-reflective literary projects of 
the 20
th
 century. At the same time, it contributed to the creation of withdrawn and 
extracted spaces, sullen yet captivating mental landscapes where the most intimate 
Beckettian struggles take place: Cartesian mind/body dualism, being in and through 
language, the dissonance between “I” and the Other in me.  
Following Stanley E. Gontarski, Greg Garrard points out that Beckett “habit-
ually pared down successive drafts of his plays, eliminating references to the real 
world.”4 Perhaps, even at the risk of hasty generalisation, this diagnosis might be put 
as a much bolder statement. If Beckett is pursuing all the traces of the real world for 
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the sake of wiping them away, his zeal in doing so results in eliminating nearly the 
entire exterior reality instead. As a result of such an assumption, the central question 
would no longer be that which binds Beckett’s fictional worlds with “the real world” 
together to assess their interdependence, but rather that which against all odds un-
dermines the existence of the reality outside of protagonists. Still, Beckett’s reduc-
tionism is not hinged in any solipsistic belief; instead, it aims at suspending the very 
possibility of representing reality. If indeed every narrative is bound to fail eventual-
ly, as it relies on misunderstood intentions and misnamed objects or misleading lan-
guage in general, then any attempt to describe a coherent world makes us stray 
amidst the objects of our fantasies and projections. The alternative, however, is 
equally disturbing; in fact, it forces us to accept such a vision of reality which has 
barely survived in any nameable form after being exposed to destructive forces be-
yond imagination. What remains then are the frail witnesses of some unsaid catastro-
phes: a lonely tree, a forsaken stone, a pile of dump submerged in overflowing si-
lence, or windows which never impart what actually can be seen behind them. 
Although Beckett’s problem with leaves in the Polish production of Waiting 
for Godot is mostly anecdotal and hardly proves anything except for Beckett’s rigid 
relation to his texts, it might serve as a starting point for this chapter. In its light, the 
landscapes – which are scarce, diminishing, and by all means vulnerable – become 
the matter not only of attention, but also of control and care. Either minimalist or 
abstract in their refusal of outer reality, Beckett’s narrative realms are worth noticing 
and considering also from an ecocritical perspective, as they are the results of a tre-
mendous effort to articulate oikos at its very twilight, when the representations of the 
environment fall apart and language betrays its users. Because of that, as I would 
argue, in the case of Beckett’s “The Lost Ones” and “Ping” we might speak of pecu-
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liar aesthetics of the Anthropocene, yet long before the recognition of this epoch. 
These short stories, albeit each in a unique way, are concerned with founding the 
extracted sites where the liminal human condition becomes the object of both study 
and experimentation. “The Lost Ones” exhaustively depicts the eerie creatures dwell-
ing in a rubber cylinder that erodes their bodies exposed to the extreme changes of 
temperature and light. Moreover, the turbulent environment of the prismatic abode 
affects their social organisation, daily routines, and even cognitive processes. These 
dramatic occurrences are described with a cold precision by the ominous narrator 
residing outside of the cylinder; a parabola rather than an ecological warning, “The 
Lost Ones” confronts the disastrous environmental conditions with a detached mode 
of storytelling in order to deconstruct particular descriptive and voyeuristic practices 
in the end times. “Ping” develops a similar deconstructive and critical project as that 
inaugurated in “The Lost Ones”; at the same time, “Ping” abandons the linear mode 
of storytelling and attempts to express its own idiosyncratic narrative site. If indeed 
the extreme conditions are linked with corporeal erosion and even extinction, then 
both cases are always the matter of a thought experiment speculated from a detached 
and safe position; if the world and its inhabitants are (nearly) dead, then the language 
of the works has to be equally degenerated. In “Ping,” Beckett, arguably, refuses to 
follow the principles of grammar, semantics, and logic to use its disconnected narra-
tive components rather as a matter of which this work is constructed of
5
; looping and 
iterating, these dispersed words – sui generis linguistic images – force us to accept 
that any liminal condition resists being represented or signified, whilst its erosion is 
bound to reach a counterpart in an equally wrecked language. 
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Using the term of the Anthropocene might provoke considerable criticism if 
one bears in mind that Beckett’s works restrain from referring to the capitalist socie-
ties whose rise has turned human activity into a geological force; even less might his 
texts inspire new modes of environmental activism that the contemporary debate 
over the Anthropocene in the humanities predominantly revolves around. I resort to 
the Anthropocene purposefully, as I am convinced that despite the urgency of an 
ethical response and the necessity of change it calls for, this period has created a sig-
nificant lacuna that demands epistemological and ontological interventions also di-
rected from literary studies, and not only from philosophy and social sciences. Even 
though peculiar, Beckett’s literary project is capable of tracing the temporal confu-
sion and the economy of remnants that this hypothetical age puts in motion. Specifi-
cally, the Anthropocene is the point in history when human beings have been violent-
ly confronted with the question of their unexpected inheritance, as the collective ac-
tivity of our species has become imprinted as the Other in the sediments; hence, hu-
man and nonhuman timelines are interwoven. Not a new materialist himself but its 
staunch critic, Timothy Morton aptly identifies this moment in history, nonetheless; 
it is the emergence of radical coexistence with nonhumans and the time when the 
new forms of intimacy come to being (or we should say “come to matter”).6 Hence, 
we become closer to the second theme crucial for the Anthropocene that Beckett’s 
works might help us investigate, once again by means of an anachronism: the rela-
tion between the human and the nonhuman agencies. 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to immerse in the weird cycle of short 
stories consisting of “The Lost Ones” and “Ping,” which settles what might be called 
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the aesthetics of the Anthropocene. These two short stories exercise the material 
transcorporeality of the tormented inhabitants of their geometrical halls. I endeavour 
to explore how these perilous settings contribute to such a vision of the end times 
that entails the deterioration of language and therefore breaks with the conceptual 
bubble which too often allows us to project our fantasies of the end of the world from 
a safe position. I begin with recollecting Paul Saunders’ seminal reading of ecocriti-
cism of Trilogy in the light of Timothy Morton’s terms. Then, I will confront this 
interpretation with my own project of reading Beckett ecocritically, rooted in Gilles 
Deleuze’s canonical essay entitled “The Exhausted,” which might serve as a theoret-
ical bridge between Beckett’s peculiar oeuvre and new materialism. This conceptual 
part of the chapter will be followed by the detailed analyses of “The Lost Ones” and 
“Ping.” Treating them both as the allegories for the Anthropocene, I aim at exploring 
how they stage their vulnerable landscapes that reconcile the speculations of living in 
the end times with the distrust towards linguistic cognition by means of either sus-
pending its reflexivity or envisioning it as material that constitutes literary worlds 
outside of its grammatical and semantical rules. Finally, I will examine how these 
short stories both challenge our practices of storytelling and looking in the eschato-
logical perspectives, and invent critical tools against the aforementioned conceptual 
bubble. 
The Ecology of Exhaustion 
A prophet of vulnerable landscapes, Beckett has been rarely read from the 
ecological angle, but it would be unjustified to claim that the preoccupation with 
environmental issues in his works has been left unnoticed. In “Strange Weather,” 
Paul Davies puts forward a ground-breaking argument that places Beckett’s “anti-
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climates” in a broadly understood ecopoetical perspective, planting inspiration for 
further studies and demonstrating that the particular dogmas of the critique focusing 
on intrapersonal readings might be overcome.
7
 For some scholars, such as Kathryn 
White, ecocriticism remains a distant and merely implied point of reference, identify-
ing bleakness and deterioration of Beckett’s spaces with the extracted landscapes8; 
for others, Garrard or Saunders being the most prominent instances, Beckett’s strug-
gles with the downfall and limits of nature provide allegorical allies to think and act 
ecologically, or even to rethink ecology anew in the uncertain times. Garrard, for 
one, goes to argue that “[p]erhaps the significance of Endgame for understanding 
climate change lies at once in its tragi-comic exploration of the end of nature and in 
the fact that we cannot see it.”9 Following Morton’s Ecological Thought, Garrard 
continues that despite vanishing references to the actual natural catastrophes, End-
game and the way it exercises the end of nature introduce such an act of writing that 
resists fetishising images and usages of nature, and therefore serves deeply ecologi-
cal intentions.
10
 Thus, Garrard clearly demonstrates that the environmental critique in 
Beckett studies does not have to be linked entirely to ecopolitical concerns, but might 
also contribute to the greater search for the ontological and epistemological alterna-
tives in this field. 
Drifting off purely ecopolitical readings even further than Garrard, Paul 
Saunders poses one of the most powerful and well-detailed accounts of Beckett and 
ecocriticism. Although Saunders, against contemporary radical tendencies, does 
acknowledge that environmental realism resorts to “the political and pedagogical 
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practicality […],”11 he clearly shows that this position “risks closing off valuable 
avenues of critique and stifles the ecological imagination.”12 Realism might be eco-
logical only with regard to content; however, in being such, it far too often tends to 
fall back into the conceptual trap of the subject/object binary. Now, Beckett’s indebt-
edness to the modernist tradition, just as the exceptional self-reflexivity he develops 
at length in his works, encourages us to think differently; Saunders points out that in 
Molloy one might pursue a noteworthy withdrawal of the realist ecology in favour of 
the modernist one. Accordingly, this emerging mode of ecological thought relies on 
“anti-referential aesthetics and ‘higher mimesis,’ with the relinquishment of control 
over nature, suggesting that modernist modes of representation are deeply ecological, 
that they are ecological in form […].”13 Consequently, a parallel might be drawn be-
tween the formalist attunement of Beckett’s Trilogy (hardly complacent with the 
fashion in which literature is capable of representation) and the speculative method-
ologies in the line of Morton’s ecological thought (hostile towards the linguistic par-
adigm that has dominated the humanities in the 20
th
 century). For Saunders, Mor-
ton’s ontological investigations of ambience, which merges subject with object and 
wipes clear boundaries between them, are precisely what characterises Beckett’s 
style in Trilogy. Furthermore, Beckett’s writings, suspicious of nature in its content, 
become deeply ecological, formally speaking; shared by Morton and Beckett, ambi-
ence happens to be a conceptual device that prohibits establishing “a unified, trans-
cendent nature that could become a symptomatic fantasy thing.”14 Therefore, ambi-
ence becomes an indispensable tool for the critique disclosing the presupposed agen-
                                                             
11
 Paul Saunders, “Samuel Beckett’s Trilogy and the Ecology of Negation,” Journal of Beckett Stud-
ies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2011), p. 73. 
12
 Saunders, “Samuel Beckett’s Trilogy,” p. 73. 
13
 Saunders, “Samuel Beckett’s Trilogy,” p. 62. Emphasis mine. 
14
 Saunders, “Samuel Beckett’s Trilogy,” p. 66. 
178 
 
 
 
 
da of our notions of nature that might block our abilities to think and act ecological-
ly. 
It has to be emphasised that Saunders neither equates Beckett with Morton 
nor frames the former as a direct predecessor of the latter; instead, Saunders cau-
tiously reconstructs Morton’s argument and, as it might be gathered, prepares the 
ground for the re-education of his ecological thought through Beckett’s Trilogy. We 
read: “Beckett’s work is maniacal in its pursuit of ‘ecology without a subject,’ to use 
Morton’s term even as its willingness to recognise the inevitable return of the subject 
might otherwise position it as the very kind of ‘enlightened Cartesianism’.”15 Even 
though such fascination draws Beckett’s style close to Morton’s ambience, what dis-
tinguishes the former author is the awareness of failure. Inevitable but rarely taking 
place at all, failure has a weird agency which for Beckett pertains to the paradoxical 
sense of hope rooted in the helpless and in the hopeless. Consequently, his complex 
relationship with failure and hope makes it possible to reconcile an “esoteric pur-
suit”16 for “ecology without a subject” – impractical, elusive, and utopian – with its 
deconstructive and critical capacities intact, which more realist approaches might still 
benefit from. Far from ecological concerns and even further from any practical solu-
tions to environmental crises whatsoever, Beckett’s elevation of failure does not 
abandon a critical insight into its own matter fuelling the ambience-driven hopes; it 
also discloses the sense of underlying impossibility foregrounding their abstract rhet-
oric. Furthermore, Beckett – as Saunders suggests – approaches nature with distrust 
and doubt that do greater good for ecological thinking than even the most meticulous 
realist accounts anchored in transcendent fantasies. 
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Although Saunders’ reading is foundational for the critical standpoint of this 
chapter, I will anchor my point of departure in a different tradition than object-
oriented ontology, endorsed by Morton. In his insightful reading, Saunders success-
fully shows how the modernist orientation of Beckett’s works is capable of rework-
ing the critical modes of the contemporary ecological thought. Indeed, Trilogy 
demonstrates how the literature of ambience can be conceived of. Precisely, it devel-
ops a style that multiplies the negotiations of the boundaries between subject and 
object to such an extent that the firm texture of words becomes cracked, vulnerable 
to the excess of self-reflexivity. The Unnamable is the most prominent example of 
this tendency. Having employed failure and weakness as conceptual safeguard of his 
line of thinking, Saunders defines them as affirmative means that relocate the bound-
aries of subject and object, and of the human and the nonhuman. Importantly, failure 
and weakness preserve a degree of self-reflexivity that not only disallows us to ac-
cept abstract and elusive conceptualisations too eagerly, but also – in a seemingly 
contradictory manner – retains the critical potential of such investigations, despite 
their hazy matter. At the same time, as I am convinced, Beckett’s “The Lost Ones” 
and “Ping” encourage us to take a different approach, albeit inspired by those two 
merits of Saunders’ paper. Firstly, in those stories, Beckett constructs impossible 
halls whose interrelation with (most certainly) the human body transcends thinking in 
terms of ontology exclusively. Because of that, new materialism – privileging an 
embodied encounter – might demonstrate how different nature-cultures, even if the 
fictional ones, function in our environmental toolbox and foster it. Secondly, “The 
Lost Ones” and “Ping” retain a self-reflexive distrust for the practices of looking and 
the practices of narrating that they employ, which challenges the anthropocentric or 
“Nature-centric” tendencies that Saunders dismantles. Finally, in each of them lan-
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guage either suspends or gradually withdraws from its own descriptive or representa-
tional mode, embracing a more material form mentioned above. 
In a new materialist reading, the ecologies Saunders extensively discusses 
might be replaced with the ecology of exhaustion, inspired by Gilles Deleuze’s semi-
nal reading of Beckett’s oeuvre. In “The Exhaused,” Deleuze argues that Beckett’s 
style might be divided into three distinctive types of language. The first one, typical 
of his early novels, is the language of names that represents literary worlds as “dis-
junctive” or “atomic” structures; syntactical logic is substituted with that based on 
enumeration, whereas amassing words mirror the coexistence of objects.
17
 The sec-
ond language “no longer operates with combinable atoms but with blendable 
flows.”18 In fact, it is the language of voices. Mastered in plays and later novels, es-
pecially in Trilogy, it is the style embracing the cacophony of Beckett’s protagonists, 
whose stories frequently tend to respond to and undermine each other, and then fuse 
and blend. Consequently, the solid boundaries between the stories and their authors 
are no longer discernible. Even more uncanny than the first language, the voices 
muddle and gradually withdraw from making sense, exposing the aporia they origi-
nate in. Finally, Beckett advances the most radical language: the language of spaces 
and images. It “relates to […] immanent limits that are ceaselessly displaced – hia-
tuses, holes, or tears that we would never notice, or would attribute to mere tiredness, 
if they did not suddenly widen in such a way as to receive something from the out-
side or from elsewhere.”19 Jean-Jacques Lecercle describes this language as follows:  
We no longer have a message, with its syntax, however rudimentary; we 
no longer have a sender, with her voice; all we seem to have is a heap of 
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broken images. Why call it a language still? Because there is still an ad-
dressee, the audience, and there is still something going on, the process of 
emergence of those images, which, reflexively, is the process of emer-
gence of language itself, when art takes it to its limits, closer and closer to 
silence, to which it aspires, and which it achieves with this “language.”20 
According to Deleuze, Beckett develops the progressing aesthetics of turning lan-
guage against itself in order to omit all those redundant elements that divert its signi-
fying work. Simultaneously, it is not a strategy based on the solipsist vision of the 
world; the stripped languages Beckett employs, as Lecercle rightly assumes, aim at 
recovering the uncanny event in which “the” language comes to being. 
Not quite a diachronic perspective, Deleuze’s classification revolves around 
the eponymous category of the exhausted. Beckett’s individual style and peculiar 
aesthetics create a counterintuitive space of literature in which his protagonists suffer 
from physical exhaustion, and so does the language they use.
21
 Exhaustion thus is not 
embedded in an entirely abstract process, as ambience, but rather its origin is fixed in 
the worn out bodies. It is worth emphasising that exhaustion in this case is an entirely 
different state than tiredness. The latter embraces such a situation in which the par-
ticular possibility – of moving, acting, or speaking – remains intact, whilst it is its 
realisation that is no longer possible.
22
 Contrary to mere weariness, exhaustion emp-
ties the very possibilities, but in doing so exhaustion becomes also a process of hol-
lowing posibilia: things.
23
 Because of that, images and spaces might be exhausted 
when the principles of the third language apply. Importantly, space becomes “any-
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space-whatever”24; be it a cylinder in “The Lost Ones,” a cuboid in “Ping,” or a ref-
uge in “Lessness,” it stages a well-known place in Beckett’s universe that is actually 
a locus of indeterminacy, “opposed to all our pseudoqualified extensions […].”25 
Any-space-whatever belongs to a negative cartography pointing to somewhere which 
is not exactly here and not quite there, but always marks a slipping point between 
these two. Hence, Deleuze’s third language of Beckett’s works “extenuates” spatiali-
ty.
26
 Since spatiality is invented anew due to the forces exhaustion initiates, 
Deleuze’s reading calls also for new temporal units when time is no longer possible; 
it is through images that the time of exhaustion is marked. Flashes, blinks, or sudden 
outbursts of darkness – they do not refer to the specific representations; rather, these 
images are linked with temporariness that preserves their vivid emergence. Being 
exhausted, an image “inasmuch as it stands in the void outside space, and also apart 
from words, stories, and memories, accumulates a fantastic potential energy, which it 
detonates by dissipating itself.”27 Whilst space is extenuated, images rely on dissipa-
tion, exhausting the possible within the irruptive release of energy. 
As a thought experiment, the ecology of exhaustion could rely on Deleuze’s 
reading of Beckett in pursuit for an aesthetics of the Anthropocene. Let us briefly 
recall the epistemic rupture this epoch causes that has been discussed at length in 
Chapter 1. The Anthropocene initiates the radical opening of the unified “World,” 
equally arbitrary as “Nature,” into the dispersion of worlds that are barely traceable, 
or into somewheres that are neither here nor there, and in the same fashion it breaks 
linear passing of time. When human beings have already been imprinted on the sed-
iments as the first anthropoid fossil, it becomes inevitable to think of them as a spe-
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cies that is simultaneously alive and extinct. Even though the end of the world still 
remains an event that is yet to come, the apocalyptic timelines are already at play. 
Temporally speaking, the Anthropocene confronts our sense of belonging with the 
speculative times in which we have become extinct as a species, yet that realisation 
does not obliterate the world which continues to exist, just as many other nonhumans 
that still inhabit it. The image of the end of the world as a catastrophe that has not 
happened dissipates the linear passage of time into a plethora of human and nonhu-
man timelines that counterintuitively, and often reversely, affect each other. Fur-
thermore, the Anthropocene is the time of spatial reconfiguration. The recognition of 
humanity as a geological force induces the unintended nonhuman effects of the pur-
poseful development of civilisation and capitalist societies. Human beings have to 
face the fact that, similarly to fossilising processes, they are entangled in different 
nonhuman agencies surrounding them that inverse, if not dismantle, the historically 
granted domination of anthropos. Deprived of (the sense of) control, we – under-
stood as individuals – are experiencing what Stacy Alaimo calls “transcorporeality,” 
since our human bodies are “intermeshed with the more-than-human world.”28 The 
end of the world is in fact the opening of the world, or individually embodied worlds, 
to the other – human and nonhuman – realities and the repressed material intimacy. 
Just as in Deleuze, our understanding of space extenuates whereas our sense of time 
dissipates in the advent of the Anthropocene. 
As I have mentioned before, the ecology of exhaustion – inspired by Beckett 
and Deleuze – is the search of the aesthetics of the Anthropocene; what would be 
then such an artistic project? By all means, the temporal and spatial twists that the 
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Anthropocene induces might inspire powerful representations of the liminal position 
the human occupies, capable of sharpening critical tools and constructing tremendous 
ecological dystopias. Yet, the vision of the Anthropocene challenges the representa-
tion-oriented thinking. As Timothy Morton claims, this era marks the moment in 
history when the radical subject/object binary known as correlationism becomes 
dismantled.
29
 If correlationism is to be upheld, so have to be the representations of its 
fall; otherwise, they would redirect us back to the speculative human fantasies of 
being outside, which inexorably originate in the presupposed subject. Although I 
would not necessarily claim that literature, with its inevitable degree of subjective 
position of the authors, readers, or narrators is capable of transgressing the correla-
tionist deadlock, I would like to examine how Beckett’s works allow us to suspend 
such reading of the Anthropocene that privileges representations: apocalyptic fanta-
sies and literary speculations. What I propose instead is to look at “The Lost Ones” 
and “Ping” as either allegories or stages for the mechanisms that the Anthropocene 
puts in motion. Consequently, both short stories are going to be read as the sites of 
the logic of the Anthropocene. Importantly enough, these texts do not leave us solely 
with their vulnerable and desolate landscapes, but also with a greater sense of antici-
pation. Perhaps, this is the moment when the ecological affirmation of failure, de-
fended by Saunders and inspired by Beckett, is the cause worth fighting for also from 
the new materialist perspective. For that reason, this chapter endeavours to embrace 
the Anthropocene materialising in Beckett’s works and still to defend a sui generis 
hope in the hopeless positions. 
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The Geometry of Isolation 
“The Lost Ones” provides us with an extensive account of the weird civilisa-
tion residing in a rubber cylinder. The frigid narrator begins his
30
 story as follows:  
Abode where lost bodies roam each searching for its lost one. Vast 
enough for search to be in vain. Narrow enough for flight to be in vain. 
Inside a flattened cylinder fifty metre round and sixteen high for the sake 
of harmony. The light. Its dimness. Its yellowness. Its omnipresence as 
though every separate square centimetre were agleam of the some twelve 
million of total surface. Its restlessness at long intervals suddenly stilled 
like panting at the last. Then all go dead still. It is perhaps the end of their 
abode. A few seconds and all begins again.
31
 
The abode is the extracted world with its own rhythms, pulses, and cycles. Just as 
light regularly dims into overflowing darkness only to brighten into the gloomy yel-
lowness in a matter of seconds, temperature fluctuates between cold and hot, expos-
ing the inhabitants to the extremely varying conditions. Consequently, because of 
such an artificial and isolated climate, the roaming searchers are deeply mutilated 
and their condition is deteriorated; we read: “Thus flesh and bone subsist.”32 Pene-
trated by the hostile environment around them, their eyes cease to search, while their 
skin folds revealing its disfigured texture. What (or who) is the eponymous lost one 
that each of the inhabitants is looking for? Some of them are looking for an exit, 
while others have completely forgotten their motivations. Most of them simply roam, 
move the ladders leaning against the rubber walls, and climb them in order to gain 
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access to niches and tunnels carved in the cylinder. Eventually, no escape is found 
and no search leads to a satisfying discovery. 
In this circular hell-like space, reminiscent of Dante’s Inferno, the atrocity af-
fecting the inhabitants of the abode is governed by predictable and unchangeable 
principles. Indeed, the changes in temperature and light occur within precisely de-
fined intervals, whereas the space ascribed to each of two hundred five individuals is 
strictly measured. Because of that, the rubber cylinder is an ominous realm whose 
principles are harmonically determined. It might be claimed that the inhabitants drift 
off these rules, as their deteriorated bodies make them rely predominantly on biolog-
ical instinct and physiological needs; this, however, proves otherwise, as their de-
individualisation makes their behaviour schematic. Consequently, the searchers are 
not bound by any social structure whatsoever, including familial bonds
33
; still, the 
conditions inside their gloomy reality have imposed new forms of organisation on 
them. As Ruby Cohn enumerates, the roamers consist of “(1) the climbers who con-
stantly move; (2) the watchers who move and stop; (3) the sedentary who are immo-
bile, except for their violence when stepped on; (4) the vanquished whose heads are 
lowered in their immobility.”34 Such a tentative categorisation does not disrupt the 
harmony of the abode. Firstly, the inhabitants are patiently awaiting in queues lead-
ing to the ladders since each of the latter might be occupied only by one entity. Sec-
ondly, the dwellers roam carefully in order not to traverse the boundaries of the sec-
tors that do not belong to them. Finally, they respect the maximum capacities of the 
niches. What gives birth to their “society” is therefore the sense of anticipation, as 
each of the inhabitants believes that their roaming is not in vain, and that somewhere 
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inside the cylinder there is a way-out, leading through either “a secret passage 
branching from one of the tunnels […] to nature’s sanctuaries” 35 or “a trapdoor hid-
den in the hub of the ceiling giving access to a flue at the end of which the sun and 
other stars would still be shining.”36 Emphatically, this obstinate faith does not fade 
away even in these traumatic moments when the roaming inhabitants are certain of 
the imminent end of their world. Despite the sudden outbursts of complete darkness, 
the cycle of the abode and the torment of its dwellers persist. 
One of the most interesting issues described in Beckett’s “The Lost Ones” is 
the rumour about a hidden exit. It is assumed that the way-out either leads upwards, 
so that a clear sky might be visible at last, or downwards, where some unknown “na-
ture’s sanctuaries”37 might be found. In this light, the abode appears to be the place 
deprived of any internal connection with nature. Consequently, the natural might also 
be the matter of a rumour; it is something hidden and hypothetical, if not lost alto-
gether. A way-out, nature is replaced with the perilous conditions that alter both the 
bodies and the perception of the inhabitants. Similarly to the light fluctuating and 
penetrating the eyes of the dwellers, and similarly to the temperature oscillating and 
piercing through their skin, these entities are driven by the desires of exploring the 
tunnels in the cylinder. As bodies and therefore senses deteriorate, the inhabitants 
have adapted to the conditions of the abode in such a way that their cognition be-
comes metonymic to their searching practices, founded on the libidinal energy. The 
sexual notions of penetrating movements and phallic structures suggest that “The 
Lost Ones” stages the struggle between its harmonic principles and excessive drives. 
Seemingly extinguished in the weakening bodies, these figures of unpredictability 
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still pose a serious threat to the calculable existence of the abode. This tension is vis-
ible even in the narrator’s attempt to describe the sexual intercourse between two 
searchers, which displays the disastrous impact on the deteriorated bodies. We read: 
For skin in its own way as it is not to mention its humours and lids it has 
not merely one adversary to contend with. This desiccation of the enve-
lope robs nudity of much of its charm as pink turns grey and transforms 
into a rustling of nettles the natural succulence of flesh against flesh. The 
mucous membrane itself is affected which would not greatly matter were 
it not for its hampering effect on the work of love. But even from this 
point of view no great harm is done so rare is the erection in the cylinder. 
It does occur none the less followed by more or less happy penetration in 
the nearest tube. Even man and wife may sometimes be seen in virtue of 
law of probabilities to come together again in this way without their 
knowledge. The spectacle then is one to be remembered of frenzies pro-
longed in pain and hopelessness long beyond what even the most gifted 
lovers can achieve in camera. For male or female all are acutely aware 
how rare the occasion is and how unlikely to recur.
38
 
Beginning with the excessive depiction of the bodies, the passage approaches sexual 
intercourse from an aloof perspective. The narrator reduces it indeed to a physiologi-
cal need, whose rarity in the perilous conditions establishes a sexual consensus. In-
terestingly enough, the narrator refers to this situation as the “work of love,” despite 
his otherwise clinical descriptions. In “The Lost Ones,” love is indeed a peculiar 
word choice, yet a justified one if one delves into the genesis of the French variant of 
the text: “Le Depépleur.” As Cohn notes, the original French title is derived from 
Lamartine’s “L’Isolement,” in which we read: “You lack a single being, and the 
world is depopulated.”39  
If indeed the inhabitants are looking for “the lost ones,” or “depépleurs” in 
the French version, what might be at stake is a form of veering intimacy in the end 
                                                             
38
 Beckett, “The Lost Ones,” p. 220. Emphasis mine. 
39
 Cohn, A Beckett Canon, p. 309. Emphasis mine. 
189 
 
 
 
 
times. In Beckett’s short story, the eponymous “depopulator” or “the lost one” marks 
the seemingly unreachable object of the search. It is a form of dark intimacy in the 
hostile environment where nothing at all is intimate. At the end of the short story, we 
might note that such intimacy is indeed possible when one of the searchers looks into 
the eyes of the vanquished woman. As Steven Connor claims: 
This is the only determinate event in the whole of “The Lost Ones.” 
Something has at last happened that cannot, it appears, be reversed or un-
done by subsequent events; but that thing that has at last happened is the 
last thing of all to happen, ever. It is the moment at which narrative be-
gins, the moment at which the possible becomes actual.
40
 
The intimacy in the eschatological times between humans and nonhumans might be 
manifested in the end of the narrative that constantly meshes with its own setting, 
wrapping it in the thick veil of words. The end of the story, therefore, is the only pos-
sible conclusion when the fixed logic is torn by an unexpected event. Whereas the 
search has been triggered by the lack depopulating the world and deploying the 
roaming searchers as a mass, it is the final event of finding the lost one that depopu-
lates the story entirely, so that it cannot be preserved in any state. Yet, in this brief 
and fleeing moment, a glimpse of veering intimacy might be captured, both that be-
tween the two searchers and that between the reader and the text, if not – the narrator 
and the tale he tells. “The Lost Ones” is about to be lost itself, reaching its exhausted 
form at the end of the story, which, nevertheless, involves the moment breaking the 
cycle of the cylinder. 
In “The Lost Ones,” we might note how the narrator yearns for the intimacy 
to the object he describes even though his mode of storytelling shows that he loses it 
over and over again. Apparently, he occupies the position of a detached observer, 
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whose cold tone is somewhat reminiscent of a scientific study. However, there is 
something rushing and hasty in his seemingly detailed and scrupulous account, 
which is implied by the abandonment of punctuation. Overly controlling and patron-
ising, the narrator carefully enumerates the properties of the abode, and distinguishes 
the actual needs and intentions of its inhabitants from the mere appearances in a 
clear-cut fashion. At the same time, as Cohn emphasises, the more details he accu-
mulates, the more inconsistencies resurface.
41
 The mistakes correspond to the mo-
ments in which he slightly withdraws from being an omniscient narrator. Precisely, 
at one point he begins to use the vocabulary of uncertainty, encapsulated in the recur-
ring phrase: “if this notion is to be maintained.”42 Cohn adds that the omniscient po-
sition returns at the end of the story, when the narrator provides us with the account 
of the end of the cylindrical realm, concluding his story within a mythical framework 
of the last of the seekers.
43
 Perhaps, the narrator indeed assumes the position of the 
creator who remains intensely connected with his creation. If indeed he is not sepa-
rated from the described world, then the narrator happens to be a tragic protagonist as 
well, whose knowledge and reasoning have failed to grant any fate to the inhabitants 
other than their everlasting torment. Hence, he would act as Emil Cioran’s evil demi-
urge. We read: 
We are at liberty to imagine that one day the demiurge, when struck with 
the inadequacy or the perniciousness of his work, may wish to bring 
about its doom, and even arrange to disappear along with it. But it is also 
conceivable that, from the beginning, his one concern has been to destroy 
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himself, that the future may unfold according to the workings of this slow 
self-destruction.
44
 
The tenacious searches make the inhabitants appear as an unfinished project that the 
rushing account aims at concluding with a mythical ending. By means of that clo-
sure, the story would be annihilated and their suffering interrupted. Although such an 
assumption challenges what we have said before, it is not entirely implausible. Such 
haste would be in fact consequent to the awareness that intimacy cannot be achieved 
within the story itself. 
Contrary to that, we might claim that the narrator is a separated entity who is 
not that much a creator of the cylindrical realm but rather its warden. Apparently, to 
a great extent the abode resembles the (in)famous carceral project of Jeremy Ben-
tham. The panopticon, as Bentham calls it, is a circular prison with a tower in the 
centre which allows for observing the inmates in an assymetric fashion, so that they 
are unable to notice the watchman and, thus, decide whether they are being observed 
or not.
45
 Michel Foucault, who has written extensively on Bentham’s invention, per-
ceives it as an absolute tool of the discipline over bodies,
46
 contributing to the sover-
eign power that condemns one to death and permits another to stay alive.
47
 Im-
portantly enough, the panopticon might also be read as an iconic institution of bi-
opower, which – inversely – condemns one to live and permits one to die.48 Accord-
ingly, the panopticon not so much controls the bodies of the inmates as decides upon 
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their behaviour and governs them by means of the affects it produces, fuelling the 
ongoing uncertainty of being supervised. 
Not only does the narrator have the access to all activities of the whole socie-
ty of the searchers, but he also forces the readers to accept his account as an objective 
narrative, supporting it with extensive analyses and their seemingly empiric ground. 
Furthermore, the vision of the inhabitants is doubly limited if we compare it to that 
of the narrator. Even if we assume that the cylinder is a translucent structure, which 
might always be the case, then the light fluctuations not only disallow the inhabitants 
to see through it, but also have injured their eyes so profoundly that they can hardly 
see the reality inside the abode, not to mention recognising the external one. Emphat-
ically, Beckett’s panopticon does not rely solely on vision; in fact, it manifests itself 
also as an auditory prison. As we are ensured, the rubber walls and floor mute any 
sounds inside the cylinder, except for those of moving ladders and unexpected colli-
sions of the nearly blind inhabitants. What persists is not silence; the cylinder reso-
nates with a humming sound instead, which, most probably, makes the other noises 
drown out. In fact, this sound might be a trope similar to the buzzing noises de-
scribed in Chapter 4; however, it might also be read as the voice of the narrator dis-
torted and muted by the rubber walls. Once again, such a situation would turn the 
inhabitants into aphatic and deaf entities, whose being in the cylindrical realm is bio-
politically produced by the story itself. We are returning, therefore, to the striking 
asymmetry between the narrator and the civilisation of searchers. The excessive 
means of control participate in creating the world of the short story, yet at the same 
time their work becomes distorted and interrupted. The intimacy between the two 
realms is the matter of ongoing negotiations; nevertheless, it is also due to these ne-
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gotiations that the failure of the narrator as an investigator is shown, as his care has 
been replaced by overt control. 
From the Deleuzian perspective introduced before, the rushing language of 
the narrator might be the language of names, typical of Beckett’s early novels. It has 
already exhausted the commonly accepted laws of logic, semantics, or punctuation 
by means of the pursuit for atomised and disjunctive images of the objects the narra-
tor observes. Still, the narrator resides in a separate realm, located elsewhere than the 
action of the short story. Along with the sudden moments of undecidability induced 
by the changes in light, this fact emphasises the qualities of the third language of 
images and spaces, and, therefore, a deeper state of exhaustion. Thereby, “The Lost 
Ones” might function as an example of the ecology of exhaustion and an allegory for 
the Anthropocene. The abstract and ominous reality in the prism maps the situation 
in which one has to be confronted with the society which, due to extreme and artifi-
cial climate, has been forced to reorganise its social structures and adapt. However, 
this adaptation to the realm that hardly bears resemblance to ours has resulted in the 
reduction of the dwellers’ senses and capacities to a hopeless searching which, as I 
argue, is in fact the search for intimacy, even if such intimacy is inseparable from 
isolation in the end times. These new modes of being together are not subsumed un-
der a valuable representation, but rather they stage a radical rupture within the repre-
senting paradigm. The text itself points to certain material or affective force beyond 
its textual limits, which makes the narrative shake and struggle for retaining its con-
sistency. Indeed, the relations between the narrator and his story, the reader and the 
text, and the roaming bodies themselves provide us with various takes on intimacy. 
The aporia of “The Lost Ones” is perceptible at the very moment when regaining 
intimacy becomes no longer the matter of any of these relations, but rather of sui 
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generis material closure that demands the end of the parabola. Such a veering or dark 
intimacy is therefore a matter of glimpse at the story the very moment it falls apart.  
There is yet another implication of reading “The Lost Ones” through the 
ecology of exhaustion that serves more analytic purposes. Accordingly, the asym-
metry between the inhabitants and the narrator, either a biopolitical warden or an evil 
demiurge, invokes the Anthropocene as predominantly a speculative narrative of the 
end times. As any speculative fiction of the end of the world, the Anthropocene is 
dependent on the practices of storytelling and looking, whereas its critical output 
might be indeed articulated from the warden’s tower, to put it figuratively. In this 
particular case, the panoptical structure produces remnants, relations, and hu-
man/nonhuman binaries it claims to only ponder upon. In spite of his safe position, 
the narrator and his failure to deliver an objective account do not necessarily dis-
prove that the cold precision brings us closer to the object. Instead, this fact reminds 
us of the conceptual bubble and the asymmetric position such a narrative might es-
tablish. Furthermore, it might show that for Beckett thinking in the end terms is al-
ways entangled in the world refusing to give in to it. These terms are rather posited 
as abstract possibilities and the conditions of future. Manifested as the outbursts of 
darkness and the fluctuations of temperature in “The Lost Ones”, Beckett’s concep-
tual strategy encourages the storytelling tendencies to hasten the event of the end of 
the world. One way of reaching it includes losing “The Lost Ones” as a text, whose 
absence makes it possible to catch the glimpse of intimacy this short story has at-
tempted to capture through language. Its emergence points to a weird non-textual 
agency of this work which is delivered the very moment the anthropocentric modes 
of descriptions fall apart. Eventually, the pursuit for completeness happens to risk 
adopting demiurge-like and destructive modes that the Anthropocene is never im-
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mune to, unmasking the speculative bubble which might be the site from which the 
pronouncement of this era is articulated.  
The Stories of the White World  
In the introduction to The Complete Short Prose, 1929-1989, Gontarski notes 
that “Ping” – firstly written in French as “Bing” – “may be regarded as the result of 
miniaturization of ‘Le Dépeupleur’ abandoned because of its intractable complexi-
ties.”49 Since the latter text has been ultimately completed and thereafter translated as 
“The Lost Ones,” the ascribed hierarchy seems to be rather dubious. In a somewhat 
provocative gesture I would like to argue that “Bing,” although never abandoned, 
remains an unfinished work. If we investigate Beckett’s archives, we will find that 
there exist sixteen versions of this text (of which ten were printed) as well as the 
English translation, entitled “Ping,” which arguably strives for a unification of the 
preceding forms. Beckett’s short story in English – consisting of only seventy sen-
tences – is an extremely concise and disturbing work preoccupied with the instability 
of the frontiers and their recurring displacement. Let us immerse in the unique tone 
of Beckett’s narrative: 
All known all white bare white body fixed one yard legs joined like sewn. 
Light heat white floor one square yard never seen. White walls one yard 
by two white ceiling one square yard never seen. Bare white body fixed 
only the eyes only just. Traces blurs light grey almost white on white. 
Hands hanging palms front white feet heels together right angle.
50
 
“Ping” depicts a white cuboid with an equally white entity inside. The trapped hu-
man (is it a human at all?) is ceaselessly merging with the surroundings, as the 
boundaries of both his or her body and the space of the prism are nearly undistin-
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guishable. Emphatically, such a passage is never complete. Despite the fact that the 
narrator informs us about the cubic structure of the presented realm, its curves seem 
to be unnoticeable for the being in it. What the dweller most presumably observes is 
the overwhelming excess of whiteness without any horizon given even though the 
light grey traces, described as “almost white on white,” loom at a distance. Moreo-
ver, for an external spectator the inhabitant would appear equally invisible, except 
for his or her blue eyes, which are also “almost white.”51 
 Driven by his own disappointment with “The Lost Ones,” Beckett has made a 
significant advancement in the world of “Ping.” Analogously to the earlier short sto-
ry, the tragic position of the protagonist stems from the unbearable excess, displayed 
in “Ping” as a state founded on measurable terms with regard to nearly mathematical 
precision; however, the logic of the antecedent work still allows the roaming bodies 
to move, and, in this sense, “The Lost Ones” are by design exposed to the threat of 
the unexpected. Probably, this is one of the reasons why Beckett has abandoned “The 
Lost Ones” in the first place. Even though the phenomena occurring within the cyl-
inder are repetitive, their intensity seems to gradually increase. In “Ping,” conversely, 
the standstill is the pre-eminent condition, which is especially visible in its saturated 
form purified of any verbs. Far from being means of some Dadaist aesthetics, both 
the regular repetitions and the way the particular words interact only emphasise the 
meticulous design of Beckett’s short story. Along with its disposal of syntactical and 
logical patterns of grammar, the language of “Ping” is devised in order to continu-
ously interrupt the process of dissolving the depicted being within the white cuboid. 
The last task is made possible by two weird words Beckett refers to which entail the 
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change in the environment that is seemingly resistant to it: these words are “ping” 
and “hup.”52 
For Deleuze, both pings and hups are the means belonging to the third lan-
guage, embracing spaces and images. Respectively, hups “activate strange move-
ments within the spatial directions,”53 whereas pings “activate the images.”54 Moreo-
ver, hup designates the only form of movement that is permitted to the dweller of the 
cuboid since it does not signify a verb. Interestingly enough, this strange onomato-
poeia transports the being “elsewhere,” which – as the narrator assures – is “always 
there” and yet is simultaneously “not known.”55 Hup happens to be a substitute for 
movement within the vast whiteness of the cuboid, yet as an action it barely entails 
any change of place. Even though on one occasion the dweller wonders whether 
there is an exit (“perhaps a way out”56), he or she remains inside since the change 
indicated by hup has not caused a noticeable difference. Still, hups happen; they re-
negotiate the spatial boundaries of the cuboid, permuting their already multiplied and 
superimposed white surfaces without limits, and establishing a peculiar place de-
prived of any fixed location. It is pings that puncture the structure of the cuboid and 
destabilise its standstill. Each of them is accompanied by the murmuring of the 
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dweller, whose mouth is “like sewn.”57 Pings demand a response, as if the novelty 
that has just emerged requires its own form to inhabit. Hence, pings are irruptive, but 
they also induce a change orientating the dweller towards uncertainty and temporari-
ness that might resist the measurable laws of the cuboid.  
Similarly to “The Lost Ones,” “Ping” is a text that sets the limits of 
knowledge, reflected in language and based on observations, only insofar as these 
limits might be questioned once again in a more thorough way. Apparently, in the 
latter text there are attempts to identify the qualities of the cuboid as either natural 
(“perhaps a nature”)58 or meaningful (“perhaps a meaning”).59 Simultaneously, some 
of pings are repetitively alluding to “blue and white in the wind”60: precisely, the 
times of harmony and purity, when the balance between both hues was preserved, 
whereas the borders persisted. In the light of this reference, David Lodge goes as far 
as to claim that pings are, in fact, the figurative representations of the consciousness 
of a dying human being.
61
 Gontarski, on the contrary, criticises such a realistic read-
ing, as it undermines the significance of the narrator.
62
 The importance of Gontar-
ski’s position is encompassed in the fear of the black eye, which is unmasked via 
several pings; since the whiteness remains the only available matter in the cuboid, 
this eye signifies an instance of supervision unaffected by the principles of the prism. 
Similarly to “The Lost Ones,” “Ping” also constructs its own panopticon. Further-
more, in the earlier work, the narrator distances himself from the myth he tells via an 
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odd formula, “if this notion is maintained.”63 Consequently, the cylinder counterintu-
itively stages a contingent realm, as nothing can be said regarding it once and for all, 
and, at the same time, it remains immune to this narrative formula. The crucial ques-
tion which should be posed at this moment is: is, then, the reality of “Ping” also the 
radically contingent one? If yes, how does Beckett achieve its dissipating state in a 
manner different than that adopted in “The Lost Ones,” which he abandoned and 
considered unsuccessful? 
 As it has been mentioned, the first two words of “Ping” are “[a]ll known.” 
Previously, we have been assuming that this knowledge belongs to the dweller. As a 
result, the seemingly delusive nature of hups only consolidates the deadlock of mov-
ing within the already fixed cartography; however, if one admits that this knowledge 
belongs to the mediator of the story instead, then hups become equally disruptive as 
pings. If hups transport the being “elsewehere” which is “always there” and this fact 
is “not known,” then the recent position of the being is doubly concealed: firstly, 
owing to the lack of knowledge of its placement, and secondly – because the very 
placement is reduced to the elusive “there.” The all-embracing sight of the black eye 
is, therefore, exercised by the exhausted language that extenuates spaces. The re-
negotiated positions of beings “here,” “there,” and “elsewhere” evoke a situation in 
which the properties of the cuboid are challenged since the dweller becomes able to 
evade the centralising and determining logic of the white world. Such a recapitula-
tion is augmented by the realisation that the dweller’s white skin superimposed on 
the white cuboid contributes to the instability of corporeal boundaries; these, in turn, 
resist the centralising aspirations of the eye, as limits it delineates are never entirely 
fixed.  
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 In his study of Beckett’s bilingualism, Brian Fitch indicates that the English 
self-translation is also, in fact, a revision of all the pre-existing French versions.
64
 
With regard to this claim, the incompatibility of “Ping” and “Bing” is surprising. 
Apparently, in the English text “bing” and “hup” merge into the sole trope of “ping.” 
Furthermore, Beckett’s correction affects the ending of the short story, which reads 
as follows: “ping silence ping over.”65 At this stage, the protagonist’s body is nearly 
gone, as we are assured of him losing his hair and nails (commonly believed to per-
sist after one’s demise) while the references to the black eye reiterate. Actually, in 
the French version, the second ping is replaced with hup. Thereby, the reader notes 
that the last interruption of the order within the cuboid is followed by the displace-
ment. Curiously enough, bing remains a plosive, although voiced sound. In the 
Deleuzian reading of Beckett, voice always belongs to the second language and is 
incapable of transcending the domination of the more exhausted spaces and images 
of the third one. Thus, the French version might suggest that the end of the story fol-
lows the abandonment of space extenuated by hup and time dissipated by bing. In the 
English text, what is at stake is not only the singularity of ping, but also the fact that 
it is voiceless. Apparently, in an early draft the eponymous phenomenon has func-
tioned as “pfft,” in which all the consonants lack voicing.66 We might assume then 
that pings themselves are the paragons for the logic of exhaustion; voiceless and de-
prived of connection to language I and language II, pings stage the extracted and 
irruptive images with their excess of materiality. Importantly, even though pings re-
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place hups, the former tropes do not take place as the onomatopoeias of movement. 
We read:  
Ping of old only just perhaps a meaning a nature one second almost never 
blue and white in the wind that much memory henceforth never. White 
planes no trace shining white one only shining white infinite but that 
known not. Light heat all known all white heart breath no sound. Head 
haught eyes white fixed front old ping last murmur one second perhaps 
not alone eye unlustrous black and white half closed long lashes implor-
ing ping silence ping [hup] over.
67
  
It might be thus assumed that the final ping ends the tale that the short story deploys; 
it disperses its time, while the space depicted persists somewhere else, just as intima-
cy in “The Lost Ones.” “Ping” functions as a text that embraces the materiality of 
language until its presence is no longer needed and thus is replaced with the implied 
reference to the (im)material somewhere.  
Vulnerable Landscapes 
Variants of the same idea, “The Lost Ones” and “Ping” differ significantly 
even though each of them founds its own panoptical and geometrical hall. The rubber 
cylinder functions as the area in which everything can be measured and controlled 
due to the asymmetry of vision. What meshes with the narrator’s account is his own 
uncertainty, multiplying the places where he hesitates and distances himself, and 
causing his omniscient authority to shake. In his frail attempts, he is incapable of 
preserving the fixity of principles and behaviours inside the abode. “Ping” along with 
its cuboid also is a structure of supervision, as the motif of the imploring eye seems 
to suggest. Contrary to “The Lost Ones,” this short story is less interested in impos-
ing fixed boundaries and laws that can be easily measured on its reality, but rather it 
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strives for the vapourising limits of the body and the cuboid, which merge and intra-
act. Both texts are treatises on staging and probing the liminal existence from the safe 
distance, emphasising that such a position is at best artificial. What is at stake are the 
realms of trans-corporeal coexistence, in which the prefix “trans indicates movement 
across different sites,”68 to use Alaimo’s words. She adds: “[T]rans-corporeality also 
opens up a mobile space that acknowledges the often unpredictable and unwanted 
actions of human bodies, nonhuman creatures, ecological systems, chemical agents, 
and other actors.”69 In the case of Beckett’s stories, these actors embrace also the 
textual factors and instances which formulate and negate, transform and abandon 
particular notions in the pursuit of the liminal condition, which always carries a sur-
plus resisting stable representations. Numerously rewritten and rewriting “The Lost 
Ones” itself, “Ping” goes in this matter much further; as a more exhausted text, 
“Ping” refrains from renegotiating storytellers, their authorities, and positions in fa-
vour of the materialised language. Beckett reminds us in this short story that in order 
to stage the liminal condition, language must be driven into an equally uncanny and 
unstable state. 
Inaugurating such a turn alongside Serenella Iovino, Serpil Oppermann pro-
poses to begin to think of material instances as sites where stories and textual content 
are stored. Inspired by Alaimo’s trans-corporeality and Jane Bennett’s vibrant matter, 
she argues that “the eloquence of matter’s ongoing configurations are visible in the 
eruption of volcanoes, the rumbling vibrations of earthquakes, the contingencies of 
hurricanes and storms, the formation of metals, the perduring lithic compositions, the 
delicate patterns of spider webs, the intricate songs of whales, the coordinated dance 
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of bees, and in species encounters […]”70 Material ecocriticism, which both academ-
ics argue for, is a strategy of reconfiguring our strategies of reading since the active 
and transformative potential of embodied materialities involves the practices of in-
scribing and deciphering, bringing about the posthuman understanding of a text. Op-
permann clarifies:  
Material ecocriticism proposes that these stories, in the form of active 
creativity, emerge through the interplay of natural-cultural forces, trajec-
tories, and flows, forming constellations of matter and meanings. Ele-
ments, cells, genes, atoms, stones, water, landscapes, machines, among 
innumerable others, are embodied narratives, repositories of storied mat-
ter. Inhabiting not only the material, but also the discursive spaces 
spawned by human agency, these variously agentic material formations 
as narrative agencies create meaningful “choreographies of becoming.”71 
I would argue that Beckett read through the ecology of exhaustion pertains to the 
very same approach, yet realises it inversely. The exhaustion of the third language, 
profoundly embodied in the vulnerable space of “Ping,” divides its aesthetics into the 
series of intra-acting, temporary, and yet repeating images, whose transience eventu-
ally prevails. They do not necessarily represent the reality of the cuboid, but rather 
mimic the liminality and undecidability it instils, and, simultaneously, preserve the 
translucent and vanishing materiality inside of it. Beckett, therefore, invents such a 
storied matter, to use Iovino and Oppermann’s term, that does not stem from any 
actual material whatsoever, but rather follows the scheme of inscribing and decipher-
ing it. The play of different degrees of whiteness, the tensions between vanishing 
boundaries and merging bodies, the interconnectedness of the inhabitant and the cu-
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boid, finally the permutation of all these figures through which they come to being in 
the text of “Ping” trigger intra-active and metamorphing trajectories, which pierce 
through one another and form constellations of exhausted images and cartographies 
of provisory spaces. 
Presumably, the ecology of exhaustion is a project constantly struggling with 
an interpretative failure, as it relies on speculative aspirations and abstract imagery, 
and constantly wanders at the limits of language. Hence, it draws inspiration from 
Saunders’ seminal reading that marks the possibility to examine Beckett through the 
lens of weird ecocriticism. Presented in “The Lost Ones” and “Ping,” the spaces de-
ployed through exhaustion, are deeply related to human and nonhuman agencies that 
enter numerous transformative relations, exposing the descriptive insufficiency of the 
narrative modes. These, often perilous, connections allow us to think of both short 
stories as the instances of Beckett’s vulnerable spaces: as allegories affecting our 
perception of the Anthropocene or living in the end times. The critical project of such 
liminal environments confronts us with the practices of looking and storytelling, and 
emphasises the danger of the aforementioned narratives being the limited projections 
articulated from a safe position. At the same time, both short stories adapt to the 
world as if it were gone, yet in a fashion that entails the deterioration of our cogni-
tion. The affirmative project embraces Beckett’s exhaustion as a means allowing us 
to consider the perspectives residing on the limits of language itself. “Ping” (but to 
an extent also “The Lost Ones”) constructs the world of vulnerable ruins which lack 
fixed locations and exist without being pinpointed in any cartography whatsoever. 
These structures bring us to the verges of our modes of storytelling and expose us to 
the speculative modes beyond those. In doing so, they invent a peculiar sense of in-
timacy, otherwise unattainable to us, creating literary worlds that are implied by the 
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texts themselves yet exist outside of them. The vulnerable spaces of Beckett are in-
deed fragile and elusive, yet, in being such, they point to the radical sense of being 
together which, even though temporarily, brings us closer to the nonhuman within 
and beside us. 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Prismatic theatres are the sites of diffraction. Just as a light wave piercing 
through the prism bends, changes its own trajectories and colours, and becomes split, 
dispersed, and reconstructed, they engage in transgression of seemingly fixed bound-
aries, redistribution of limits, and production of difference. Rarely recalled directly in 
the course of this dissertation, their halls have been established both by particular 
works discussed and within a greater literary-material space Tadeusz Kantor and 
Samuel Beckett contribute to. Captured between the solidity of geometrical prisms 
and the fragility implied by the etymology they are rooted in, prismatic theatres stage 
the realms that are intensely material, even when this materiality might lack noticea-
ble physicality. This vulnerability or temporariness does not strip them of their sig-
nificance; perhaps our relation to the (nonhuman) world has never before encom-
passed such a plethora of material entanglements, connections, and agencies, which – 
either invisible or simply unnoticed – do not lose anything of their vividness. After 
all, the spatial and temporal configurations we inhabit consist of meticulous and 
miniscule interplays on material and corporeal levels. Matter is lively, matter is vi-
brant, matter is dynamic and performative; it possesses its own agency, just as non-
human, nonorganic, and nonanimated entities do. Matter is prismatic. 
This dissertation focused on re-reading Samuel Beckett’s and Tadeusz Kan-
tor’s selected works through the theoretical lens of new materialism. Their artistic 
projects were tackled in terms of their capacity both to manufacture powerful materi-
al imagery, deepening our relation to the human and the nonhuman, and to become 
conceptual machines, producing material and discursive relations themselves. Beck-
ett’s and Kantor’s shared affirmation of the feeble, weak, derelict, empty, and ruined 
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contributes to the broader economy and ecology of remnants; these logics challenge 
the anthropocentric subject by driving it to a dehumanised and liminal condition, and 
by opening its representations – quite literally, if we consider their trans-corporeal 
encounters – towards the nonhuman world it belongs to. Imitated family members, 
mechanised infantrymen, disfigured people roaming through their cylindrical abode, 
or an old man captivated by his recording device, to name a few examples recurring 
in this thesis, showed that every existence is in fact a coexistence with numerous, and 
often swarming, materialities with their vibrant agencies. Eventually, Beckett and 
Kantor facilitate our connection with the nonhumans around us, attuning us towards 
the transformative encounters we might have with these alien entities. 
Despite the historical inconsistencies with the theory of the Anthropocene, 
both authors in my new materialist readings happen to prove their correspondences 
to this epistemological rupture, anticipating some of its notable challenges. Beckett’s 
and Kantor’s explorations of memory, transience, liminal spaces, and archival tropes 
contribute to the position comparable with that the Anthropocene imposes on human 
beings. The rigid ecology and economy of remnants result in the images that enhance 
living in the end times and the nonhuman agencies this practice involves. By the 
same token, not only do Beckett’s and Kantor’s works provide anachronic represen-
tations for the Anthropocene, but also they engage in their own performativity, dis-
turbing the acts of inhabiting the liminal spaces and of belonging to the end times. In 
the new materialist readings, Beckett’s and Kantor’s works respond to the crisis of 
imagination the Anthropocene tends to articulate. 
With regard to the aforementioned premises, what was at stake in Prismatic 
Theatres might be understood as the project of weird intimacy that can be described 
both in temporal and in spatial terms, inspired among others by Karen Barad’s and 
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Timothy Morton’s discoveries. The modes of coexistence resurfacing in Beckett and 
Kantor exercise dualistic thinking and the fixed binary of subject and object, bringing 
us closer to the nonhuman modes of being and the fragility of the anthropos. At the 
same time, these two tensions take place in the immanent space where we encounter 
only the congruent textures of reality engaged in mutual unfolding, the process hint-
ed at in the unfinished work by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Moreover, what is suggest-
ed to be the temporal intimacy embraces these moments in Beckett’s and Kantor’s 
discussed works when the linear perception of time becomes challenged. According-
ly, Krapp’s Last Tape, Wielopole, Wielopole, and “Ping” show us directly how the 
anthropocentric notion of time either falls apart in favour of the multitude of coexist-
ing timelines that vary in intensity or is replaced with new temporal figures, render-
ing time as atomic and transformative, and interfacing it with the fluctuations of the 
unstable spaces. Such weird intimacy thereby depends on the dissolution of the pre-
dominant construct of time and the immersion in the human and nonhuman tempo-
ralities, which this anthropocentric view attempts to stifle. 
Just as diffraction – understood both as a physical phenomenon and as a new 
materialist method – relies on boundary-making practices and intricate transfor-
mations, the freedom of experimentation and affirmative co-dependence Barad’s 
process cherishes was also at play in Prismatic Theatres. My dissertation followed 
this premise in its openness to the readings that might seem counterintuitive or con-
flictual at terms, yet at the same time diffractively affect one another. As for Beckett, 
his indebtedness to metafiction and to self-reflexivity posits him as a writer against 
the writing itself, making him able to experiment with the literary forms in the mar-
gins of narration and language. Respectively, Kantor experiments with the means of 
performance and exercises unduly his individual position onstage, aiming to deper-
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sonalise or dehumanise the theatrical experience. In this light, my dissertation en-
deavoured to rethink reading practices and literary criticism by means of new materi-
alism and to form a theoretical and practical alliance between these. More specifical-
ly, this thesis allowed us to disconnect both Beckett and Kantor from the anthropo-
centric traditions of reading their works. Finally, it made it possible to collate them 
with the Anthropocene in an anachronic manner; even though this fact remains at 
odds with historical reasoning, such a contradiction did not block the transformative 
potentialities of the proposed perspective. 
Although its aspirations and scope have been delineated rather widely, Pris-
matic Theatres does not result in an all-embracing study nor claims the status of a 
complete project. New materialism might also open the artistic works that were not 
analysed in this dissertation, among which Beckett’s last works might be the most 
promising ones. Still, neither Beckett nor Kantor establishes a self-contained and 
disconnected artistic project, despite strong authorial signatures that often suggest so. 
Perhaps it is equally important to deconstruct their seemingly unique positions and 
analyse them within a greater constellation of authors and texts, who might also be 
read in reference to their indebtedness to matter and distrust in the subject / object 
binary. Hinted at in the introduction, the interpretation focusing on either feminist or 
gender applications of new materialism to Beckett’s and Kantor’s works delineates 
the problem not tackled in this thesis, which deserves utmost attention. Drawing in-
spirations from its feminist roots, new materialism plants an intuition that regardless 
of Beckett’s and Kantor’s rigid deconstructions of anthropocentrism, these authors 
might still remain within the limits of either a universalist or an androcentric posi-
tion. By the same token, their normative, and sometimes even exaggeratedly stereo-
typical representations of women ought to be investigated, so that their corporealities 
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and connections with the material practices might be collated with those ascribed to 
men in these oeuvres. 
Beckett’s and Kantor’s artistic projects are vibrant yet fleeing matter; they 
pose interpretative difficulties in their shared affirmation of failure and weakness, be 
it in Beckett’s irony or Kantor’s pathos. As I am convinced, this dissertation is to an 
extent intoxicated by these categories as well because of its relation to both authors. 
However, what I understand by the dependence on failure and weakness of this thesis 
by no means aims at suggesting that my project is inconclusive or inconsistent, 
thereby implying a mental trap that would immunise it to a criticism. Rather, what I 
endeavour to emphasise is the fact that this thesis struggled with constant falling into 
and renegotiating the positions it aimed to overcome, or traversing through the di-
chotomous realms of the abstract and the concrete, the linguistic and the material, the 
human and the nonhuman. Perhaps this is the cost of following Iris van der Tuin and 
Rick Dolphijn’s conviction of exhausting the dualisms, which oftentimes leaves us at 
their thresholds. Is it not the case of Beckett with his constant renegotiations of lan-
guage at the verge of language? Is it not the case of Kantor, who persistently con-
fronts private histories and anxieties with the idea of depersonalised theatrical expe-
rience? Perhaps the two alliances this dissertation thereby convoked, between Beck-
ett and Kantor and between literary criticism and new materialism, have to be tainted 
with failure and weakness, so that they do not blunt its critical tools too eagerly. Em-
phatically, failure and weakness are affirmative, creative, and transformative. The 
thought experiment of the Anthropocene proves this profoundly. After all, despite its 
emphasis on human civilisational failure and fundamental weakness as compared to 
the material forces of the world, we have never been so close to both humans and 
nonhumans whom we share this reality with. As it turns out, only in embracing fail-
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ure and weakness as the constituents of any encounter can our anthropocentric posi-
tion be challenged, exposing this world to its Other we have so eagerly repressed and 
resulting in the promising alliances to come.  
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SUMMARY 
 
Prismatic Theatres. Towards the New Materialist Readings of Samuel Beckett 
and Tadeusz Kantor explores how new materialism might be redefined within 
posthumanist literary studies, so that Samuel Beckett and Tadeusz Kantor might be 
read as theoreticians of the poetics and performativity of the matter. Despite bio-
graphical and artistic similarities, both authors are rarely discussed together. Still, 
they seem to share the economy and ecology of remnants, which expose the mutilat-
ed protagonists of both authors to the uncanny life of objects, things, and matter. 
Moreover, Beckett’s and Kantor’s focus on the vibrant agencies of nonhuman enti-
ties, their distrust in narratives, their disapproval of dualistic thinking, and their af-
firmation of transgressive corporealities make them partners in the theoretical de-
bates anchored in new materialism. Finally, Beckett’s and Kantor’s works not only 
provide powerful material imagery, expanding our perception of human and nonhu-
man worlds, but also function as “machines” that produce material and discursive 
relations, which temporarily suspend the representation-oriented paradigm and an-
thropocentric positions. Therefore, their works may be argued to found prismatic 
theatres that are equally material (the solidity of prisms) and fragile (the etymology 
of prizein); just as prisms that contain bending light waves, these works become the 
sites of dynamic boundary making practices, which Karen Barad understands as dif-
fraction. 
The dissertation consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 maps contemporary onto-
logical and onto-epistemological tendencies in humanities and outlines the theoreti-
cal position of this thesis. It discusses selected concepts of Karen Barad, Jane Ben-
nett, Timothy Morton, Donna Haraway, and Serenella Iovino and Serpil Oppermann, 
232 
 
 
 
 
and contextualises them within the Anthropocene. Moreover, the correspondences 
between new materialism, object-oriented ontology, and literary criticism are dis-
cussed and confronted with Jacques Derrida’s “envois” and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty’s The Visible and the Invisible. 
The following chapter reconstructs Kantor’s readings of history and discusses 
his innovative contribution to traumatic and non-individual (or nonhuman) modes of 
memory in Wielopole, Wielopole, I Shall Never Return, and Let the Artists Die. Fol-
lowing Gilles Deleuze and Barad, this chapter shows how Kantor’s indebtedness to 
the medium of photography – which by design relies on diffraction – stages affective 
and fictional memories which feel more real than the most detailed historical narra-
tives. Eventually, Barad’s notion of diffraction is explored more thoroughly in the 
context of the multiple positions Kantor occupies in the theatre of death. 
Following the intimate and personal memories discussed earlier, Chapter 3 
problematises the (un)homely spaces in Beckett and Kantor, that is, the intensely 
material realms which in fact are the figures of lack. Inspired by the epistemological 
rupture of the Anthropocene, this chapter discusses the uncanny sense of inhabiting 
the world after the fall of oikos, focusing on such tropes as the archive, dust, and 
rags. Read through Donna Haraway and Jolanta Brach-Czaina, dust and rags become 
chthonic tropes of coexistence and sympoiesis in The Unnamable, Endgame, Wielo-
pole, Wielpole, and The Dead Class. Thus, what the chapter testifies to is the trans-
formative dynamics of nonhumans which co-inhabit the aforementioned liminal 
spaces. 
The next chapter delves deeper into the significance of nonhuman agencies in 
Beckett and Kantor. As it assumes, mannequins and insects deserve utmost attention 
in the artistic projects of both authors since they correspond in their convoluted rela-
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tion to the empty notion of death, deprived of linear dying. Indebted to the ideas of 
Rosi Braidotti and Giorgio Agamben, such a figure makes it possible to redefine life 
as an equally empty process of vibrant becoming. Furthermore, this chapter sheds 
light on the representations of the swarm in Beckett and Kantor, and endorses Beck-
ett’s relation to modern technologies, whose noise constructs a metonymy with buzz-
ing insects. 
The final chapter returns to the connections between the Anthropocene and 
Beckett’s works. It proposes to read “The Lost Ones” and “Ping” as the ecologies 
after the end of the world itself. These two short stories are investigated within a crit-
ical project that deconstructs the speculation of living in the end times by means of 
challenging the particular modes of language and visual perception. More important-
ly, this chapter also attempts to build Beckett’s “post-apocalyptic” realms from the 
materiality of language, whose grammatical, logical, and semantical rules are nearly 
equally ruined as the world it endeavours to depict. Persistently anticipating the cog-
nitive crisis of the Anthropocene and renegotiating the limits of subject / object or 
human / nonhuman positions, Kantor and Beckett expand our corporeal and material-
ist imagery and exercise the performativity of the conceptual machines inscribed on 
their works.  
 
 
  
STRESZCZENIE 
 
Praca Teatry pryzmatyczne. Ku nowomaterialistycznym odczytaniom Samuela 
Becketta i Tadeusza Kantora podejmuje próbę zbadania, w jaki sposób nowy mate-
rializm może być przedefiniowany w ramach posthumanistycznej refleksji literaturo-
znawczej, tak, aby Samuel Beckett i Tadeusz Kantor mogli zostać odczytani jako 
teoretycy poetyki i performatyki materii. Obaj autorzy są zestawiani ze sobą niezwy-
kle rzadko pomimo biograficznych i artystycznych zbieżności. Warto podkreślić, że 
współdzielą oni swoistą świadomość ekonomii i ekologii resztek, które odsłaniają 
przed ich okaleczonymi bohaterami niesamowite życie przedmiotów oraz materii. Co 
więcej, sposoby, w jakie Beckett i Kantor ujmują niezwykle żywe, sprawcze pod-
mioty nieludzi oraz wyrażają nieufność wobec narracji i języka, kwestionują myśle-
nie za pomocą dualizmów czy afirmują transgresywne cielesności, czynią z nich 
obiecujących partnerów w dyskusjach teoretycznych, zakorzenionych właśnie w no-
wym materializmie. Ich dzieła wyrastają z wyobraźni obfitej w intensywne, mate-
rialne obrazy, poszerzające nasze postrzeganie ludzkich i nieludzkich światów. Prace 
te funkcjonują również jako „maszyny”, tworzące materialne i dyskursywne relacje, 
które tymczasowo zawieszają paradygmaty reprezentacji i pozycje antropocentrycz-
ne. Dzieła Becketta i Kantora stają się zatem teatrami pryzmatycznymi, bytami zara-
zem materialnymi (ufundowanymi na trwałości brył [prisms]) i niezwykle kruchymi 
(o czym świadczy etymologia prizein, zakorzeniona w „cięciu”). Niczym pryzmaty, 
w których załamują się fale światła, stają się one przestrzeniami praktyk wznoszenia 
i przekraczania granic, a zatem dynamiki, którą Karen Barad nazywa dyfrakcją. 
Niniejsza praca składa się z pięciu rozdziałów. Pierwszy z nich przedstawia 
tendencje ontologiczne i onto-epistemologiczne we współczesnej humanistyce i na-
235 
 
 
 
 
kreśla teoretyczną ramę tej dysertacji. Omówione w nim zostają wybrane koncepcje 
Karen Barad, Jane Bennett, Timothy’ego Mortona, Donny Haraway czy Serenelli 
Iovino i Serpil Oppermann, które następnie zostają wzbogacone o szerszy kontekst 
antropocenu. W toku dyskusji, którą ten rozdział proponuje, zbadane również zostają 
powiązania między nowym materializmem, ontologią zwróconą ku przedmiotom 
oraz literaturoznawstwem, poddane następnie konfrontacji z envois Jacques’a Derri-
dy oraz Widzialnym i niewidzialnym Maurice’a Merleau-Ponty’ego. 
W kolejnym rozdziale zrekonstruowana zostaje Kantorowska wizja historii w 
kontekście jego nowatorskiego rozumienia traumatycznej i nie-indywidualnej (a na-
wet nieludzkiej) pamięci, przedstawionej w Wielopolu, Wielopolu, Nigdy tu już nie 
powrócę i Niech sczezną artyści. Posiłkując się ustaleniami Gilles’a Deleuze’a oraz 
Karen Barad, w niniejszym rozdziale staram się pokazać, w jakim stopniu medium 
fotografii, oparte na zjawisku dyfrakcji, pozwala Kantorowi tworzyć afektywne i 
fikcyjne wspomnienia, które okazują się bardziej realne niż nawet najbardziej szcze-
gółowe opisy historyczne. Jak się okazuje, dyfrakcja w ujęciu Barad pozwala rów-
nież przyjrzeć się bliżej różnorakim rolom, jakie pełni (lub odgrywa) Kantor w tea-
trze śmierci i ich wzajemnym przecięciom. 
Rozdział trzeci kontynuuje tropy osobistych i intymnych wspomnień i w ich 
perspektywie problematyzuje domowe i (nie)samowite [(un)heimlich] przestrzenie u 
Becketta i Kantora, to znaczy miejsca, które zarazem uderzają nas swoją materialno-
ścią i funkcjonują jako figury braku. Epistemologiczne pękniecie, które spowodował 
antropocen, pozwala na przemyślenie niesamowitego sposobu zamieszkiwania świa-
ta po kresie oikos za pomocą tropów archiwum, kurzu oraz szmat. Podążając za 
Donną Haraway i Jolantą Brach-Czainą, rozdział ten przedstawia kurz i szmaty jako 
chtoniczne i sympoietyczne tropy koegzystencji obecne w Nienazywalnym, Końców-
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ce, Wielopolu, Wielopolu i Umarłej klasie. W ten sposób pokazuję tym samym me-
tamorficzną dynamikę nieludzi, współzamieszkujących z nami wcześniej wspomnia-
ne przestrzenie graniczne. 
Kolejny rozdział jeszcze większą wagę przywiązuje do nieludzkich podmio-
tów sprawczych u Becketta i Kantora. Jak się okazuje, manekiny i owady w obu pro-
jektach stają się figurami wartymi zbadania ze względu na współdzieloną przez nie 
relację do pustego konceptu śmierci, pozbawionego perspektywy umierania. Ta figu-
ra, inspirowana pracami Rosi Braidotti i Giorgia Agambena, pozwala przedefiniować 
życie jako symetrycznie pusty proces intensywnego stawania się. Co więcej, rozdział 
ten rzuca nowe światło na reprezentacje roju u Becketta i Kantora oraz nakreśla rela-
cję Becketta do nowoczesnych technologii, bazując na metonimii ich szumu i bzy-
czenia insektów. 
Ostatni z rozdziałów powraca do powiązań między antropocenem a dziełami 
Becketta. Przedstawione w nim zostają propozycje interpretacji Wyludniacza i Dzyń 
jako projektów ekologicznych po końcu świata. W ramach krytycznej lektury niniej-
szy rozdział dekonstruuje namysł nad życiem w czasach końca ze względu na jego 
uwikłanie w język i postrzeganie wzrokowe. W tym rozdziale podjęta zostaje rów-
nież kwestia możliwości budowania Beckettowskich „post-apokaliptycznych” świa-
tów na materialności języka, którego gramatyka, semantyka i logika pozostają w 
równie zrujnowanym stanie jak świat, który starają się opisać. Stale wyprzedzając 
poznawczy kryzys, jaki niesie ze sobą epoka antropocenu i przesuwając granice 
podmiotu i przedmiotu, ludzkiego i nieludzkiego, Beckett i Kantor poszerzają nasze 
imaginarium ciała i materii oraz uwydatniają performatykę konceptualnych maszyn 
zakodowanych w ich dziełach. 
 
